Addressing unaffordable insurance
Affordability stands out as a primary challenge in advancing coverage. The lack of financial resources to cover insurance premiums hinders individuals and communities from accessing crucial coverage. As a result, despite recognizing the importance of insurance, many climate-vulnerable populations struggle to afford the premiums, underscoring the need for innovative solutions and support mechanisms.
The barriers to insurance uptake in countries eligible for risk pool participation have been studied, revealing a significant obstacle – the lack of capital to cover insurance premiums. The notion of ’affordability’ in this context isn't a strictly measurable concept; instead, it reflects the financial constraints and complex political priorities facing many climate-vulnerable economies, as pointed out by some authors.
External support has played a substantial role in increasing demand for insurance, boosting insurance uptake rates, and enhancing membership in risk pools. However, it is important to acknowledge the potential downsides of premium subsidies, including the emergence of moral hazard – where subsidized policies could encourage riskier behaviors – and behavioral shifts that might lead to less cautious practices. Additionally, there is a risk that these subsidies might create a dependency on external financial support for the insurance scheme, as highlighted by vivideconomics in 2017.
The “moral hazard” is a subject in insurance, as insured parties may be less motivated to reduce risk as an insurance will cover their losses. Governments benefiting from insurance may neglect attention and subsequent action of disaster preparedness measures. A reduction of “moral hazard” could be an advantage of parametric and index insurance compared to traditional indemnity-based insurance, as payout is based on an index rather than single policyholders.
Concessional donor support can target micro, meso, and macro schemes. It can either be direct and on the demand side by financing a portion of the insurance premium through premium subsidies. On the supply side, donors can indirectly subsidize the insurance product by providing the capital necessary for product development, marketing and distribution or capitalizing risk carriers.
Both types of subsidies have been used in the past, but not always based on purely impact-based considerations. Donors are often limited by the kind of finance available through government decisions (loan vs. grant finance) and often prefer to provide indirect finance to insurance vehicles to increase their capital base. While at micro- and meso levels this approach is often well justified, stakeholders in risk pool-eligible countries expect direct donor support to grow and unanimously support more premium subsidies. Evidence also points to the benefit of prioritizing premium over capital support at the current moment.
While initially hesitant, donors are becoming more open to the idea of (longer-term) premium subsidies. In order to be just and efficient, allocation criteria become ever more important. The InsuResilience Global Partnership has developed a set of SMART Principles for Premium and Capital support. However, further research is needed to optimally allocate the support across countries, instruments, and means of support. Criteria that are important to donors include the proportion of vulnerable people in the population and the climate and disaster risk profile of a country, but the decision-making is opaque and often driven by political considerations.
In addition to systematic premium support, there might also be the necessity for premium relief reacting to short-term factors negating the ability to purchase appropriate insurance coverage. This could include pre-financing insurance premiums.
The concept of insurance frequently intersects with notions of “climate justice”, as it involves climate-vulnerable nations and communities having to bear the cost of insurance premiums for events they are not fully responsible for. This notion, as highlighted by the Centre for International Governance Innovation in 2016, frames premium support as a potential avenue for addressing the financial consequences of such events, akin to a form of financing for L&D.
While there is a developing discourse on the need for premium support, there are several issues to be solved. This includes, among others, transparent allocation criteria and long-term, predictable provisions. The discussions –including institutional set-up – is the most advanced for sovereign-level insurance. For instance, the African Disaster Risk Financing Programme (ADRiFi) by the African Development Bank provides premium support in the context of ARC insurance offerings and has been a determining factor to upscale sovereign coverage, though its capitalization is insufficient vis-à-vis the overall need. For subnational meso and micro scheme premium support, further work is necessary.
The benefits of subsidizing insurance premiums must be compared to other solutions such as direct cash transfers. Insurance is a powerful tool to promote economic growth and reduce inequality.
Compared to cash-transfers, insurance gives greater long-term incentive for investing for poor and vulnerable households. On the other hand, the simplicity and efficiency of cash-transfers make them easier to distribute to poorer households. For example, during Covid-19, Togo designed a cash-transfer based on the vote register which could be accessed through any type of phone, and that was focused on transferring cash to women (and their families) with occupations that were hit hardest by the pandemic. The system took ten days to set up and was transparent and effective in distributing money to the households that needed it the most. Another example is the cash-transfer system that was set up in Bangladesh to pre-emptively provide cash for the most vulnerable communities prior to peak flooding. The timing of the anticipatory action was determined by pre-defined triggers indicating an extreme flood event and cash was distributed via phones days prior to the flood took place. If there is a lack of early-warning systems, a cash-transfer message could give valuable information that would otherwise not been given.
For activities that avert and minimize L&D, a feasible approach might be (small) payouts that enable asset protection, and to promote adaptation and investment in resilience, with particular focus on the poorest and most vulnerable communities. This could be undertaken in parallel with livestock insurance and other types of household insurance for those individuals and communities that can benefit more from insurance. Further, in addressing L&D, the establishment of cash-transfer schemes could be set up for the most vulnerable and poorest communities prior to the climate-related events, and payments could be distributed quickly to those groups that are uninsured.
Finally, there is likely a very limited economic basis for non-concessional weather-related insurance arrangement in some countries, such as the Sub-Sahara African countries, without any governmental support, as insurance premiums would be too high to be financially manageable for low-income countries. Affordability remains a central barrier for index-based insurance. With climate change progressing, disastrous weather events will be hard to insure against, which will likely increase needs for concessional financing.