It is important to note that this dependence on imported feed ingredients is already recognised as a strategic vulnerability. For example, the Norwegian government has launched a dedicated mission on sustainable feed, with a national objective to increase the share of domestically sourced feed ingredients to 25 percent by 2034 (Research Council of Norway, 2025). Current national strategies, therefore, seek to strengthen domestic and regional production of key feed inputs
Factors that strengthen Nordic preparedness
The Nordic region’s aquatic food system has some strengths that enhance crisis preparedness. First, overall production volumes are high, with substantial outputs from both capture fisheries and aquaculture. This scale provides a broad raw-material base that can be redirected if market conditions change, and it reduces the risk that short-term fluctuations in any single segment will compromise regional supply.
Second, several Nordic countries are net surplus producers of aquatic foods for human consumption. This surplus, particularly in Norway, Iceland, the Faroe Islands, and Greenland, creates a buffer that can be directed towards domestic and intra-Nordic needs if external markets or transport routes come under pressure. In practical terms, it means that a significant share of Nordic production could be retained within the region without reducing domestic availability.
Third, the region’s large production volumes make it reliant on global systems along the value chain from inputs through processing to trade. While this creates certain vulnerabilities, a broad international market presence can buffer a partial crisis by allowing trade to be shifted to alternative destinations if parts of the market close.
Fourth, aquaculture biomass serves as a short-term reserve. While biological and welfare limits prevent rapid, indefinite scaling, standing biomass in salmon and other farmed species offers some flexibility in harvest timing. This can smooth short-term supply shocks, support predictable deliveries to processors and retailers, and mitigate volatility when wild capture landings are seasonally low or logistically delayed, or if wild fish chains come under pressure.
Fifth, strong intra-Nordic trade flows underpin regional resilience. Established logistics‑, processing relationships, and wholesale networks allow raw materials and finished products to move efficiently between countries, helping to balance mismatches between where fish is produced, vacant processing facilities, and where consumers are located. In Norway, national freezing and storage capacity is sufficient to smooth out seasonal fluctuations, and domestic transport capacity is considered adequate to redirect seafood from export to domestic consumption (Grünfeld et al., 2023).
Sixed, long-term resilience may also be strengthened through national strategies aimed at reducing dependency on external inputs. Examples include Norway’s goal of increasing the share of domestically sourced feed ingredients to 25% by 2034, and Sweden’s proposal to expand domestic aquatic production by 60% by 2035 through targeted investments and better use of pelagic resources.
Finally, technological developments and a more efficient use of existing raw materials offer additional scope to increase supply. Improved processing of side streams and species that are currently used mainly for reduction, such as small Baltic herring, could broaden the range of products available for human consumption. In a severe crisis, diverting some pelagic fish from reduction to food use could raise edible supply, but would simultaneously constrain salmon feed availability.
Factors that constrain Nordic preparedness
Globalisation in the Nordic aquatic food system
The Nordic region’s large production volumes imply that the system is closely tied to global processing chains and markets. There is a high degree of globalization along the value chain, from primary production through secondary processing to trade. Nordic vessels frequently land catches in foreign ports, foreign vessels land at Nordic ports, and much of the processing takes place outside the region. Moreover, seafood is the food category with the highest global trade share (Anderson et al., 2018), making the sector particularly exposed should access to external markets be disrupted (Jennings et al, 2016; Ababouch et al., 2023). If producers were unable to sell their products externally or were forced to sell large volumes domestically or within the Nordic region at significantly reduced prices, production would not be maintained at current levels. In such situations, many actors would reduce activity or cease fishing, farming, processing, and trading altogether. While the scope of the project does not allow quantification of these effects, the dependence on export markets must be acknowledged as a key factor influencing Nordic crisis preparedness (Straume et al., 2024; Asche et al., 2022; Guillen et al., 2018).
The primary sector of the Nordic seafood industry is closely integrated into global value chains, both through operations in distant waters and a substantial dependence on international inputs. Nordic fishing vessels operate to a large extent outside their own economic zones; for example, 19% of the Norwegian catch in 2023 was taken in international waters (such as Antarctica and the Irminger Sea), while 11% was harvested in British and European zones. These dependencies may increase the primary sector's vulnerability during crises.
Similarly, Greenlandic vessels catch all their mackerel and half of their herring in international waters, in addition to catching cod, haddock, and saithe in the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea. Icelandic vessels caught 400,000 tonnes of pelagic fish in international waters in 2023, Faroese freezer trawlers operate as far away as the NAFO area east of Canada, while a substantial share of Danish catches appears from British waters. In Norway, frozen whole fish, particularly cod and saithe, originating from Russian vessels, are used as input in the Norwegian processing industry. Within aquaculture, reliance on imported feed ingredients is one of the largest systemic vulnerabilities to Nordic food preparedness. As much as 92% of the raw materials used in Norwegian salmon feed are currently imported, with plant-based proteins and oils largely sourced from countries outside the Nordic region, mostly from Europe but also from overseas markets such as Brazil, the United States, and Canada.
Although Finland has some domestic production of marine ingredients, the Finnish aquaculture industry nevertheless relies on importing half of its finished fish feed (mainly from Denmark) and sources critical additives such as vitamins and amino acids from Asian markets. This extensive integration means that the Nordic region’s ability to be self-sufficient in aquatic food production ultimately depends on the stability of global supply chains. The production stage of the Nordic food system is characterised by extensive globalisation that goes far beyond commodity trade. This is evident in complex cross‑border ownership structures and the strategic relocation of processing activities to markets outside the Nordic region.
The Danish processing and wholesale sector illustrates this dynamic. While many companies are Danish, a significant share of activities is owned by Norwegian and Greenlandic parent companies. Similarly, Norwegian companies today hold majority ownership in three of the four largest aquaculture firms in Iceland.
Greenlandic giants such as Royal Greenland and Polar Seafood operate not only domestically but also run processing facilities in several other countries, such as Denmark, Canada, and Germany. Moreover, a substantial share of value addition of Greenlandic products, largely halibut and shrimp happen after sale outside the Nordic region, such as in China
A large share of Nordic seafood is exported as whole, unprocessed fish for value-adding processing in lower-cost countries or hub markets (Kuempel et al., 2024; Asche et al., 2022; Straume et al., 2024). In Norway’s case, large volumes of whole unprocessed fish are sent to European processing hubs such as Poland and the Netherlands, while notable volumes are also routed to Asian facilities, particularly in China, for secondary processing before entering consumer markets.
The production inputs of the aquaculture sector are also highly globalised. Feed producers located in Denmark, such as BioMar and Aller Aqua, operate global production networks, while the Norwegian feed industry is dominated by international firms, with only one of the five largest (Polarfeed) under Norwegian ownership.
Seafood is the most highly traded food category in the world. In the Nordic region, more than 80% of total production from countries such as Norway and Iceland is exported to markets outside the region, with the majority going to the European market. At the same time, a not-insignificant part is destined for overseas markets; Norway, for instance, exports roughly one-third of its output.
For the largest producer nations, markets outside Europe are important. For Greenland, China is a very large market, primarily for shrimp and Greenland halibut. Similarly, China is the most important overseas processing market for Norwegian fish, such as mackerel and cod. This market concentration creates economic vulnerability. If access to the Chinese market were restricted, it would lead to significant price drops and require large-scale redirection of Nordic seafood products to alternative markets.
Denmark is a significant importer of raw materials for its own processing industry; the majority of raw materials for human consumption originate from Nordic countries, but the reduction industry depends heavily on overseas markets.
This dependence illustrates how political instability or sanctions affecting countries outside the Nordic region can directly impact industrial capacity and product flows within the region.
This means the Nordic production system is highly exposed to global demand and logistics fluctuations. This extensive globalisation means that Nordic food preparedness is inseparably linked to geopolitics and factors beyond regional control. Although the Nordic region theoretically has a substantial surplus of fish, the commercial system and industrial capacity are structured to serve global markets rather than regional self-sufficiencyIn a crisis, preparedness would be challenged by four critical factors:
1) Loss of decision-making control and capacity: The globalisation of ownership and the relocation of processing activities create a risk that decisions in a crisis may be guided by the interests of multinational corporations rather than national needs. If global processing hubs were to become unavailable, the Nordic region would lack sufficient local capacity to process its own raw materials.
2) Economic and market shocks: Because the system relies heavily on overseas demand, the loss of major markets could lead to sharp price declines and require a large‑scale and logistically demanding redirection of seafood to alternative destinations. Political instability or sanctions affecting key trading partners may also reduce industrial capacity. While broad market access can offer flexibility in some types of disruptions, it increases exposure in others.
3) Loss of key inputs and logistics: Disruptions in international supply chains for feed, or breakdowns in transportation routes and ports, would quickly reduce the actual availability of aquatic food.
4) Lack of diversification: Limited diversification in species, inputs, processing routes, or market destinations increases vulnerability. Producers and processors that rely heavily on a single species, a single input source, or a single export market face higher exposure in a crisis, whereas more diversified operations, biologically, geographically, or commercially, are more resilient.
Overall, this means that actual Nordic supply security depends on the stability of global capital flows and trade relations, underscoring the need to integrate geopolitical risks into regional preparedness planning.
This report identifies these four systemic vulnerabilities, acknowledging that some underlying characteristics may be advantageous in certain types of disruptions but can also constrain crisis-time flexibility. Biological and regulatory constraints add further limitations. Other dimensions, including fuel availability, storage capacity, and logistics, are also important for food system resilience, but fall outside the scope of the country analyses and are therefore noted only with reference to external assessments.
Biological and regulatory vulnerabilities
Biological constraints represent a fundamental vulnerability for Nordic crisis preparedness. Several key stocks across the region show reduced spawning biomass, fishing pressure above MSY, or uncertain biological reference points. This includes multiple cod stocks, Norwegian spring-spawning herring, and a range of demersal and invertebrate stocks in Icelandic and Faroese waters. Such stock conditions limit the system’s crisis flexibility: in a disruption, production cannot be increased beyond sustainable levels, regardless of demand or geopolitical need.
Regulatory and governance challenges further compound these biological limitations. Several major pelagic stocks, most notably mackerel, blue whiting, and Norwegian spring-spawning herring, lack comprehensive and stable coastal state agreements (Baudron et al., 2020; Schuch et al., 2021). Prolonged disputes over quota shares have led to catches above scientific advice, reducing long-term stock resilience and creating uncertainty about future access and quota levels. This instability affects both primary producers and processors, who rely on predictable, coordinated management regimes to plan their activities and maintain market access.
Vulnerabilities also arise from shared stocks managed jointly with Russia, particularly in the Barents Sea. While the Norway–Russia fisheries cooperation has traditionally been stable and scientifically based (Hammer, 2025; Durant et al., 2021), recent geopolitical developments have increased uncertainty. Continued access to joint stocks, quota exchanges, research cooperation, and operational coordination in shared waters cannot be taken for granted under all political conditions. Given the importance of Barents Sea cod and other jointly managed species for Nordic supply, any weakening of this bilateral management framework would have direct consequences for harvested volumes and regional availability.
Finally, the ability to build biological “buffers” is limited. Stock rebuilding and ecosystem-based management must take place in peacetime (Mildenberger et al., 2021; Scotti et al., 2022; Perryman et al., 2025); once a crisis occurs, it is too late to generate additional supply. Strengthening the status of key stocks and resolving unresolved quota sharing disputes therefore form part of the long-term foundation for Nordic food preparedness.
Other vulnerabilities
Although factors such as access to fuel, storage capacity, infrastructure robustness, and seasonal constraints are not addressed in the country chapters, they are recognised as critical components of food system resilience. Recent EU analyses reinforce this broader perspective. The Joint Research Centre (JRC) External Study Report on Risks and Vulnerabilities in the EU Food Supply Chain (2023) highlights several structural vulnerability factors that directly relate to these dimensions, including dependence on upstream supply chains, limited technological alternatives, weak logistical infrastructure, and constraints in natural resources such as land and water. These structural conditions can amplify the effects of disruptions in energy availability, storage, and transport systems.
Similarly, the European Food Security Crisis Preparedness and Response Mechanism (EFSCM) Recommendations on Ways to Mitigate Risks and Vulnerabilities (2024) explicitly emphasise the need for resilient infrastructure, diversified supply sources, reliable transport systems, and improved crisis preparedness. The EFSCM identifies climate-smart infrastructure, robust storage facilities, improved logistics networks, and better coordination mechanisms as essential measures to reduce systemic vulnerability across the food supply chain.
Together, these reports underscore that fuel availability, infrastructure performance, storage capacity, and seasonality are not peripheral concerns but rather foundational elements that shape the extent to which food systems can adapt to different types of crises.
Scenario Analysis: Assessing Nordic Self-Sufficiency and Resilience
Building on the identification of structural strengths and vulnerabilities, this section presents the Nordic region's capacity to handle trade disruptions through two hypothetical scenarios. These scenarios allow an assessment of how the systemic factors described above, such as regional production asymmetry and reliance on external inputs, affect actual food availability when normal trade flows are restricted.