COVID‑19 — lessons learned and future resilience

Paper 5 – Lessons from Covid-19 effects on small Nordic water supplies: future resilience and vulnerability

No immediate, widespread service failures in small supplies were attributed to COVID‑19. During the COVID-19 pandemic the main challenges or problems reported by interviewees were vulnerabilities in staffing or system management, see Fig. 6. Among specific experiences reported by interviewees, one of the supplies interviewed, had a staff of two. Both had to quarantine because of COVID-19 but a recently retired employee took over with support from local contractors. The case illustrates strong local unity in the small settlements, which increases resilience but is often underestimated.

Problems experienced in COVID-19	Supports resilience in COVID-19
Staff related strain Short of staff More cleaning needed	Contingency plan In place and tested for working
System managing Reserve delivery problematic Water patterns consumption changing	Contextual support Assistance from authorities National associations / local support
Sampling and monitoring Problem in transport (less local traffic) Inspection and sampling inhouse not allowed Delayed maintenance	Technical and management Automation of water supplies Safe IT RBA in place Reserve equipments secured Infrastructure in good conditions
Contextual factors Support from authorities lacking Less meeting attendance

Figure 6 Problems experienced or anticipated in the COVID-19 pandemic, and factors expected to increase resilience against COVID-19, as mentioned in initial and hindsight interviews.

System management implications included delayed maintenance built up during the pandemic and constraints in delivery of spare part and other consumables. Contingency plans for a pandemic or epidemic were inconsistent in some countries and sometimes unworkable for small water supplier‑level. Several operators complained about the contingency plan e.g., that the plan precluded two employees working together, but some repairs such as pipe failure could not be done by one person alone or relying on extra staff from a neighbouring water supply, was considered unrealistic, reasoning that system-specific knowledge is needed to operate it. There were also surveillance disruptions and difficulties in transporting samples to the laboratories. Automation and remote communication supported continuous system operation without human encounters; cyber‑security challenges and supply logistics difficulties were evident (Fig. 6).

We interpret these findings as highlighting the value of integrating epidemic preparedness into RBA risk assessment and contingency planning; ensuring active support from the authorities, professional associations and locally in the sector; ensuring reserve equipment, and safe IT and prioritize automation of the water supply. Small settlements and their water systems have specific vulnerabilities that require appropriate planned responses.