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Executive summary


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This study examines how offshore wind energy deployment can be accelerated across the Nordic countries. It maps current practices and identifies key barriers in each country, draws lessons from international experience, and presents a set of recommendations for faster and more efficient deployment. While all Nordic countries share strong ambitions for offshore wind, their levels of deployment, regulatory maturity and policy frameworks vary significantly – with Denmark in a clear leading position. The main conclusion is that credible political commitment, predictable and transparent legal frameworks, support schemes that align with stated ambitions, well-sequenced licensing processes, and early government provision of site data together form the foundation for accelerated deployment. These factors reduce project time, uncertainty and cost, thus enabling faster expansion of offshore wind energy across the region.

What holds back timely deployment in the Nordics?

Lack of political ambition and predictability is identified as a crucial barrier for all Nordic countries. Denmark is in the forefront of offshore wind development and has set an upcoming target of 3 GW offshore wind to be in operation by 2032 and 2033. The overall goal for the North Sea is 35 GW of offshore wind capacity by 2050, as part of the joint target of at least 150 GW set out in the Esbjerg Declaration. Norway has stated ambitions of allocating areas for 30 GW offshore wind by 2040, but the ambition is not binding and the political support for facilitating offshore wind development in Norway is uncertain. Sweden and Finland are also ambitious with regards to offshore wind development, but without establishing any quantitative targets. Åland, Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Greenland currently have no stated targets for offshore wind development. Åland is working actively with specific project initiatives and Iceland is in the process of developing an Energy Production Strategy and roadmap, which are expected to include all energy sources, including onshore and offshore wind.
Most offshore wind projects are still reliant on financial support to ensure profitability. As such, efficient and targeted subsidy schemes are vital, both in terms of the subsidy level and the design. Denmark was an early adopter of targeted support measures for offshore wind, ensuring a steady build until the 2020s. Rising costs and changes in both design and support level in later years have introduced some long-term uncertainty. Even so, the political agreement following the no-bid auction in 2024 has confirmed the country’s dedication to offshore wind, where, among other things, CfDs were reintroduced. The Norwegian design is more immature, with limited predictability for upcoming competitions. As of now, different designs have been chosen for floating and bottom-fixed technology, with changes being made to the former in the late stage of the tender process. Furthermore, financial support for new projects remains uncertain. Sweden, Finland, Åland, the Faroe Islands, Iceland and Greenland presently have no support schemes in place. Allowing for hybrid connections and facilitating the development of alternative fuel production could, all things being equal, reduce the need for financial support.
Lack of clear and supportive regulations may also be a barrier to the acceleration of offshore wind development. For the EU countries, implementation of EU regulations is not necessarily a barrier (see chapter 2), but implementation may be carried out more or less efficiently, and there are requirements for grid integration and interconnectivity that may slow processes somewhat. Denmark’s licensing regime is comparatively mature after decades of refinement. Finland’s framework is at an early stage, with one small operational offshore wind farm. Norway and Sweden sit between these. However, Sweden’s developer-led process severely affects the project risk in the planning phase. This weakness is reflected in the number of projects that have been stopped by the government in recent years. Sweden and Finland also run distinct procedures for the Exclusive Economic Zone and territorial waters, increasing complexity and the number of authorities involved; Denmark and Norway do not, which reduces fragmentation.
Norway distinguishes between which law applies to the licensing procedure and the approval of the detailed plan, but the processes are the same.
Centralisation also differs: having DEA as the single point of contact in Denmark clarifies accountability, whereas Norway splits key decisions between the regulator (NVE) and the Ministry of Energy. In Sweden, the Land and Environmental Court licenses projects in territorial waters and the government decides in the EEZ, while municipalities retain strong influence – resulting in a more decentralised system. Finland’s pathway is segmented, requiring a water permit from Regional State Administrative Agencies, EIA approval by government, Defence Forces clearance, and seabed leasing from Metsähallitus in territorial waters (with auctions there and, in the EEZ, auctions run by the Energy Authority). All Nordic countries except Sweden designate development areas and use tenders; Sweden presently relies on developer-initiated sites, though an auction system has been proposed.
Stakeholder involvement is a regulated necessity for balancing different interests, e.g. biodiversity, fisheries, marine traffic and defence interests. Still, in interviews, industry actors suggest that the number of consultations and the time required to facilitate them constitute somewhat of a barrier in Denmark and Norway. In Finland, and particularly in Sweden, less time is devoted to stakeholder involvement early in the process. However, projects in both countries face a greater risk that specific interests may intervene and delay progress at a later stage. This illustrates a key dilemma: while limiting consultations might speed up early project development, insufficient stakeholder engagement can ultimately undermine progress and weaken acceptance for offshore wind projects. In Sweden, projects located within territorial waters also face the risk of a municipal veto in the later stages of planning, while in both Sweden and Finland, defence interests may still halt or significantly delay offshore wind projects.
Lack of knowledge gathering and sharing may be a barrier to offshore wind deployment, compared to a situation with full available information. Timing of knowledge gathering, and the sharing of that information between and within government and industry actors, may accelerate deployment in all Nordic countries. Our interviews reveal that these are likely more limited barriers than others we identified in the study.
System and delivery capacity matter. Access to specialist installation vessels, turbine availability (especially for floating) and availability of skilled personnel may slow processes. Nevertheless, the main lever under government control is port capacity. Outside Denmark, the lack of assembly and installation ports is a strong constraint on feasible build schedules. Similarly, grid connection is a necessity, and unclear allocation of scope, cost sharing and timing are sources of developer uncertainty.
The identified barriers and their assessed relevance for Denmark (DK), Norway (NO), Sweden (SE) and Finland (FI) are summarised in Table A, from high (highly relevant, a strong barrier to accelerated deployment, in expectation or as a driver for uncertainty) to low (somewhat a barrier, in expectation or as a driver for uncertainty), as well as N/R (not relevant for the specific country). Most barriers are also relevant for Iceland, the Faroe Islands, Greenland and Åland, but these countries have less developed policies and fewer plans for deployment of offshore wind. The chief barrier for these countries, therefore, is establishing the political conditions and the regulative framework for facilitating offshore wind developments.
Barrier
Sub-barrier
DK
NO
SE
FI
Political ambitions and predictability
Binding national targets
Medium
High
High
High
Profitability for developer
Subsidy level
Medium
Medium
High
High
Support scheme design
Medium
High
High
High
Electricity prices
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Regulations
Implementation of EU reg.
Low
Medium
Low
Low
Regulatory framework 
Low
Medium
High
Medium
Organisation of processes
Low
Medium
Medium
Medium
Stakeholder engagement
Timing and no. of consultations
Low
Low
Low
Low
Municipal veto
N/R
N/R
High
Low
Defence interests
Low
Low
High
High
Knowledge sharing
Seabed and water column data
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Impact assessment results
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Industrial barriers 
Vessel, turbine and infrastructure availability
Low
Medium
Medium
Medium
Expert availability
Low
Low
Low
Low
Grid connection
Organisation
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Table A: Overview of main identified barriers and relative score between countries
We consider the barriers at three levels, in addition to “not relevant for the specific country (N/R): highly relevant and strong barrier for accelerated deployment, in expectation or as a driver for uncertainty (high); barrier, in expectation or as a driver for uncertainty (medium); somewhat a barrier, in expectation or as a driver for uncertainty (low).

What works elsewhere?

Learning from the experiences of other countries – particularly other European frontrunners – can inspire policy development in the Nordic countries. Aligned with the main barriers identified in the Nordics, we highlight relevant practices in the areas of political ambition and predictability, developer profitability, regulatory frameworks, stakeholder involvement, knowledge sharing, industrial capacity and grid connection. Key lessons are briefly summarised below, with further detail provided in the country review and in the synthesis in Chapter 4.6.
Political ambition and predictability: Germany’s three time-bound, legally binding targets drive steady build-out. The Netherlands pairs targets with a clear pathway and action plan to deliver them.
Developer profitability: The UK’s CfD-based tendering ensures sufficient support while limiting the subsidy level, due to reduced risk exposure for developers/owners. The Netherlands awards “full-package” sites (pre-surveys, permits, grid substation/interconnection, long lease), cutting cost and early-stage risk.
Regulation: The UK is assessed to provide a predictable regime with time-bound approvals for Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects. Scotland, Germany and the Netherlands operate one-stop shops, with Germany also centralising site allocation and tendering. Belgium’s legally binding marine spatial plan enables early, effective spatial planning. With rising expectations on sustainability and local content, using non-price criteria in a pre-qualification (as in Germany and the Netherlands) may improve acceptability while preserving price competition.
Stakeholder involvement: Belgium embeds early stakeholder involvement through the marine spatial plan. Scotland mandates pre-application consultation with defined stakeholders, reducing later objections and litigation.
Knowledge sharing: The Netherlands and Belgium provide authoritative pre-tender site surveys and EIA materials to bidders, lowering risk, improving bid quality and speeding up permitting.
Industrial constraints: Turbine, vessel and many labour markets are largely European/global, so developers face similar supply-chain headwinds across countries; skills are relatively transferable.
Grid connection: TSOs manage connections in all countries. Germany’s TSO-built, cost-socialised offshore links reduce developer risk and enable integrated planning; the UK’s competitive OFTO model is an alternative model to lower transmission costs, though the effect on project complexity compared to a more centralised process could offset potential gains.

Accelerating offshore wind deployment in the Nordic countries

Offshore wind policies and industries are evolving quickly across countries, meaning that we are assessing a moving target: we are seeking to link changing policies in other countries to changing policies in the Nordic countries. This is important to keep in mind as we present our “catalogue” for best practice.
We present seven recommendations for accelerating offshore wind deployment, as outlined below. Recommendations 1–3 build a solid foundation for policies, where the level of ambition and extent of government commitment determine the need for regulatory frameworks and support levels. Recommendations 4–6 centralise government organisation in one-stop shops, integrating grid planning, as well as centralising and frontloading information gathering. This reduces developer risk and costs, and likely also total costs. It may improve stakeholder consultation and front-load conflict resolution. Recommendation 7 more specifically addresses stakeholder involvement and acceptability through early and well-designed consultation processes. This may also reduce the risk of delays or cancellations and time spent on stakeholder consultation later in the process, and may increase local and regional acceptance for deployment.
The recommendations are relevant for all Nordic countries, although to different degrees and with a somewhat different cost of implementation. More country-specific, we point to the need to establish political conditions and regulatory frameworks for facilitating offshore wind developments in Iceland, Åland and the Faroe Islands. Åland is working on this structure in parallel with the Sunnanvind project, while the other countries do not have any specific projects in the pipeline. In Finland and Sweden, early and formal compatibility checks with defence interests and municipalities will reduce developer risk. The developer-led process in Sweden also differs from most other countries, increasing risk in later stages. In Norway, greater predictability and assurance in the set targets, aligning grid licensing with site awards and clarifying TSO/developer roles, while maintaining bankable tender parameters, would lower bid premiums. The political commitment and ambition for offshore wind in Finland, Sweden and Norway is also somewhat unclear. Denmark is reintroducing revenue stabilisation and capping negative bidding where market conditions are volatile, which should keep Denmark on the map as the Nordic standard-setter in offshore wind. Nevertheless, the summary of our recommendations highlights that there is room for improvement across several categories, for all Nordic countries.
1. Clear and predictable targets:
Broad political agreement on offshore wind targets and willingness to support development will increase predictability for developers and reduce investment risk in national supply chains. However, the time frame of the targets needs to be balanced against demand-side risk.
Relevance
Ownership
DK
National government. Parliament if legislative enactment.
NO
SE
FI
IS
FO
AX
Non-Nordic examples: Germany and the UK
2. Clear and stable regulatory framework:
Adopt a law-anchored, end-to-end regime with statutory timelines, efficient and robust tender design, as well as alignment of tenders with data collection, MSP and grid planning.
Relevance
Ownership
DK
National government,
Energy ministries
NO
SE
FI
IS
FO
AX
Non-Nordic examples: The UK and the Netherlands
3. Support level that matches the targets:
Auctions and CfDs have become the gold standard, and use market mechanisms to reduce costs. Given lack of profitability, government support should align with stated targets and commitment. Full-package permits, hybrid connections and other infrastructure to support profitability and reduce risk should be considered.
Relevance
Ownership
DK
National government,
Energy ministries
NO
SE
FI
IS
FO
AX
Non-Nordic examples: The UK and the Netherlands
4. One-stop shops, centralised tendering and licensing:
Establish or strengthen a single point of contact across permitting and grid interfaces. Where relevant, pair this with centralised tendering to reduce post-award uncertainty.
Relevance
Ownership
DK
NO
SE
FI
IS
FO
AX
Energy ministries and agencies; TSOs
Non-Nordic examples: The UK and the Netherlands
5. Government data collection and sharing:
Government-led site surveys and data shared with bidders to reduce total cost and risk, which also may speed up the process. Costs may be reimbursed to authorities by bidders.
Relevance
Ownership
DK
NO
SE
FI
IS
FO
AX
Relevant agencies (One-Stop Shop)
Non-Nordic examples: Scotland, Belgium and the Netherlands
6. MSP-anchored zoning and data framework:
If possible, active use of MSP that designates offshore wind areas, sets common standards for baseline surveys and open data (methods, metadata and release timelines), links to the one-stop shop and tender data rooms, and is revised on a fixed cycle.
Relevance
Ownership
DK
NO
SE
FI
IS
FO
AX
Relevant agencies (One-Stop Shop)
Non-Nordic example: Belgium (MSP 2020–2026; Princess Elisabeth Zone)
7. Early stakeholder consultation:
Stakeholder consultation in developing MSP and other strategic processes may identify conflicts and potential barriers for development early on. This reduces risk for developers and governments, e.g. of municipal veto or conflict with national security interests, and may reduce total consultation time.
Relevance
Ownership
DK
NO
SE
FI
IS
FO
AX
Relevant agencies (One-Stop Shop)
Non-Nordic example: Belgium
Denmark is a frontrunner and has to a larger extent than the others already implemented recommendations 1–3 and is thus indicated as slightly less relevant than the other countries.