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Denmark

Denmark is the Nordic country that has moved furthest in two opposite directions at the same time. Its electricity system, 20 years ago dominated by coal, is now run primarily on wind, and Denmark sits at the operational crossroads of the Nordic and continental European grids, running large flows in both directions and acting as the principal transit corridor between the two systems. On the fuel side, Denmark has moved from full self-sufficiency two decades ago to roughly 40 per cent net import dependence today as the North Sea fields have depleted. The Tyra redevelopment has restored a share of domestic gas output, but the longer trend is clear: Denmark is becoming a net recipient in a regional architecture in which it used to be a supplier.
The forward direction of the Danish system is also visible from offshore. Denmark holds a structurally important position in the European offshore wind buildout, with the Bornholm Energy Island as the major project in the pipeline, scheduled for commissioning from the early 2030s and routing flows between Denmark and Germany through a 3 GW hybrid offshore hub. Bornholm itself currently runs on a single subsea cable from southern Sweden, with local backup generation in Rønne. The island therefore shifts over the coming decade from a small dependent system to a critical link in a much larger cross-border architecture, and the converter platform becomes a single point of failure for a substantial cross-border flow.

Key challenges

The Bornholm pivot. The cable that has failed in 2004, 2010, 2013, and again in January 2026 will, over the coming decade, become the landing point for a hybrid offshore hub of European significance. Bornholm therefore shifts from being a local resilience question to a regional one, and the security profile of the converter platform and the cables that connect to it has consequences well beyond the Danish system.
The transition from supplier to recipient. Denmark is now a net importer of oil and a smaller producer of gas than it was at the peak. The heating and industrial base remains partly gas-dependent during the transition period. The change does not in itself create a near-term energy security crisis, but it does mean that Denmark’s position in regional fuel security conversations is no longer that of a producer whose questions are mainly about exports, but of a consumer whose questions are about supply continuity.
Cluster exposure in the offshore buildout. Every new offshore wind project adds inter-array cables, an offshore substation, and an export cable to the Baltic stock of high-value subsea assets. Denmark is the largest single contributor to that stock through Bornholm Energy Island, Kriegers Flak, and the projects in development behind them. The cumulative exposure rises faster than any single asset’s.

Recommendations

Recommendation 1. Treat Bornholm Energy Island as a national security-of-supply project from the design phase. Lock in redundant cable routing, security-by-design standards for the converter platform, and a cross-border incident response protocol with Germany before commissioning, with the Rønne backup generation retained as the standing fallback whenever the cable system is unavailable.
Recommendation 2. Develop a Danish gas transition strategy to 2040 setting out how the residual gas role in winter heating, industrial users, and peak power is to be supplied, with explicit emergency-sharing provisions with Norway and Germany.
Key figures (2024):
 
 
2004-24
Population
Millions
6.0
+11%
Gross domestic product (GDP)
Billion EUR
311
+32%
Total final consumption (TFC)
PJ
540
-14%
Electricity generation
TWh
35.3
-13%
Electricity net trade (imports/exports)
TWh
3.7 (25.2/21.4)
..
Final consumption intensity
Index (2004 = 100)
78
-21%
Oil intensity
Index (2004 = 100)
58
-42%
Overall import dependency
%
40%
0% (2004)
Figure 1: Energy system exposure, 2024
Figure 2: Electricity generation output (TWh), 2004-24
Figure 3: Electricity generation capacity (GW), 2004-24
Figure 4: Total final consumption of energy (PJ), 2004-24
Figure 5: Industrial concentration (measured by energy consumption), 2024