2.2 ECAs’ potential role in the global energy transition
So far, the shift of export finance from fossil fuels to RE has been slow, inconsistent (Figure 1) and not in line with the estimated needs for the energy transition. Klasen et al. (2022), for example, estimate that ECAs would need to increase their climate financing more than ten times to EUR 57.4 billion by 2030, to retain their current proportion relative to other institutions’ climate finance flows. As PFIs, all ECAs must be on board to transform the export finance system towards becoming key enablers for clean energy (Schmidt et al., 2024).
Recent research suggests that ECAs have increasingly taken a more proactive role as trade facilitators in addition to being insurers or lenders of last resort (e.g., Klasen et al., 2024). They can become even more active agents of the energy transition if sufficiently ambitious climate-related commitments are made and convergence among a critical mass of like-minded countries is achieved (e.g., Hale et al., 2021), particularly in times of multiple crises (e.g., Lundquist, 2022). For example, energy-related projects have represented a significant share of the overall amount of support that falls under the OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits, suggesting that this forum may have a significant impact on the role of export finance in the energy transition.
Arguably, the starting positions of ECAs inside and outside the OECD vary significantly. If an economy’s exports have traditionally been from fossil-intensive industries, ECAs are likely to have a corresponding portfolio. For example, the portfolio of Denmark’s EIFO is dominated by RE-support. In contrast, the Export-Import Bank of the US (US-EXIM) has never supported environmentally beneficial exports with 5% or more of its total financing authority, despite its dedicated 1992 mandate (Censkowsky et al., 2022; E3F, 2023; see further US-EXIM, 2024). Most countries have at least one domestic sector with the potential to export clean technologies internationally: from turbines (which can be used for RE instead of gas), climate-adapted/adaptation technologies such as hurricane-proof wind turbines to grid and transmission infrastructure, as well as clean transport, to name only a few (Sankaran, 2024). As PFIs, ECAs, no matter their current portfolio, should thus head in the same direction of facilitating energy transitions globally and at home considering that:
ECAs can increase domestic clean energy supply by supporting the import of critical minerals needed for the energy transition, as already done by US-EXIM and Sweden’s EKN, for example (Atkins, 2022; US-EXIM, n.d.). Mining projects are intrinsically high-impact. This makes it even more important that ECAs within the OECD and beyond adopt and adhere to ever-stricter, internationally recognised standards, also considering that ECAs have historically demonstrated significant shortcomings in safeguarding human rights and environmental due diligence (e.g., ECA Watch, 2024). The clean energy sector that ECAs can help bolster and expand is not just generating wealth but also new employment opportunities. Projections by the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimate 30 million new clean energy jobs by 2030 worldwide while fossil fuel jobs might decline by 13 million, from currently 35 and 32 million respectively (IEA, 2023). Some ECAs like UK Export Finance (UKEF) have already started prioritising domestic job creation within the low-carbon and RE sector over protecting employment in the oil and gas (O&G) sector (Shishlov et al., 2022).
2.3 Climate policies and initiatives related to export finance
Several noteworthy commitments targeting international public finance, including export finance, have been made by governments and ECAs in the past few years. Several milestones stand out:
April 2021: Launch of the E3F coalition. E3F is a ‘coalition of the willing’ initiated by France that now consists of ten major European economies – Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK – and aims to promote and support a shift in investment patterns towards climate-neutral and climate-resilient export projects and the publication of joint energy finance transparency reports (E3F, 2022, 2023a, 2024b). In 2023 and 2024, Denmark has been chairing E3F’s rotating presidency. Previous chairs were France, the Netherlands, and Germany.
October 2021: Agreement among participants of the OECD Arrangement to ban support for coal-fired power plants without carbon capture and storage (CCS) (OECD, 2021). While the agreement marks historic progress in integrating climate change considerations into the OECD Arrangement, it still lacks significant additional components, including other parts of coal value chains, e.g., mining and transport, as well as entire O&G value chains, for which there are currently no restrictions whatsoever. At the negotiations that took place in June 2024, the EU, UK, Norway and Canada tabled a proposal for O&G restrictions but the endorsement from the US, South Korea and Japan was still missing by the time of publication of this guide (European Commission, 2024).
November 2021: Statement on International Public Support for the Clean Energy Transition (CETP) launched at COP26 in Glasgow (UK Government, 2021). A UK-led initiative of now 40+ signatories (countries and financial institutions) which commits them to end new direct public support for the international ‘unabated’ fossil fuel sector, except in limited and clearly defined circumstances, within one year of joining the initiative (CETP, n.d.). Throughout 2022 – against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine – signatories reduced their fossil fuel financing but only by USD 6.5 billion while supporting clean energy with an additional USD 5.2 billion (Jones and Mun, 2023). In 2023, CETP signatories financed a total of at least USD 5.2 billion in international fossil fuels, (between USD 10 to 15 billion less compared with the pre-CETP 2019–2021 annual average (Jones et al., 2024).
March 2022: Berne Union launched its Climate Working Group to advance “thought leadership and practices within export credit, trade finance and political risk insurance and contribute to global problem-solving around climate challenges [...]”. Consisting of 15 different institutions, the Climate Working Group is managed by the Berne Union Secretariat and currently focuses on three workstreams: (i) Products, Incentives and Innovation, (ii)Best Practices in Low-Carbon Transition, and (iii) Policy Coherence & Alignment (Berne Union, n.d.).
June 2023: Reform of the Climate Change Sector Understanding (CCSU) under the OECD Arrangement. Through this reform, ECAs were granted new possibilities to support climate mitigation projects (including new technologies), via extending repayment periods, making terms more flexible and reducing minimum guarantee payments (e.g., Finnvera, 2024b).
December 2023: launch of the UN-convened Net-Zero Export Credit Agencies Alliance (NZECA) at COP28 by Sweden’s EKN and SEK, Denmark’s EIFO, Export Development Canada, UK Export Finance, the UAE’s Etihad Credit Export Insurance, Spain’s Cesce and KazakhExport. They aim to “[unite] leading [ECAs] committed to delivering net-zero economies by 2050 [...].” NZECA is the first-of-its-kind net-zero finance alliance of global PFIs, contributing to the goals and activities of the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero (GFANZ), and whose members have supported USD 120 billion in international trade in 2022, including clean energy. They have committed to ”[transition] all operational and attributable [GHG] emissions from business activities in alignment with the path to net zero by mid-century, or sooner [...]” and to ”[publish] GHG emission data and evidence annually to showcase action in line with the commitments [...].” (NZECA, 2023, n.d.)