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4. Opportunities for accelerating the licensing processes

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In this chapter we present a wide range of options for accelerating the licensing processes within offshore wind. To overcome the barriers identified in the previous chapter, it is important to draw on experience from mature markets such as the UK, Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium. Below, we present a review of each of these countries, highlighting the policies that have had the greatest effect on long-term deployment. The relevance of these policies in a Nordic perspective will be further investigated in chapter 5, where we develop a catalogue of best practice.

4.1 Experience from the UK

Clearly defined legislative framework and targets

The UK set its first long-term climate target in 2008 through the Climate Change Act, which aimed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80 per cent (from 1990 levels) by 2050. An additional target was set in 2009, requiring 30 per cent of all electricity to come from renewable sources by 2020. Today, the UK is aiming for net zero by 2050. In 2019, the government signed the Offshore Wind Sector Deal, which set a target of 30 GW of installed capacity by 2030. The legally binding target has since been increased twice, with the latest target of 50 GW by 2030 set in April 2022 through the British Energy Security Strategy (GWEC, 2024a). However, in December 2024, the UK government published the Clean Power 2030 Action Plan, which revises the offshore target downwards to 43–50 GW by 2030 (UK Government, 2024).
Establishing clear national wind energy production targets played a crucial role in creating a supportive regulatory environment for offshore wind development in the country, helping drive the necessary strategies and actions to scale up the sector (Monteiro de Vasconelos et al., 2022). As highlighted in Metcalfe & Sasse’s (2023) study on the UK, the question of if action was needed became irrelevant once concrete targets were embedded in law, and instead the focus of discussions shifted to how. A firm government commitment, backed by a strong political will, boosts industry confidence and has a catalytic effect on offshore wind development. In addition, a well-defined strategic vision, supported by ambitious medium-term GW targets for renewables, provides essential political leadership and clarity for renewable energy developers and stakeholders, stimulating investment in infrastructure and value chains (Energy Transitions Commission, 2023).
The UK’s targets have been underpinned by a stable legal framework. The period from 2010 to 2016 was a defining phase for the country’s offshore wind development, as legislation introduced during this time laid the foundation for the rapid expansion that followed (Metcalfe & Sasse, 2023). The same authors identified a crucial factor in the UK’s successful development of offshore wind: the clear and concise policy direction provided by the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC). The Department set clear priorities at an early stage within a well-defined and authoritative programme, providing stability, direction and long-term consistency for its policies. Furthermore, the DECC was not just a leader in the field but also had the capacity and capability to develop and implement effective policies. Its large team of experienced civil servants, specialising in electricity market reform, contributed to the development of effective policies. In addition, the DECC operated as a standalone department until 2017, allowing it to maintain a clear and dedicated focus
Other interests were brought into discussions after the DECC merged with the Business Department to create the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy.
 and to develop a comprehensive suite of policies, including:
  • Well-designed price support: The DECC introduced Contracts for Difference under the Energy Act 2013 as part of the Electricity Market Reform, creating predictable revenue streams, reduced investor risk and cost reductions. (Further elaborated in chapter 4.1.2)
  • Clear planning process deadlines: Reforms under the Planning Act 2008 created a streamlined, time-bound approval system for major offshore projects, which were classified as Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects. This classification moved decision-making authority from local authorities to the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change and established a fixed 18-month timeline for assessment by the Planning Inspectorate.
  • Competitive transmission licences: The DECC introduced the Offshore Transmission Owner (OFTO) regime under the Energy Act 2004. This required developers to construct the transmission infrastructure themselves but to sell it to an independent TSO through a competitive tender process. The TSO then owns and operates the asset under a long-term contract. This tender process ensures a transparent and competitive procedure for selecting the TSO that will acquire the transmission infrastructure. To safeguard its profitability, the TSO operates under long-term contracts with regulated returns, ensuring a stable and predictable revenue stream. According to the Cambridge Economic Policy Associations Ltd (2016) and Metcalfe & Sasse (2023), this model lowered costs for offshore wind developers and increased efficiency by engaging dedicated grid operators. However, Nieuwenhout (2023) argued that a TSO-led model, as employed in Germany and Belgium
    In Germany and Belgium, the offshore wind owner only needs to construct cables from the turbine to the offshore converter station, which is owned and managed by the TSO, and treated as a regulated asset for which the TSO receives income via tariffs from electricity users.
    , is more cost-effective.
  • Green Investment Bank: Established in 2012, the Green Investment Bank (GIB) provided financing for low-carbon infrastructure, supporting early projects like Gwynt y Môr and Dudgeon. However, the GIB was privatised in 2017, and its new owner is not legally obliged to continue focusing on green investments (Vaughan, 2018).
  • Industrial policy to grow domestic supply chains: The DECC, together with the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, created an Offshore Wind Industry Strategy (2013), and encourages port and manufacturing investments as well as turbine manufacturers like SGRE and Vestas to set up factories in the country
    Siemens opened its first turbine blade factory in Hull in 2016.
    . Later, the Offshore Wind Sector Deal (2019) set local content targets (60 per cent by 2030), further strengthening the local supply chain.

Low-risk tendering mechanism

A key factor in accelerating offshore wind in the UK has been the transition from non-competitive Renewables Obligation Certificates (ROCs) to Contracts for Difference (CfDs) (O’Hanlon & Cummins, 2020). This publicly funded support measure for large-scale renewable energy projects was introduced in 2014 and the UK’s auction system for offshore wind has since, amidst multiple reforms, proven to be one of the lowest-risk tender design models to developers (Brinckmann, 2025).
In the CfD Allocation Rounds, the Crown Estate and Crown Estate Scotland issue guidelines on potential offshore development areas and developers choose which ones to apply for. If successful, the developer is awarded an Agreement for Lease (AfL) (Monteiro de Vasconelos et al., 2022). Seabed leasing in the UK began as early as 2001 and has been managed by the Crown Estate (TCE) (England) and Crown Estate Scotland (CES) since then. Pre-determined zones are tendered through “Contract for Difference” rounds. Nieuwenhout (2023) found that state control over seabed allocation is crucial, particularly as competition for space intensifies.
The design of the auction encompasses multiple factors that reduce investment and development risk:
  • Guaranteed revenue streams: The CfDs provide price stability by bridging the gap between the wholesale market price and the generator’s strike price, which is determined through the auction process and remains unchanged for 15 years
    Under a CfD, a government-backed entity agrees to pay renewable energy generators the difference between a fixed “strike price” and a market reference price for electricity. If the market price falls below the strike price, the generator receives a top-up payment; if the market price rises above the strike price, the generator pays back the excess.
    . By providing revenue certainty, CfDs made offshore wind projects more bankable, allowing access to lower-cost financing. Furthermore, long-term investments and larger-scale projects were encouraged due to increased planning confidence.
  • Auction-based pricing: The UK’s CfD auctions have been one of the key factors driving down offshore wind costs by stimulating competition among developers. In 2015, the strike price was around £120/MWh, while by 2019, it had dropped below £40/MWh. Although prices increased again in subsequent rounds
    In the 2024 AR5 auction, no developers submitted bids, mainly because the strike prices were too low to reflect rising costs, highlighting the system’s sensitivity to appropriately set strike prices. AR6 responded to the challenges facing the wind industry by increasing the bid price ceilings to £73/MWh.
    , CfDs are still regarded as one of the most cost-effective support mechanisms, as they provide a fixed revenue stream that enables lower financing costs (Wind Europe, 2024).
  • Centralised cost for site allocation: By identifying the most suitable offshore wind project areas, the seabed licensing agencies (TCE & CES) create a level playing field. This centralises the initial cost of site identification, allowing bidders to focus on development and potentially attracting more interest (Johnson et al., 2022).
  • Grid connection cost and timing: The cost of connecting the wind farm to the grid is state-funded or borne by the transmission operator. Furthermore, grid connection and timelines are guaranteed by the state or grid operator.
  • No state ownership: The UK does not mandate state co-ownership.
  • Long-term policy commitment: A clear target (see chapter 4.1.1), backed by ongoing CfD auctions, has been providing a clear roadmap that has reassured investors and supply chain stakeholders, enabling long-term strategic planning. 

A one-stop shop permitting authority (unique to Scotland)

Marine Scotland's Marine Licensing and Operations Team (MS-LOT) provides a one-stop shop for marine licences in Scotland, covering projects of all sizes (Scottish Government, 2018). The one-stop shop for project consenting was established by the Scottish Government through the Marine (Scotland) Act 2010, setting the legislative basis for Scottish marine licensing carried out by MS-LOT. It handles the entire consenting/licensing process
Including marine licences, EPS licences and basking shark licences (Scottish Government, 2018).
 and is the single point of contact for all queries relating to the licensing and deployment of offshore wind projects. MS-LOT also coordinates with other agencies, such as the Scottish Environment Protection agency, to ensure a streamlined decision-making process. The function works in two directions: it acts as an advisor to the developer on preparing and submitting competent applications but also gives the Scottish Ministers independent advice on the suitability and sustainability of a proposed project. Additional divisions within Marine Scotland include Marine Scotland Science (MSS), which provides expert scientific advice to MS-LOT to enable informed decision-making. Additionally, the Crown Estate Scotland (CES) aids in the designation of leasing zones and works collaboratively with Marine Scotland/MS-LOT in granting a seabed lease once consents have been granted to the developer. The two government agencies, MS-LOT and CET, work strategically together to streamline the process for developers.
According to a study conducted by O’Hanlon & Cummins (2020), Marine Scotland’s one-stop shop integrative structure for project consenting has enhanced integration and streamlined government functions, increasing developer confidence in the functionality and responsiveness of the regulatory system. The country’s one-stop shop procedure has further been recognised by Moscoloni et al. (2023) as contributing to an efficient authorisation process for the deployment of offshore renewable energy projects with short administrative and lead times.
Further best practices in relation to the Scottish permitting process include:
  • Centralised environmental assessment before leasing: As part of the Marine Sectoral Plan prepared by MS-LOT, a strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA), a Habitats Regulations Appraisal and a Social and Economic Impact Assessment were conducted centrally. This ensures that environmental risks are assessed at a regional level, thereby reducing duplication and accelerating approvals (Monteiro et al., 2022). Later in the process, developers must conduct a more comprehensive Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), but the previous pre-clearing of suitable zones means developers face fewer environmental barriers later in the permitting process.
  • Mandatory pre-application consultation: Developers must consult with key stakeholders, such as local communities and environmental organisations prior to submitting a formal application. This reduces legal challenges and objections later in the permitting process.
  • Structured process and timelines for EIA approval: MS-LOT establishes a standard timeframe for EIA decision-making, providing developers with clear guidance on deadlines and documentation requirements from the outset.
    Marine Scotland Consenting and Licensing Guidance (Scottish Government, 2018).

4.2 Experience from Germany

Continuous adaptation of offshore wind targets and the related regulatory framework

Germany has consistently increased its legally binding offshore wind targets, with the most recent amendment made through the Offshore Wind Energy Act (WindSeeG) of 2022. The legally binding targets now include 30 GW by 2030, 40 GW by 2035 and 70 GW by 2045 (Deutsche Wind Guard, 2024), providing long-term investment security. Germany is the only country in Europe with three time-bound targets, ensuring steady progress and predictable sector growth through a phased approach. A firm government commitment, backed by strong historic political will, enhances industry confidence and acts as a catalyst for offshore wind development
The political will is now being undermined by the rise of popular (centre-) right-wing parties, who are showing less commitment to wind power.
. In addition, a well-defined strategic vision, supported by ambitious medium-term GW targets for renewables, provides essential political leadership and clarity for renewable energy developers and stakeholders (Energy Transitions Commission, 2023).
The primary legislation governing the construction and operation of offshore wind farms includes the Renewable Energy Act (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz, EEG), the Energy Industry Act (Energie-wirtschaftsgesetz, EnWG), and the Wind Energy at Sea Act (Windenergie-auf-See-Gesetz, WindSeeG)
Additionally, several other regulations apply, such as the Marine Facilities Ordinance (Seeanlagenverordnung, SeeAnlV) and the Federal Nature Conservation Law (Bundesnaturschutzgesetz, BNatSchG) (BWO, 2025).
. The WindSeeG of 2017 and its subsequent amendments stand out as best practices, marking Germany’s transition from an open-door approach to a centrally planned offshore wind strategy. The law regulates bidding procedures and coordinates the licensing, planning, construction and commissioning of offshore wind projects, including grid connections. Additionally, government authorities conduct pre-selection and assessment of suitable coastal sites
Since 2023, in addition to tenders for sites centrally pre-investigated by the BSH, tendering rounds have also been held for sites not centrally pre-investigated or put out to tender (Deutsche WindGuard, 2024).
 (Jansen et al., 2022).

Creation of a centralised geographic allocation method and tender system

Prior to the WindSeeG, Germany offered feed-in tariffs for offshore wind projects (2008–2014), which effectively supported the first projects in the market. However, the system adopted an open-door approach, where developers independently identify and investigate suitable sites before applying for permits. This system produced mixed results, including issues around suboptimal site selection, partially overlapping projects, a high risk of stranded investments and insufficient coordination regarding grid connections (adelphi & German Offshore Wind Energy Foundation, 2022).
To address these challenges, the WindSeeG of 2017 established a centralised planning process for wind farms, overseen by the Federal Maritime and Hydrographic Agency (BSH) (Norton Rose Fulbright, 2023). Since 2021, annual auctions have been held under this system, with pre-investigated sites identified under the Site Development Plan (SDP) assessed by the BSH and the Federal Network Agency (BnetzA). Shifting from feed-in tariffs to a competitive auction system for offshore wind site allocation created a predictable framework for investors, moving project allocation away from direct subsidies towards market-based competition. This, in combination with more centralised planning, has contributed to cost reductions and more efficient development, with zero subsidy bids being awarded from 2021 onwards
Although the auctions held in 2017 and 2018 already saw several companies submitting zero-subsidy bids, the winning projects still received a subsidy of around €45 per MWh. Subsequent rounds were exclusively zero-subsidy.
 (GWEC, 2024b).
Germany’s auction design has been continuously refined and improved, with the latest amendment to the WindSeeG in 2022 resulting in the current auction framework (Brinckmann, 2025; Deutsche WindGuard, 2024; Norton Rose Fulbright, 2023):
  • Two-track auction system: Germany has an auction-based system in place for both pre-investigated sites and another one for non-pre-investigated sites.
  • Multi-criterion auctions: For centrally pre-investigated sites, apart from price criteria, additional non-price criteria, such as a bidder’s decarbonisation initiatives, are now considered for evaluation alongside concession payments
    For sites that have not been centrally pre-assessed, projects are awarded to those offering the lowest market premium. If several bidders submit €0.00 offers, a second round determines the winner based on the highest concession payment, replacing the former lottery-based selection method.
    . What sets Germany’s new auction system apart is, unlike for instance Belgium and the UK, the inclusion of non-price criteria, balancing price and sustainability. By considering factors such as sustainability, system integration and innovation, rather than solely prioritising the lowest bid, Germany avoids a “race to the bottom” and promotes a more holistic approach.
  • No state ownership requirement: Germany does not mandate state co-ownership.
  • Grid connection partially funded and managed by the TSOs: The TSO is responsible for offshore grid planning and covers the cost of connecting the offshore platform, which gathers electricity from multiple wind farms, to the mainland grid. The developer only needs to build the relatively short connection from the turbine to the substation. According to Nieuwenhout (2023), the TSO-led model is most effective when a centrally planned offshore location approach is in place, as this allows offshore converter stations to be efficiently planned. While delays can still occur under this system, the cost of the offshore grid connection in Germany is borne by the TSOs, such as 50Hertz, TenneT and Amprio. The TSO-led model therefore centralises responsibility for offshore grid infrastructure with the TSOs, enhancing efficiency and reducing risks for wind farm developers.
  • Hybrid management of permitting: Under the latest auction design, centrally developed sites have state-managed permitting, while non-pre-developed sites require developers to manage permitting and project-related studies.

Adoption of a one-stop shop permitting procedure

In Germany, the Federal Maritime and Hydrographic Agency (Bundesamt für Seeschifffahrt und Hydrographie, BSH) has been recognised as a best practice for a one-stop shop process in offshore wind licensing by multiple studies (Nieuwenhou, 2023; Monteiro de Vasconelos et al., 2022, Moscoloni et al., 2023 and Salvador et al., 2018). The BSH is responsible for permitting beyond territorial waters in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
Offshore wind permitting within territorial waters in managed by the Federal States, though they play a minor role with only 0.5 GW offshore wind capacity installed (Deutsche WindGuard, 2024).
, and is the single authority granting all required authorisations. According to the European Commission (2023), having a single point of contact reduces administrative costs for the developer, lowers bureaucratic hurdles and shortens the time required to obtain necessary permits.
As Germany has implemented two tender systems, offering both centrally pre-investigated sites and non-pre-investigated sites, the permitting process differs depending on which site is up for tender (BSH, 2025). While open-door processes can be a barrier due to their increased length and the discretion of authorities (European Commission, 2023), the consenting process for pre-investigated sites in Germany is streamlined
According to a study conducted by the European Commission (2023), the administrative authorisation process in Germany does not entail major barriers such as lack of legal coherence or the need for a large number of uncoordinated permits.
 and coordinated by the BSH (Monteiro de Vasconelos et al., 2022, Salvador et al., 2018) as follows:
Pre-tender:
  • The BSH develops the Site Development Plan (SDP) as part of Germany’s Maritime Spatial Planning framework.
  • Site Investigation of the areas defined in the SDP, which details specific sites for development, lines and grid connection points.
  • For the pre-investigated sites, the BSH conducts environmental assessments and a geological survey to provide data for potential developers, omitting the preliminary approval procedure.
Tender:
  • The BNetzA conducts the tenders for both pre-investigated and non-pre-investigated sites in a competitive auction.
Project approval:
  1. Once the developer has secured a site
    Germany’s auction revenue model is currently market-based, with no financial support such as CfDs or feed-in tariffs given to the developer.
    , several of the major permits and licences are bundled into a single authorisation process administered by the BSH (land tenure rights, EIA, generation licence).
  2. The developer is responsible for ensuring compatibility with the BNatSchG.
  3. Next, the BSH makes a decision, after reviewing with other agencies such as the Federal Agency for Nature Conservation (BfN) and the general public, whether the project is compatible with marine environment protection.
  4. Once the BSH has granted approval, the offshore wind farm is authorised to operate for up to 25 years.

4.3 Experience from the Netherlands

Comprehensive regulatory framework establishing clear targets and a centralised tender roadmap

The Netherlands’ regulatory framework, which is key to providing political leadership and clarity for renewable energy developers and stakeholders (Energy Transitions Commission, 2023), stands out due to its clear pathway and targets and clear action plan for achievement of targets.
Offshore wind development gained momentum through the Energy Agreement for Sustainable Growth, published in 2013 by a broad coalition of government and industry stakeholders. The Agreement included not only targets to increase the share of renewables in the energy mix (16 per cent by 2023), but also the Offshore Wind Energy Roadmap 2023, which proved to be a key instrument in kick-starting large-scale offshore wind development. According to the Dutch Government, the Roadmap 2023 was a “game changer” for the development of offshore wind in the Netherlands, as it led to the successful tendering of the planned 3.5 GW (Netherlands Enterprise Agency, 2024).
The most important characteristics of the Offshore Wind Roadmap can be summarised as follows:
  • Clear targets: The Offshore Wind Roadmap 2023 introduced the country’s first clear offshore wind capacity target of 3.5 GW of new offshore capacity by 2023, along with a plan to tender five offshore wind farms.
  • In 2018, a second Roadmap 2030 was released, targeting 11.5 GW by 2030, adding three additional wind farm zones. The new government of 2022 committed to more ambitious targets, doubling the target to 21 GW by 2030. The Roadmap 2030 was extended, outlining a tender timeline for a third batch of offshore wind farms to be out for tender until the end of 2027. Furthermore, in 2022 the government presented the country’s first long-term target, aiming for 50 GW by 2040, and 70 GW by 2050 (Netherlands Enterprise Agency, 2024).
  • More centralised: Before the Energy Agreement and Offshore Roadmap, offshore sites were awarded on a first-come, first-served basis, restricting competition between developers (Salvador et al., 2018). Developers also retained responsibility for site selection and investigation, permitting processes and grid connection. The new tendering system that was implemented through the Offshore Roadmap 2023 established legal, centrally planned zones for long-term offshore wind development, with multi-annual tender schedules for pre-selected sites and timely state-owned grid connections (Netherlands Enterprise Agency, 2024).
  • More supportive: Under the new tender design, the government provided pre-investigated site survey data and environmental impact information, ensuring a clear and timely permitting process while introducing level-playing-field tenders.
  • One-stop shop: Netherlands Enterprise Agency (RVO) was established as the coordinating authority under the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy. Rijkswaterstaat, an agency of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management, is responsible for the Environmental Impact Assessment and the consenting process. 

Inclusion of non-price criteria in the tender design

The Netherlands was the first country to introduce non-price criteria (NPC) into its offshore wind auction design and has since served as a model for other countries, such as Germany, to incorporate NPCs into their tenders. Non-price criteria evaluate bids for offshore wind farm areas based on factors such as the likelihood of realisation, sustainability and community engagement. According to Wind Europe (2022), including NPC as auction criteria rewards companies for the wider societal value wind energy brings and encourages innovation in important areas such as system integration, biodiversity protection and community engagement. Industry participants, such as the offshore wind developer SSE (2023), have also expressed support for the inclusion of NPCs, as they help ensure that renewable projects are delivered on time and within budget while providing long-term value to society and the environment. However, they must be well designed, carefully implemented and transparently assessed. According to SSE (2023), NPCs in emerging offshore wind markets should focus on deliverability and developer track record, whereas more diverse criteria, such as sustainability factors, are better suited to mature markets where competition is typically higher.
Textbox 4.1: Introduction of non-price criteria (NPC) in the Netherlands
Due to strong interest and competition for the tenders organised under the Offshore Wind Roadmap 2023, strike prices fell rapidly following the introduction of NPC in the Netherlands. While the target price for 2020 was set at €100/MWh, the price level in the 2016 BMWFS I & II auction was already substantially lower than the 2020 target. Because upcoming tenders for the remaining zones were expected to be subsidy-free, the Netherlands introduced a new legal tender model that allowed subsidy-free leasing. NPCs were incorporated into the bid concept for the first time in the tender for the offshore area Hollandse Kust West, awarded in November 2022.
Ecowende emerged as the winner of the HKW lot VI tender by offering a bid focusing on innovative ecology measures with a strong emphasis on data sharing and transparency.
 Another innovation was the inclusion of negative bidding capped at €50 million, with the assessment of the NPCs balanced against the bidder’s willingness to pay (Netherlands Enterprise Agency, 2024). It should be noted that in the subsequent IJmuiden Ver tender, as developers were not expected to differ significantly in their NPC scores, the cap on negative bidding was increased, shifting the auction’s focus back towards financial considerations (Janipour & Groot, 2023).
""Image: iStock

Auctioning of a fully packaged permit

Under the Netherlands’ offshore wind development framework, the winning bidder in a tender is granted a comprehensive permit package, reducing both costs and risks for the developer. The package includes the lease area, a preliminary study sufficient to complete the initial engineering design, the interconnection substation and the right to build and operate the facility for up to 40 years (James et al., 2023).
Historically, the Dutch government conducted and provided site assessment campaigns, e.g. wind resource and metocean conditions and initial environmental impact assessments (EIA), to all bidders free of charge, leading to cost centralisation and increasing the attractiveness of the Dutch offshore market to developers (Jansen et al., 2022)
As such, the EIA could be viewed as a part of the subsidy received by the developers, reducing the need for additional support.
. The EIA is prepared by the government institution RVO, which organises the entire licensing process using a general “bandwidth approach” to accommodate different offshore wind designs. The EIA is prepared in accordance with the Wind Farm Zone Decision (Kavelbesluit), and serves as an assessment for the entire project, including construction activities. The developer is allowed to plan and construct the wind farm within the bandwidth indicated in the EIA. (Nieuwenhout, 2023). From 2022, starting with the tender of Hollandse Kust West, the winner of the tender has to reimburse the site development cost to the Dutch government (Jansen et al., 2022). The new legal tender model introduced a subsidy-free leasing scheme, with an indirect subsidy provided through a funded site study. The EIA was conducted in line with this updated model (Netherlands Enterprise Agency, 2024).
TSO-led offshore wind farm connection: In the Netherlands, the government ensures timely grid connections through the Transmission System Operator (TSO), which is fully responsible for developing and operating offshore wind substations and grid links. The costs of offshore transmission are socialised to accelerate site development (Jansen at al., 2022). Similar to as in Germany, the developer only needs to construct the relatively short cables from the turbine to the substation. According to Nieuwenhout (2023), this TSO-led model facilitates hybrid connections and clustering, and efficient utilisation of seabed space and resources, while reducing environmental impacts and costs. The Netherlands has improved efficiency through its TSO-led model, which standardises substation design to reduce construction and maintenance costs (Wind and Water Works, 2025).

Efficient permitting procedure and one-stop shop

According to Nieuwenhout (2023) and the European Court of Auditors (2023), the Netherlands has one of the shortest permitting procedures of all the North Sea countries. The European Commission (2023) identifies the Netherlands as the only country in its comparative study with no barriers in the offshore wind permitting process, which covers site selection, administrative authorisation and grid connection permits. The European Court of Auditors (2023) concluded that the Netherlands has succeeded in achieving some of the shortest permitting timelines in all the North Sea countries while safeguarding the ecological health of its marine areas. By adopting a proactive approach that emphasises comprehensive strategic environmental assessments and early stakeholder engagement, the country mitigates the effects of environmental impacts to prevent them becoming a barrier to project development.
Netherlands Enterprise Agency serves as a one-stop shop for offshore wind development, streamlining several key steps in the process. The agency is responsible for site mapping and selection in consultation with other sea users, conducting environmental surveys and site investigations, managing the consenting process, granting permits, ensuring timely grid connection through the TSO, and organising the tender. According to the Energy Transitions Commission (2023), the country’s proactive approach helps reduce pre-bid investment risks, financing and societal cost, which in turn drive down the levelised cost of energy and facilitates subsidy free bidding. However, the Energy Transmission notes that while this approach provides clarity and efficiency, it also places a substantial burden on government agencies. Having sufficient capacity and capability within government bodies, as illustrated by the UK’s former Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) (see chapter 4.1.1), is essential for reducing the risk of slow progress.

4.4 Experience from Belgium

Early and effective adoption of a marine spatial plan within a regular framework

The successful development of offshore wind energy relies heavily on early and effective spatial planning to ensure that the limited and valuable marine space is optimally allocated. Belgium was a pioneer among European countries in launching a marine spatial plan (MSP), showing how early and legally binding marine spatial planning can serve as a crucial tool in the sustainable development of offshore wind.
Belgium's commitment to marine spatial planning began with the establishment of the Act on the Protection of the Marine Environment in 1999. This law established the legal basis for the country’s MSP, which is now evaluated and revised every six years. It outlines guiding principles for developers, including the precautionary, preventive and restoration principles, which are designed to safeguard the environmental sustainability of marine activities, including offshore wind development (Théry, 2022). The plan’s legally binding status means that developers must comply with the designated zones and spatial allocations (Galparsoro et al., 2022). This legal robustness plays a crucial role in creating long-term certainty for stakeholders, which is often absent in countries with less prescriptive plans (Borja, 2022).
Belgium’s early adoption of MSP allowed for an organised approach to offshore wind energy development, particularly in the Belgian North Sea, a region with limited available space and multiple competing marine activities. Maes (2016) emphasises that, given the dense usage of marine space for shipping, fishing and energy production, careful planning and turbine spacing were essential to avoid conflicts and ensure optimal use of the available area. By establishing the MSP early in the process, Belgium ensured that offshore wind energy could be integrated into the broader marine environment without jeopardising other uses. Moreover, a legally binding spatial plan increases predictability for developers, all other factors remaining unchanged.
As marine environments are dynamic and spatial needs change, Belgium’s MSP was designed with flexibility and stability in mind. As stated above, the MSP undergoes a mandatory review and revision process every six years, ensuring that it remains adaptive to the dynamic marine environment. This revision process includes a public inquiry and is subject to a Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) (Galparsoro et al., 2022). The continuous refinement of the MSP allows Belgium to maintain a balance between flexibility and stability, a crucial aspect for offshore wind development (Douvere et al., 2007). By continuously updating the plan, Belgium can integrate the latest research, adapt to emerging challenges and respond to the changing needs of offshore wind energy developers.
A significant milestone was reached with the adoption of a new marine spatial plan for the period 2020–2026, which unlocked additional areas for offshore wind farm development (FPS Health, 2023). A key feature of this plan was the zoning of the Princess Elisabeth Zone, which was divided into three parcels for offshore wind development. The first parcel is currently out for tender, with the remaining two parcels expected to be tendered between 2026 and 2028 (FPS Economy, 2025).
One of the core principles of Belgium’s MSP is the inclusion of stakeholders in the planning process. From the outset, the Belgian government has engaged a wide range of stakeholders, including offshore wind developers, environmental organisations, fisheries and other marine users (FPS Health, 2023). By involving diverse interests in the decision-making process, Belgium ensures that its MSP reflects a comprehensive understanding of marine space use and minimises conflicts (Maes, 2016).

Revised tender design and support mechanism for new Princess Elisabeth Zone

Belgium’s approach to offshore wind tendering provides valuable lessons for other countries aiming to accelerate offshore wind development. As part of its goal to reduce the additional cost of offshore renewable electricity, the government has pledged to organise a competitive bidding procedure and put larger parcels on the market (FSP Economy, 2024). With its latest tender for the Princess Elisabeth Zone, the country has established a structured, transparent and competitive tendering process that ensures investor confidence, cost efficiency and grid integration. The most important aspects are highlighted below:
  • Clear legislative framework and competitive bidding: A robust legal foundation underpins Belgium’s offshore wind strategy. The Law of 12 May 2019 established a competitive tendering process and ensures a level playing field for developers. The Princess Elisabeth Zone, launched for tender on 25 November 2024, exemplifies Belgium’s structured approach. By conducting preliminary site surveys and making the data available to bidders, Belgium significantly reduces investment risks, leading to more competitive bids and streamlined project execution (FPS Economy, 2025).
  • Two-sided Contracts for Difference (CfD) for price stability: Belgium’s transition from a one-sided CfD to a two-sided CfD has enhanced market efficiency. This mechanism stabilises pricing by offering revenue protection while preventing excessive profits. It also attracts a more diverse pool of bidders, enables lower financing costs and helps mitigate windfall profits through balanced revenue mechanisms (FSP Economy, 2025).
  • Strong stakeholder engagement through public consultation: In 2022, the General Directorate of Energy organised a public consultation on the Princess Elisabeth Zone, gathering input from market players, environmental organisations and the general public. These insights directly shaped the competitive bidding framework, aligning industry needs with policy goals and enhancing social acceptance and regulatory efficiency (FPS Economy, 2025).
  • Balanced pre-qualification and award criteria: Belgium separates pre-qualification (admissibility) criteria from award criteria, ensuring only capable bidders enter the competition while allowing price and innovation to determine the winner. According to a position paper by SSE (2023), non-price criteria are best applied as prerequisites for participation rather than as factors at the point of competition. Belgium will conduct its new tender in a similar fashion, with the majority of NPC applied as pre-qualification criteria, including technical capacities, financial strength and stability, requirements for grid connection, maximum strike price, minimum installed capacity, minimum share of citizen participation and cybersecurity (FSP Economy, 2023). If a bidder complies with all pre-qualification criteria, they enter into the award process. The award criteria then focus on price, with a 90 per cent weighting on the strike price and a 10 per cent weighting on innovation in business model
    Refers to a citizen participation increase up to 4 per cent of the project’s CAPEX.
     (A&O Shearman, 2025).

4.5 Experiences from other countries: a global review

Based on Offshore Wind Licensing (Anchustegui & Hunter, 2024) and our own studies, we have conducted a comprehensive review of practices in an extended selection of countries across all continents. We summarise the results in Table 4.1. Anchustegui and Hunter (2024) map licensing practices and, while they do not explicitly identify the most favourable approaches, a number of potentially positive measures can be inferred:
  • Set national offshore targets binding in law, not just in policy.
  • Assign public authorities financial responsibility for initial resource mapping.
  • Organise one-stop shops for licensing.
  • Avoid sequential licensing in order to reduce risk for developers.
  • Pre-define compensation schemes to mitigate all (not just fisheries’) conflicts of interest.
  • Establish clear, predictable schedules for licensing rounds.
  • Simplify procedures and licensing requirements for smaller projects.
 Academic literature on wind wakes between jurisdictions emphasise the need to develop new pan-jurisdictional approaches to deal with the ever-increasing amount of OW in European waters (Finserås et al., 2024). From this we may deduce the following potential measures:
  • Coordinate licensing policies/rounds with neighbouring countries
  • Develop mechanisms to deal with wind wake effects within and between jurisdictions
  • Allow hybrid projects where all or part of the energy is exported to countries other than the one where the offshore wind farm is located.
In April 2025, the US Department of the Interior (DOI) ordered a halt to construction on the Empire Wind 1 project. Empire Wind 1 had secured necessary federal and state permits and is currently under construction (estimated 30 per cent complete). It is being developed under contract with New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA). The pause is part of a broader federal review initiated by President Trump’s administration to reassess offshore wind and other renewable energy projects.
Estimated investments to date total about USD 2.5 billion, with further exposure including guarantees and termination fees of USD 1.5–2 billion. The pause threatens more than USD 1.6 billion in investments across 23 states and more than 3,500 jobs in the Empire Wind’s supply chain.
This decision has sparked a significant backlash from industry organisations, New York state agencies and the governor, who have criticised the move as detrimental to investor confidence in the US renewable energy market. Concerns have also been raised about business predictability, financial investment and increased costs.
One of the implications of uncertain conditions for offshore wind in the US is increased short-term availability of vessels, turbines, capital and qualified personnel for projects in the Nordics. In isolation this could contribute to accelerated deployment. In the longer term, uncertain conditions could reduce expected demand and subsequently the supply of vessels and turbines.
""Image: iStock
Table 4.1: Identified offshore wind (OW) characteristics in selected countries, updated version of table in Anchustegui & Hunter (2024)
Feature
US
CO
AR
DK
FR
UK
SP
NO
CH
TA
JA
SK
AU
Marine and OW planning 
Marine Spatial Planning Framework
 
 
 
X
X
X
X
X
 
 
 
X
 
Declaration/pre-approval of Wind Zones
X
X
 
X
X
X
X
 
X
X
X
 
X
OW targets 
Offshore wind targets in policy/law
 
 
 
X
X
X
 
X
X
X
X
X
 
Governmental preparatory assessments 
Resource mapping before release of area for licensing
X
X
 
X
X
X
 
X
X
X
X
 
 
Regulatory agencies 
Separate wind regulatory agency
 
X
 
X
X
X
 
 
X
 
X
X
 
Regulatory agency combined with other offshore users’ regulator
X
 
X
 
 
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
X
Multiple licensing/permitting regulatory agencies
X
X
 
 
 
 
X
 
X
X
X
 
 
Licensing and concession regime 
Licensing and Concession regime used
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Environmental Impact Assessment permission required
X
 
 
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Consideration of other uses for the marine area in licence or legal framework
 
 
 
X
X
X
X
X
 
 
X
X
 
Consideration of field development plan
X
 
 
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
 
Capacity allocation regime included in licensing regime
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X
 
 
 
Demonstration licences 
Demonstration licence granted
 
X
 
X
 
X
 
(X)
X
X
 
 
X
Support schemes 
Support schemes
X
 
 
X
X
X
 
X
 
X
X
X
 
Allocation of licences 
Bid allocation of licence work programme bidding (WPB) or Cash bidding (CB)
X
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
X
 
 
 
Discretionary allocation of licence using non-price criteria
 
X
 
X
X
X
X
X
X
 
X
X
X
Local content/national value-added requirements
 
 
 
 
 
 
X
X*
 
X
 
 
X
Number of licences required 
Grant of access to wind areas and automatic right to construct installations and infrastructure (access and construction licence combined)
 
 
 
 
X
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X
First access and then construction licence
X
 
 
X
 
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
 
Decommissioning 
Decommissioning planning requirements in licensing regime
X
 
 
X
X
 
 
X
 
X
 
 
 
Compensation to other users/ interests 
Fisheries compensation
 
 
 
(X)
 
 
 
X
 
X
X
 
 
 
CO=Colombia, AR=Argentina, FR=France, SP=Spain, CH=China, TA=Taiwan, JA=Japan, SK=South Korea, AU=Australia.
* The ESA-approved support scheme for the Utsira Nord pilot OW project has elements of national value-added requirements.

4.6 Summary of opportunities

In Table 4.2 we summarise the main measures (and policies) identified in the case countries that contribute to accelerated deployment of offshore wind. The measures are categorised under the main barriers identified in chapter 3. We evaluate the measures based on the extent to which they contribute to acceleration, from high (strongly contribute to acceleration), medium (contribute to acceleration) and low (marginally/do not clearly contribute to acceleration). We briefly discuss the measures in each country. For more details, please see the section on the country in question subchapters 4.1–4.4. We highlight the following points for each of the barriers identified in chapter 3:
Political ambitions and predictability: Germany has three timed and legally binding targets, ensuring steady progress and predictable sector growth through a phased approach. The Netherlands has also followed up targets with a clear pathway, accompanied by a clear action plan that has ensured that targets have been achieved.
Profitability for developers: The UK has developed a tendering scheme that employs a number of mechanisms to lower investment and deployment risks. In the Netherlands, the winning tender bid receives a full-package permit, which lowers costs and risks. The permit covers the lease area, a preliminary study sufficient to complete the initial engineering design, the interconnection substation and the right to construct and operate the facility for up to 40 years.
Regulations: The UK has a clear and stable regulatory framework, including a streamlined, time-bound approval system for major offshore projects, which were classified as Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects. Scotland, Germany and the Netherlands have developed a one-stop shop policy. Germany has also established a centralised geographic allocation method and tender system. Belgium has consistently developed and integrated marine spatial planning to ensure early and effective spatial planning. With an increased focus on sustainability and local content, driven by both EU requirements and national expectations, the efficient implementation of non-price criteria in auctions is particularly important to enhance acceptability and reduce the risk of late project rejections. The review points to practices implemented in Germany and the Netherlands.
Stakeholder involvement: Belgium engages early stakeholders through its marine spatial plan. Scotland has focused on mandatory pre-application consultation of stakeholders, where developers must consult with key stakeholders before submitting their formal application in order to reduce legal challenges and objections later in the permitting process.
Knowledge sharing: The Dutch and Belgian governments have recently focused on providing preliminary site surveys and EIAs for bidders. This reduces investment risks, leading to more competitive bids and streamlined project execution. It also facilitates stakeholder involvement and contributes to quicker permitting process.
Industrial barriers: The market for turbines and vessels is largely global, meaning that developers encounter similar barriers across countries. In the labour market, skills are also largely transferable between nations, particularly within Europe.
Grid connection:In all countries, grid connection is managed by a separate agency, the transmission system operator (TSO), even where a one-stop shop policy has been implemented. In Germany, the TSO is responsible for offshore grid planning and covers the cost of connecting sea platforms, which collect energy from multiple offshore wind farms, to the mainland. In the UK, an alternative model based on competitive Offshore Transmission Owners (OFTOs) has been introduced to help reduce transmission costs.
  • High: Strongly contribute to acceleration of offshore wind deployment.
  • Medium: Contribute to acceleration of offshore wind deployment.
  • Low: Marginally/do not clearly contribute to acceleration of offshore wind deployment.
Driver 
Measure
The UK
Germany
Th­e Nether­lands
Belgium
Political ambitions and predictability
Clear and predictable targets and legislative framework
High
High
High
High
Profitability for developers
Cost reduction mechanisms
High
High
High
High
Regulations
Centralised tendering system
High
High
High
High
Stable but adaptive regulation
High
High
High
High
Efficient permitting processes
Medium
High
High
High
Non-price criteria (NPCs) in Auctions
Low
High
High
Medium
Stakeholder engagement
Efficient stakeholder engagement
Medium
Medium
High
High
Knowledge gathering and sharing
Government survey data shared with bidders
Low
Low
Medium
Medium
Industrial barriers
Contribute to supply chain development
High
Medium
Medium
Medium
Grid connection
Efficient and facilitating grid connection models
Medium
High
High
High
Table 4.2: Overview of main identified drivers and relative score between countries
Nordic Energy Research I www.norden.org/publications I pub@norden.org