8. Strategies to address unlawful influence

To gain an understanding of how unlawful influence is addressed and prevented in the Nordic countries, official documents such as strategies, reports, legislative proposals and handbooks have been analysed. A total of 17 publicly available documents from the past decade were included in the analysis (listed in Appendix). As no relevant strategic documents from Iceland were found, the country is only represented in the comparison of penalty scales in this chapter. The following presentation will examine strategic documents, changes in legislation and other prevention practices respectively, to provide an overview of the official responses to unlawful influence in the Nordic countries to date.

8.1. Strategic documents

Sweden

In recent years, several Nordic countries have launched strategic programmes to combat organised crime, in which the issue of unlawful influence has been addressed. The Swedish national strategy Resistance and Decisive Action (Government Offices of Sweden, 2025) identifies as one of its five main goals to “build robustness against unlawful and undue influence” (p. 31). This includes safeguarding the integrity of public decision-making and preventing internal threats posed by insiders and infiltrators, through measures such as maintaining rigorous recruitment processes and strengthening internal security work within government agencies.

As a part of the Swedish national strategy, the government has decided on regulatory amendments granting the prison and probation service, the prosecution authority, the economic crime authority, and the courts extended powers to screen individuals against the criminal and suspicion registers (Justitiedepartementet, 2025b). In practical terms, these amendments mean that the prosecution authority, the economic crime authority and the courts are allowed to screen all individuals employed by these authorities, while the prison and probation service gains broader powers to screen individuals who are granted access to prisons and to check individuals who will work in halfway houses, care homes and under contract care. The Swedish government is also more generally investigating the need for and conditions of background checks in both the public and private sectors (Justitiedepartementet, 2025a). The aim is through legislation to provide organisations with appropriate tools to prevent infiltration and unlawful influence.

Denmark

In Denmark’s most recent strategic programme against gang crime, Gang Package IV, organised crime is described as harmful to society (“samfundsundergravende kriminalitet og samfundsskadelig aktiviteter”). However, in this respect, the proposed responses focus primarily on economic strategies to combat organised crime (Justitsministeriet, 2023). Another important aspect in the Danish strategic programmes against gang crime concerning unlawful influence, have been the safeguarding of witnesses. In Gang Package III, in 2017, it was agreed upon that citizens who wish to report or testify against members of biker or gang groups, and who require it, should have the option to receive a personal attack alarm (Justitsministeriet, 2017a). The more recent gang package included attempts to enhance the safety of witnesses and victims in their interactions with the justice system (Justitsministeriet, 2023).

Finland

Similarly to Sweden, the latest Finnish strategy and action plan to address organised crime highlights the risk of organised crime infiltrating the basic structures of society. Justice sector authorities, other public agencies and the business sector are specifically mentioned as potential targets of harassment, violence and other forms of influence. The strategy outlines three concrete measures to address this: investigating unlawful influence targeting public authorities and strengthening prevention; ensuring that organisations have response protocols for situations involving threats and extortion; and assessing the support needs of victims of organised crime (Junninen, 2025). The strategy was preceded by a research project examining Nordic models for combating organised crime (Muttilainen et al., 2025), which provided the groundwork for the strategy update.

Norway

In a Norwegian white paper on child, youth and gang crime from 2021, the topic of intimidation-based crime (trusselbasert kriminalitet) is discussed. Particular concern is expressed about a culture of hostility to the police, fostered in gang environments, as well as the potential for established gang members to use violence to influence authorities in the justice sector. However, none of the strategic measures outlined in the report directly address such forms of unlawful influence (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2020).

In the 2025 state budget, the Norwegian government launched Gang Package 2 to strengthen efforts against organised crime, with a strong focus on combating economic crime and criminal masterminds. The goal was to enhance the fight against money laundering and corruption in a broad sense, as economic crime is often carried out by criminal networks. One objective was to carry out a project reviewing existing investigation materials to identify signs of corruption and other serious crimes linked to organised crime. In parallel, the aim was to conduct a project to map risks, particularly related to corruption, within specific industries and sectors of society, including the involvement of professional intermediaries and facilitators (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2024).

Action plans against corruption

Beyond the efforts to address organised crime, several Nordic countries have implemented action plans to address corruption, which are relevant to the prevention of unlawful influence. In 2024, Sweden launched a joint action plan addressing both corruption and unlawful influence (Regeringskansliet, 2024), viewing the two phenomena as closely linked and requiring partly overlapping responses. This development is not reflected in the other Nordic countries or in international anti-corruption initiatives.

The Swedish action plan on corruption and unlawful influence includes measures to expand inter-agency cooperation and monitoring of anti-corruption efforts to encompass unlawful influence (Regeringskansliet, 2024). Additionally, it emphasises raising awareness about unlawful influence, strengthening control and security mechanisms within municipalities and government agencies, and enhancing protections for public employees and elected officials.

Finland’s anti-corruption strategy and action plan contains numerous references to both organised crime and unlawful influence (Mäntysalo, 2025). Regarding unlawful influence, the document states that investigations will be conducted into unlawful influence directed at authorities, as well as attempts at corruption and vulnerabilities related to official activities, as part of the strategy to combat organised crime. In addition, the document includes references to other themes related to unlawful influence, such as the protection of whistleblowers and the promotion of integrity among public officials and ministers.

8.2. Changes in legislation

Several official documents from the last decade that address unlawful influence are proposals for legislative changes. These government bills primarily concern how to protect public employees against violence, threats and harassment. Sweden has made legislative proposals on strengthened legal protection for emergency response activities and the execution of official duties (Prop 2015/16:113), police personnel (Prop 2019/20:186), and public employees (Prop 2024/25:141). In Finland, proposals on strengthening the legal protection for police and emergency operations have been put forward (Finnish Government, 2025). Denmark has suggested to strengthen the protection for all public officials against violence, threats and harassment by increasing the penalties by 50% (Justitsministeriet, 2025).

Sweden introduced legislation that gives the opportunity for witnesses to be heard anonymously during a preliminary investigation and in criminal cases in court. The purpose is to strengthen witness protection and to break the culture of silence within and around criminal gangs, thereby improving the ability to investigate and solve crimes (Prop. 2024/25:20). Similar provisions exist in Norway, Denmark and Finland, although they can be applied only in very limited circumstances and are therefore used very rarely (SOU 2023:67).

Penalty levels for crimes against public officials

Penalties for offences against public officials have increased in Sweden in recent years, and changes have been proposed also in Finland and Denmark. To get an overview of the different sentence levels applied in the Nordic countries, we have compared the penalty levels for sentences against public officials (Table 2). Offences against public officials are the legal provisions typically applied when a justice sector official is subjected to unlawful influence in the form of threats and violence, although such cases also often involve additional offences depending on the circumstances. Comparing penalty levels is challenging, as there are many country-specific factors affecting sentencing. The comparison is therefore primarily indicative of general trends. Some conclusions can nonetheless be drawn from it.

Firstly, the range of applicable sentences is broader in Sweden than in the other Nordic countries. Sweden has more specific and detailed criminalisation of offences against public officials than the other Nordic countries. Yet, the penalty levels are not significantly higher, despite recent increases. For example, for aggravated violence against public officials, the maximum sentence in Sweden is 6 years, while in Denmark it is 8 years (with the possibility of doubling if it involves staff in prison and probation service), 6 years in Iceland (8 years if the victim is legally authorised to use force), and 6 years in Norway (with the possibility of 10 years if it involves firearm violence against the police). If the crime in Sweden concerns aggravated sabotage of emergency service activities (meaning police, rescue service and ambulance), 8 years or a life sentence can be implemented. Finland stands out with a lower maximum sentence of 4 years for aggravated violence against public officials. Finland aims to introduce new offences criminalising the obstruction or disruption of police and emergency service operations; however, this will not increase the maximum sentence (Finnish Government, 2025). In autumn 2025, Denmark signalled a tougher stance by announcing that it will double the penalties for violence, threats and harassment against public officials (Justitsministeriet, 2025). The Danish proposal also suggests that the provision regarding harassment should, more than at present, apply to activities on social media.

It appears that Sweden, with its broad range of penalties, has a lower threshold for recognising and punishing crimes against public officials. In particular, the newly introduced crime of insulting a public official clearly lowers the threshold for what is considered criminal. The motivation for the new crime was the development of an increasingly disrespectful and coarse tone between people, not least online. The insults to public officials are considered to be not only an attack on the individual, but also on the public service itself, as it makes it more difficult for individual public officials to carry out their duties (Prop 2024/25:141).

Secondly, the comparison of penalty levels shows that several countries have specified certain professional groups as having particularly important roles, and that offences against these groups should be punished more severely to protect them. This applies to the prison and probation service (Denmark), police (Iceland, Norway, and Sweden), customs (Iceland), and rescue and ambulance services (Sweden).

Thirdly, several countries have more or less explicitly mentioned organised crime as an aggravating circumstance in crimes against public officials within their penal codes. In Norway, an offence against a public official is considered aggravated if it is committed as part of the activities of an organised criminal group or is otherwise particularly harmful to society (chapter 19, section 155). Similarly, in Iceland, it is an aggravating factor if the crime was committed by a group; the initiators and leaders of the attack are to be given proportionally harsher punishments. In Sweden, “reference to a capacity for violence” (“anspelning på ett våldskapital”) is mentioned as an aggravating circumstance in violence against public officials (chapter 17, section 1). The term capacity for violence, or intimidation capital, is indeed intended as a formulation that targets organised criminal networks and groups (chapter 12, art. 107). In Denmark, there is no specific mentioning of organised crime, but a general gang provision on doubling of penalties that can be applied. The gang provision can be enacted if the offence is motivated by, or is likely to incite, a conflict between groups, and knives or other bladed weapons, firearms, or explosives are used in that conflict (Straffeloven, Denmark, § 81 a).

Table 2. Penalty scales for offences against public officials in the different Nordic countries (see the legislation section in the list of references)

DENMARK
Offence	Penalty
Violence or threats of violence against public official (Ch. 14, § 119 (1))	Fine or imprisonment for at most 8 years.* When committed against an employee of the correctional services, the penalty may be increased to up to twice the standard sentence ( Ch.14, § 119 (5)).
Obstruction of the duties of a public official (Ch. 14, § 119 (4))	Fine or imprisonment for at most 1 year and 6 months.
Violation of the peace of a public official by contacting, stalking or otherwise harassing them (Ch. 14, § 119 a)	Fine or imprisonment for at most 2 years.*
Assault of a public official with the use of an object (Ch. 14, § 119 b)	Fine or imprisonment for at most 8 years. When committed against an employee of the correctional services, the penalty may be increased to up to twice the standard sentence (Ch. 14, § 119 b (2)).
Assault of a public official through mockery, abusive language or other offensive remarks (Ch. 14, § 121)	Fine or imprisonment for at most 1 year.

FINLAND
Offence	Penalty
Obstructing a public official (Ch. 16, § 3)	Fine
Resistance to a public official (Ch. 16, § 2)	Fine or to imprisonment for at most six months
Violent resistance to a public official (Ch.16, § 1)	Imprisonment for at least four months and at most four years.
Insubordination to the police, a border guard or a customs officer (Ch.16, § 4, 4a, 4b)	Fine or to imprisonment for at most six months

ICELAND
Offence	Penalty
Obstructing a public employee (Ch. XII, art.106)	Fine or imprisonment up to 1 year. If directed at someone with the powers of a police officer or customs official, imprisonment of up to 2 years may be applied.
Attacking, with violence or threats of violence, or obstructing a public employee (Ch. XII, art.106)	Fine or imprisonment for up to 6 years. If directed at a public employee legally authorised to use physical force, imprisonment of up to 8 years may be applied.
Where the offence described in Article 106 is committed by a group of persons, the initiators and leaders of the attack shall be given proportionally more severe punishments, (Ch. XII, art.107)	Imprisonment up to 8 years

NORWAY
Offence	Penalty
Violence, threats, vandalism or other unlawful conduct against public officials (Ch. 19, § 155)	Fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years
Aggravated violence or threats against public officials (Ch. 19, § 156)	Imprisonment for at most 6 years
Minimum penalty for the use of firearms, etc., against the police (Ch. 19, § 155 b)	Imprisonment for at least one year and at most 10 years
Obstruction of a public official (Ch. 19, § 156)	Fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months
Protection of service weapon (Ch. 19, § 156 a)	Imprisonment for at most 6 years
Obstruction of justice (Ch. 19, § 157)	Imprisonment for at most 6 years
Aggravated obstruction of justice (Ch. 19, § 158)	Imprisonment for at least one year

SWEDEN
Offence	Penalty
Insulting of public official (Ch. 17, § 3)	Fine or imprisonment for at most six months (introduced as a new offence on 2 July 2025).
Violent resistance against a public official (Ch. 17, § 4)	Fine or imprisonment for at most six months.
Abuse of a public official (Ch. 17, § 2§)	Fine or imprisonment for at most two years.
Gross abuse of a public official (Ch. 17, § 2)	Imprisonment for at least six months and at most six years.
Violence or threat against a public official (Ch. 17, § 1)	Fine or imprisonment for at most three years.
Gross violence or threat against a public official (Ch. 17, § 1)	Imprisonment for at least one year and six months and at most eight years.
Sabotage of emergency service activities (Ch. 13, § 5c)	Imprisonment for at most four years.
Gross sabotage of emergency service activities (Ch.13, § 5c)	Imprisonment for a fixed term of at least two and at most 18 years, or for life.

* It has been proposed that the penalty be increased by 50%.

8.3. Examples of prevention practices

Legal regulations aim to prevent the types of undesirable behaviour specified in the legislation. At the same time, the legislators recognise that recent efforts to broaden the legal framework have their limits: unlawful influence can only be prevented to a limited extent through legislation. Therefore, it is important to focus on other prevention practices, such as preventing violent situations through employers’ risk management measures, training, and effective cooperation between authorities (Finnish Government, 2025; Government Offices of Sweden, 2025). The following sections present some of the most central official preventive measures that have been implemented in the Nordic countries.

Handbooks on how to prevent and manage unlawful influence

Sweden has published a set of handbooks on how to prevent and manage unlawful influence. Brå has released several such handbooks over the years, with the most recent in 2025 (Brå, 2025b). These handbooks are based on data from Brå’s surveys on unlawful influence and provide guidance and information for primarily public authorities and municipalities but can be applicable to all types of organisations.

The latest handbook contains concrete tools and strategies for preventing attempts at unlawful influence and focuses on general preventive measures, situational assessment, measures to reduce risk and good incident management. Table 3 summarizes the central strategies of the handbook.

Another of Brå’s handbooks focuses on how to act against crime and risks connected to parallel societal structures (Brå, 2022). The handbook presents how unlawful influence can be integrated into different societal structures, with parallel systems of justice being most critical to the justice sector. Parallel justice refers to decisions that disregard established laws, for example, through unofficial so-called courts, appointed mediators or the imposition of fines within criminal environments. Preventive practices, according to the handbook, are long-term, knowledge-based and trust-building measures to strengthen the legitimacy of authorities. They include dialogue, police interventions, legal support and information on the rights and available support, especially for women and other marginalised groups.

Table 3. Strategies for preventing attempts at unlawful influence.
Source: Brå (2025b). Handbok för att förebygga otillåten påverkan.

Strategies for preventing attempts at unlawful influence
General preventive measures
Leadership commitment to the issue. Promote an open and safe organisational culture. Increase knowledge among managers and employees and involve different parts of the organisation.
Situation assessment
An understanding of the scope of the problem and the risks specific to the organisation, based on information from various sources (incident documentation, employee surveys and dialogues, information from the police and other cooperation partners) as well as risk analyses and internal controls.
Risk-reduction measures
Rotation and the four-eyes principle: Rotate cases between different case officers, or have several case officers handle the same case, and ensure staffing levels that increase safety. Working alone can heighten vulnerability to both threats and violence, as well as the risk of being recruited as an enabler. Conversations and supervision to identify risks, vulnerabilities, and exposure. Communicate routines both internally and externally: Clear guidelines reduce the risk of employees being manipulated or recruited as enablers for criminal networks. Review access to information: Many employees have access to significantly more information than is necessary (Brå 2024). Access to sensitive information increases the risk that an employee, either voluntarily or involuntarily, could become an enabler for criminal actors. Unlimited access to the organization’s premises also constitutes a security risk. Strengthen the recruitment process through reference checks, background checks, and security vetting of positions.
Incident management
Good incident management enables the collection of valuable information about incidents, which is essential for creating a situational assessment and further developing preventive measures: Incident reporting, as well as the possibility to report signs of potential enablers. Police reports. Whistleblower functions. Support for employees who have been subjected to threats or incidents.

Other prevention practices

A project on unlawful influence, “Motverka hotet från insidan” (“Countering the Threat from Within”), has been carried out in Sweden in recent years among the government agencies cooperating to address organised crime (Polismyndigheten, 2025a). The project had three main objectives: (1) to raise awareness, (2) to harmonise working methods, and (3) to propose legislative amendments concerning unlawful influence, insiders and infiltration. The joint project has resulted in information initiatives, the establishment of a new HR network, and increased cooperation aimed at preventing and addressing this threat to the authorities. Several agencies have submitted requests for legislative amendments to enable better background checks – which have been acknowledged by the government. New regulations are expected to provide better opportunities to carry out checks in order to prevent and detect risks related to insiders and infiltration.

Sweden has also institutionalised reporting of risk analyses on unlawful influence within government activities. The 72 government agencies covered by the Regulation on Internal Governance and Control are required to, in their risk analysis, identify the most significant risks in the agency’s operations, such as corruption, unlawful influence, fraud and other irregularities. In these risk reports, the Swedish Social Insurance Agency, the Swedish Prison and Probation Service, the Swedish Enforcement Authority and the National Board of Institutional Care have identified unlawful influence in the form of harassment, threats and violence as a significant risk (Riksrevisionen, 2022).

In Denmark, victim protection has been a key focus. A service review of the first three gang packages notes that measures such as questioning witnesses via telecommunications and denying access to court hearings have been implemented (Justitsministeriet, 2022). Additionally, 60 personal alarm devices were purchased for distribution to citizens who wish to report or testify against gang or biker group members. Experience with these alarms varies: some districts have issued only a few gang-related cases, while others up to 20. The Danish National Police conclude that the availability of alarms has not clearly increased witnesses’ willingness to speak to the police, although several districts report that alarms can provide reassurance and strengthen the relationship between victims or witnesses and authorities.