Section 6

Natural Gas Security

Image: iStock

Compared to electricity, natural gas is a marginal energy carrier in the Nordics. It retains energy security significance at sub-regional level despite declining use and a far smaller role than in the rest of the EU (see Figure 6.1). Of the Nordic countries, Denmark is the most gas-dependent. Natural gas accounts for around 12 per cent of Danish final energy consumption, down from around 20 per cent ten years ago, and still plays a significant role in heating and industry during the ongoing phase-out.

In Finland, gas retains importance in some industrial processes even as its overall role has declined. Finland ended its Russian pipeline gas imports in 2022 and now depends on LNG imports, primarily through its shared terminal with Estonia, to supply its industrial users, mainly the petrochemical cluster around Porvoo.

In Sweden, gas plays a minor role in a few industries and in the district heating networks of individual cities. Norway produces gas at vast scale for export but uses little domestically. The Island Energy Systems do not consume meaningful volumes of gas. The energy security implication across the region is therefore asymmetric: Denmark carries the most material domestic gas dependency and faces the clearest transition management challenge.

Figure 6.1: Natural gas share of total final consumption, (%), year = 2024

Source: Eurostat

Notes: Iceland, Faroe Islands, Greenland and Åland do not consume natural gas

Unlike in the case of oil, neither the EU nor the International Energy Agency (IEA) mandates emergency stocks for natural gas. The IEA member countries have explored the possibility of establishing a gas stockholding system similar to oil, but as of May 2026 no such arrangements have been officially confirmed. In the Nordics, Denmark is the only country with underground gas storage capacity. Finland and Sweden built several LNG terminals during the 2010s, enabling supplies of natural gas by sea route (for details on LNG capacity, see Annex 1). Finland ended its imports of Russian pipeline gas in 2022 and is currently fully served by a floating LNG tanker off the coast of Inkoo. The tanker has reportedly been operated at a significant financial loss throughout, which is itself a security indicator: maintaining the route is more important than its commercial viability.

The shift from pipeline gas to LNG changes the risk profile, not only the supply route. LNG is procured to a much greater extent on the global spot market rather than through long-term pipeline contracts, which means Nordic LNG buyers are exposed to price and availability shocks anywhere in the global system. The physical exposure profile is also different. Pipeline gas from Norway arrives through a fixed and largely below-surface system; LNG arrives through a small number of high-value, externally visible terminals and floating storage and regasification units served by long maritime shipping lanes. The Balticconnector incident of October 2023, discussed in Section 4.1, is a reminder that these facilities and their supporting subsea infrastructure are within the same hybrid threat envelope as the subsea electricity interconnectors. The resilience that LNG provides against pipeline dependence on a single supplier is real, but it comes with a market-exposure profile and a hybrid-threat profile distinct from those of pipeline gas.

Overall, natural gas does not represent a systematically important supply risk to the Nordics, but sub-regionally the risks retain importance during the ongoing phase-out.

6.1 Gas security cooperation

Two layers govern Nordic gas security cooperation. The EU Gas Storage Regulation (6.1.1) sets the storage compliance baseline for the three Nordic EU members but binds none of the producer or non-EU Nordic countries. The Nordic and bilateral emergency-arrangements layer (6.1.2) is where the structural gap is sharpest: Norway, Europe’s largest pipeline gas supplier, sits outside the EU solidarity mechanism that governs its main customers, and there is no dedicated Nordic gas TSO coordination forum. The cooperation gap in gas is therefore not a gap in the rules that govern consumers but a gap in the framework that connects the producer to its Nordic consumer neighbours.

6.1.1 EU Gas Storage Regulation

The EU Gas Storage Regulation, adopted in 2022 and subsequently extended, requires EU member states with storage capacity to fill gas storage to 90 per cent of capacity by 1 November ahead of each heating season. For the Nordic region, the binding compliance footprint is narrow. Denmark's Stenlille and Lille Torup underground storage sites together provide approximately 1 billion cubic metres of capacity. Finland's storage capacity is primarily limited to commercial volumes connected to the Inkoo floating LNG terminal. Sweden has no significant gas storage.

The structural asymmetry the Regulation exposes matters more than Nordic compliance with it. Norway is closely integrated with the EU internal gas market in most respects: through the EEA Agreement it has incorporated the EU's Third Energy Package on gas, including Directive 2009/73/EC and Regulation 715/2009, and its transmission system operator Gassco participates in ENTSOG as an Observer Member, contributing to the Ten-Year Network Development Plan and to Union-wide gas-supply disruption simulations.

EU security-of-supply legislation, however, is a separate matter. The 2017 Gas Security of Supply Regulation and the 2022 Gas Storage Regulation are not part of the EEA acquis; the solidarity mechanism under Regulation 2017/1938 applies between EU member states only. Norway has no bilateral solidarity agreement with any EU member state under that mechanism. The country most capable of influencing European gas supply security therefore sits inside the EU internal gas market for routine purposes but outside the binding security-of-supply framework, including the storage Regulation.

6.1.2 Bilateral and Nordic gas emergency arrangements

There is no dedicated Nordic gas security cooperation framework. Gas security is handled nationally and through the EU Gas Security of Supply (SOS) Regulation, which requires EU member states to maintain national emergency plans and protect 'protected customers' that include households, hospitals and other social services for at least 30 days during supply disruptions. Sweden has entered a solidarity agreement with Denmark under the SOS Regulation, but Norwegian production sits outside this regional risk-group architecture entirely.

Gas TSO cooperation exists but runs along bilateral and sub-regional lines rather than a Nordic one. Gasgrid Finland's primary structured relationships are with the Baltic gas TSOs (Elering, Conexus Baltic Grid and Amber Grid) through the Finnish–Baltic regional market integration process rather than with Nordic neighbours. Energinet in Denmark and Nordion Energi in Sweden maintain bilateral operational agreements with each other and with the German TSO Gasunie Deutschland, reflecting Denmark's role as the transit point between Norwegian production and Continental European demand. No pan-Nordic gas TSO coordination forum exists, and Norway's Gassco, operator of the export pipeline system that underpins European gas supply, participates in ENTSOG only as an observer, sitting outside the EU regulatory frameworks that govern its main customers.

The Norway–EU bilateral gas partnership concluded in 2022 covers long-term supply commitments and LNG infrastructure cooperation and is the single most significant formal arrangement addressing Norwegian gas security contributions. It is bilateral and EU-level, not Nordic-level. The structure of the arrangement reflects a structural gap: the region's largest producer and its main gas-consuming neighbours have no dedicated regional framework for gas emergency coordination.