3. Unlawful influence in the Swedish justice sector

This chapter is based on several research studies on unlawful influence, including victim surveys, interview studies and a research overview, as well as a study on workplace-related violence in Sweden. Additionally, two audit reports from the Swedish National Audit Office have been used. Reports from government agencies, including the police, the prison and probation service, the courts administration, the parliamentary ombudsman and the joint cooperation of agencies against organised crime, were also incorporated. Furthermore, a Swedish government official report, the National Security Strategy and the national strategy against organised crime were utilised, along with statistics on reported offences against public officials. Finally, some media coverage, particularly on more recent phenomena not yet examined in research, was included.

3.1. Unlawful influence in Sweden

The Swedish Crime Prevention Council (Brå) has been pioneering in the research concerning unlawful influence. It started with a survey on unlawful influence directed public servants in 2005, where the concept of unlawful influence (otillåten påverkan) was coined (Brå, 2005). This survey found that 12% of the officials in the survey (including officials from coastguard, customs, tax administration, police, court and the enforcement agency, N=4,500) had been exposed to unlawful influence in the form of serious harassment, threats or violence in the last 1.5 years. Organised criminal groups were reported to be responsible for one quarter of the incidents of unlawful influence (Brå, 2005). In a similar but much larger study (N=45,500) conducted in 2015 (Brå, 2016b), the level of unlawful influence seemed to have increased, but more importantly there were big differences in which authorities and public officials were subject to this. People involved in organised crime seemed to be primarily interested in influencing officials at the customs, police authority, prosecution authority and prison and probation service. Besides these two studies, Brå studied unlawful influence on municipal employees and governance (Brå, 2025c), elected representatives (Brå, 2023), police employees (Brå, 2020), the sports sector (Brå, 2018), the Swedish Migration Agency (Brå, 2016a), companies (Brå, 2012) public procurement (Brå, 2009a), and crime victims and witnesses (Brå, 2008). Relatedly, Brå researched cultures of silence (Brå, 2019), threats and violence (Brå, 2015), corruption in the Swedish public sector (Brå, 2014) and the police’s encounter with organised crime (Brå, 2009b).

The latest study from Brå (2025c) concludes that organised criminal groups are interested in influencing municipal employees, such as social services. There are special vulnerabilities on the municipal level, such as proximity between the influencer and victims, that increase the risk of both victimisation and successful influence (see also Gunnarson, 2023). Likewise, the Swedish enforcement authority, migration agency, social insurance agency and tax agency have been mentioned as important targets for unlawful influence by organised crime. It has been pointed out that as efforts to combat organised crime in Sweden today include an increasing range of authorities, it is likely to provoke further violence, threats and harassment directed at staff in these institutions (SOU 2024: 1).

Characteristics of unlawful influence by organised crime

Altogether, the studies from Brå paint a picture of unlawful influence by organised crime that is more strategic compared to other types of influence, and often comes in subtle forms that are not criminal offences, or that are hard to prove (Brå, 2009b, 2016b, 2025c). Some traits however stand out as typical for unlawful influence by organised crime: threatening behaviour, threats based on criminal connections, and by outnumbering single victims (Brå, 2016b, 2025c). Four distinctive features of unlawful influence by organised crime are recognised (Brå, 2016b, pp. 122–124):

Legal awareness and targeting:
The individuals exerting influence often have strong legal knowledge, enabling them to act in ways that are difficult to prosecute. They also tend to have detailed information about the official they are trying to influence. This influence may be subtle, testing whether a public servant is open to invitations – potentially recruiting them as an insider.
Subtle intimidation:
The influence may involve subtle signals intended to show the official that they are being watched or monitored.
Disruption ("making a scene"):
Tactics may include creating disturbances with the goal of interfering with official duties, such as causing disorder during court proceedings.
Personal targeting:
The public servant may be held personally accountable for decisions or actions, with attempts made to influence them by attacking their private life.

Primarily very concrete incidents, such as direct threats or acts of violence, ideally witnessed by other public officials, result in convictions for threats or violence against public servants (Brå, 2016b). Actors who use more subtle forms of threats and harassment are rarely investigated. As shown in several studies, these more subtle forms of influence are just as commonly used by organised criminal groups (Brå, 2005, 2009a; Gunnarson, 2023; Riksrevisionen, 2022).

How unlawful influence occurs

In Sweden, unlawful influence is regarded as a national security issue. The latest National Security Strategy notes that infiltration, corruption, and threats or unlawful influence are growing and serious threats to the integrity of public institutions and the business sector (Skr. 2023/24:163). Criminal networks’ attempts to build parallel societal structures and to challenge the state’s monopoly on power and the use of force in certain parts of the country are considered a threat to national security.

Several Swedish government agencies are cooperating in a joint initiative against organised crime (the OB initiative) and publish a biannual situation report on organised crime in Sweden. In the latest report (Polismyndigheten, 2025b), unlawful influence is understood as part of the criminal infrastructure that enables organised crime and affects democratic decision-making. As serious examples of unlawful influence, the report mentions cases where insiders within law enforcement authorities have shared information with criminal actors, as well as indications that unlawful influence occurs through connections between criminal actors and individuals working in public authorities – although the report does not specify which authorities. An older situation report assessed that more advanced forms of unlawful influence are likely to become more common, as well as threats and assaults perpetrated by minors (Polismyndigheten, 2023).

A survey by the Swedish National Audit Office across a range of public authorities found that in 13% of the reported incidents involving harassment, threats or violence, the perpetrators were linked to organised crime (Riksrevisionen, 2022). Influence associated with organised crime was typically more systematic and calculated in nature, and often more serious and difficult to manage. According to the survey, the police authority and the Swedish National Board of Institutional Care were the public institutions most frequently exposed to harassment, threats and violence, while the enforcement authority, the social insurance agency, and the inspection activities of the national food agency were the main targets of more systematic influence connected to organised crime.

Reported offence against public officials

Interestingly, and somewhat contrary to what the abovementioned surveys and reports on unlawful influence suggest, there has not been any clear increase in reported offences against public officials in Sweden over the past decade, with the exception of reported threats (see Figure 1). Violence against public officials (including police and public order officers) has decreased over the past decade, from about 4,600 to 3,600 incidents per year, while threats against public officials have increased from approximately 5,500 to 6,500 annually. These figures include all reported offences and are not limited to organised crime. This trend concerns both the number of reported and convicted cases of threats and violence against public officials (Brå, 2025a, 2025d), as well as the work environment authority’s statistics on reported workplace accidents caused by threats and violence (Riksrevisionen, 2022). It is noteworthy that there has not been any increase in violence, given the large focus on the topic in Sweden. What this statistic of reported cases confirms, however, is that threats are much more prevalent than violent acts, which previous surveys have suggested, and that these have increased more than violent acts during the last decade.

Figure 1. Reported offences against public authorities in Sweden, 2013–2024
Source: Brå (2025a).

A possible reason for the perceived rise in harassment, threats and violence is the increased awareness of such incidents. Incidents which previously would not have been regarded as threats or harassment are now seen as such (Riksrevisionen, 2022; Wikman & Rickfors, 2017). The statistics show that this is not reflected in reporting to the police, which suggests that a lot of events are not considered illegal acts or left unreported. Moreover, only a small proportion of reported cases results in prosecution: out of a total of 9,958 reported cases of violence and threats against public officials, only 1,313 resulted in prosecution in 2024 (Brå, 2025a, 2025d).

Unreported unlawful influence

Leaving unlawful influence unreported appears to be common in Sweden. A study by the police authority estimated that 62% of those subjected to unlawful influence had not reported the incident (Projekt Medarbetarskydd, referenced in SOU 2024: 1, p. 78). The mentioned reasons for not reporting are many (Brå, 2025c, pp. 75–78; Riksrevisionen, 2022, p. 60):

the legislation is insufficient or unclear, uncertainty about whether certain types of actions are criminal or not
the actions are considered as part of the job
not wanting to break the trust or relationship with the client with whom they must continue to work
reporting is not considered to lead to any result, it may even worsen the situation
preliminary investigations are often discontinued – particularly in cases involving threats and harassment committed online
not wanting, or daring, to appear in court as private individuals in a trial
the resulting penalties are considered too lenient to deter serious criminals
not feeling enough support from the authority they work for

In some authorities, however, such as the Swedish Enforcement Authority, most cases of violence, threats and harassment are in fact reported (Riksrevisionen, 2022).

An example of the impact that criminalisation can have on reporting levels is the crime of insulting a public official in Sweden, introduced in 2025. During its first three months in effect, the law was actively applied, with 710 reported offences (SVT Nyheter, 2025). This contrasts with the period before the law, when insults against public officials were not covered by specific legislation, and the number of individuals prosecuted for insults decreased from 147 in 2011 to 40 in 2021 (Riksrevisionen, 2022). The new law has sparked public debate, with discussions concerning its necessity and what public officials are expected to tolerate. So far, its application has shown that more severe insults (such as “I wish your children dead”) have resulted in convictions, whereas insults perceived as less serious (such as calling police officers “whores”) have been dismissed (SVT Nyheter, 2025).

Insiders

Research and government agency reports have identified the use of insiders as a distinct and serious form of unlawful influence exerted by organised crime (Brå, 2014, 2024; Polismyndigheten, 2025b). Beyond Brå’s 2024 report, there is currently little additional research specifically addressing the use of insiders. According to this report, criminal networks use insiders or enablers, within public and private organisations to facilitate criminal activities, avoid detection, reduce or avoid criminal penalties or other sanctions, and launder proceeds of crime through legal sectors.

Brå (2024) notes that the justice system is particularly exposed to insiders, primarily regarding exchange of information between insiders and criminal networks. Besides the justice system, insiders have been identified within several other government agencies, municipalities, the banking and finance sector, real estate agencies, company formation services, accounting and bookkeeping firms, legal services, the security and surveillance industry, and the transport sector. The use of insiders often appears to be a strategic response to increased control and investigative efforts by authorities and municipalities, and a way for criminal networks to expand and diversify their illegal activities.

According to Brå’s study (2024), insiders were often individuals that the person recruiting already knew; family members, relatives, childhood friends or someone who held positions or jobs within legal society that could be useful. The criminal networks’ use of intimidation and coercive power makes it difficult for individuals to refuse once they have been drawn in as insiders. Moreover, the study showed that employers often find it challenging to detect and investigate insider activity.

3.2. The police

Police officers are the occupational group most frequently subjected to violence, threats and unlawful influence. According to a study conducted in 2016, a total of 40% of police employees reported being subjected to one or more attempts at influence during the past 18 months (Brå, 2020). The factor that most affected the risk of exposure was the person’s professional role, especially for those working as frontline police officers. According to the study, influence clearly had an impact on the behaviour of police employees. It was common for those affected to change their behaviour in their private lives as a result of the influence, but also to change or leave their job. Most report having no larger consequences due to the attempted influence, but there are still employees that face consequences, such as hesitating before taking action or avoiding work tasks.

In 2019, the police internally audited their management of risks related to unlawful influence (Internrevisionen, 2019). The report identifies a normalisation process, in which employees are forced to tolerate and accept subtle threats in the workplace. This normalisation primarily concerns undue influence and is described as a constant wear-and-tear in daily work. The report refers to a survey conducted by the police authority in 2018 (as a part of Projekt Medarbetarskydd), which showed that one in four police employees had been subjected to attempts at influence during the past year. Among frontline police officers, the figure was as high as seven in ten. The report further indicated that new officers appear to be more exposed than experienced ones, as they are “tested” by criminals.

The Swedish police regularly monitor the prevalence of unlawful influence through their internal survey on employee safety. This survey also shows that the most vulnerable group is frontline personnel, with 60% of frontline police officers reporting that they have been subjected to unlawful or undue influence (Polisen, 2024). According to the survey conducted in 2024 were organised criminal networks responsible for 63% of the attempts of unlawful influence. Looking at the number of reported offences of violence against police officers, the numbers fluctuated somewhat over the past decade, but without any drastic increase (see Figure 1).

Cases of insider activity or corruption within the Swedish police have also been reported in recent years. Most of these cases have come to light through media; reports of police officers loyal to criminal relatives, illegal arms deals, leaks of sensitive information to criminal networks, and inappropriate sexual relationships (Erlandsson & Örstadius, 2024b; Erlandsson & Sadikovic, 2025; Örstadius & Erlandsson, 2025). Confidential information is leaked to organised crime, and in many cases the police cannot determine the source (Erlandsson & Örstadius, 2024a). According to an investigation by Dagens Nyheter (Erlandsson & Örstadius, 2024b), of 514 reports of suspected leaks since 2018, at least 30 police employees have been identified as security risks and either forced to resign or have resigned voluntarily. In 14 cases, there was strong evidence, including court judgements in several instances, showing that police employees have disclosed classified information to organised criminals. Two patterns emerged from the investigation: female police employees entering sexual relationships with criminals, and police employees with foreign backgrounds being pressured by criminal family-based networks.

3.3. The prison and probation service

Unlawful influence is considered a significant security threat to the Swedish Prison and Probation Service, as an increasing number of clients have ties to organised crime (Kriminalvården, 2025). Since 2022, employees within the prison and probation service have begun reporting attempts at unlawful influence. Notably, probation officers have this far been overrepresented in the reported serious cases of attempted undue influence.

In recent years, the prison and probation service has hired a large number of new staff, which is seen to heighten the risks of unlawful influence and infiltration. To address these concerns, the agency has strengthened its procedures around security vetting, interviews, and training connected to the hiring process (Kriminalvården, 2025).

Internal reporting of threats, violence and unlawful influence against employees within the Swedish Prison and Probation Service have increased in recent years. For example incidents of violence against prison staff have risen significantly, from 197 cases in 2020 to 617 in 2024 (Kriminalvården, 2023, 2025). However, the proportion of these incidents related to organised crime has not been disclosed. The annual reports of the prison and probation service, however, link this trend to the growing number of clients connected to organised criminal groups.

As the issue of undue and unlawful influence has gained prominence within the prison and probation system, it has brought along challenges. The Swedish Parliamentary Ombudsman (JO) has expressed concern that even legitimate expressions of dissatisfaction by prisoners are at times being reported as unlawful influence. The ombudsman emphasises the importance of accurate, well-founded reports and the need for clear criteria in determining what constitutes undue or unlawful influence (Justitieombudsmannen, 2025).

3.4. Courts and prosecutors

An assessment of the security situation in the Swedish courts, based on compiled incident reports, shows that in 2023 there was one reported case of violence against staff, 85 reports of threats, and 27 reports of harassment (Domstolsverket, 2024). No information is available on the extent to which these incidents are connected to organised crime. The overall assessment is that the level of exposure is not considered particularly high, nor drastically increasing. However, the societal climate has become harsher, and this affects the courts to such an extent that security measures must be adjusted accordingly.

There have been cases in Sweden where defence lawyers leaked information to major criminal networks in Stockholm (SVT Nyheter, 2022). This has resulted in a government inquiry commissioned to examine measures aimed at reinforcing the integrity of the justice system and enhancing the legal profession’s resistance to criminal infiltration (Strömmer et al., 2024)

Operational prosecutors at the Swedish Prosecution Authority and the Swedish Economic Crime Authority received an online survey during one working week (Brå, 2019). The same survey was sent over the course of four weeks in 2018. The percentage who reported suspected attempts to influence varied somewhat over the four weeks but was between 7% and 9%. In total during the four weeks, 18% or 120 public prosecutors, stated that they perceived attempts to influence. The most common influencer was the suspected perpetrator (64% of the public prosecutors stated this alternative), but it could also be a relative of the person suspected of the offence, someone entirely different or an unknown person.

Threats against victims and witnesses

According to Sweden’s national strategy to address organised crime, there is a pervasive culture of silence surrounding criminal networks (Skr. 2023/24:67). Fear of threats and violence from these groups makes people too afraid to testify or even speak to law enforcement (Brå, 2019, 2025c). This culture of silence has spread beyond the networks, obstructing criminal investigations.

According to a study on unlawful influence on victims and witnesses (Brå, 2008), organised criminals typically seek to protect their business operations. This study found that victims were most commonly affected, while it was uncommon for witnesses to be targeted. When directed at outsiders, organised crime primarily used implicit threats and signals. The influence within networks, which was more common, was far less subtle, with direct threats and violence being the most frequent forms of unlawful influence. A more recent study on cultures of silence (Brå, 2019) reported similar findings. However, in the newer survey of prosecutors regarding suspected attempts to influence victims or witnesses, the prosecutors more frequently stated that such offences were committed as part of organised crime.

The Swedish Police Authority has a Victim and Personal Security Unit (Bops) that assesses the risk of individuals being exposed to threats and violence and implements protective measures when needed (Riksrevisionen, 2024). The focus areas are domestic violence, organised crime, and work-related threats (primarily targeting police officers, prosecutors and judges). The unit is reported to increasingly handle cases related to organised crime and extortion, but as there is no systematic monitoring of the cases handled, it is unclear how widespread this trend is.

3.5. Summary

Compared to other Nordic countries, unlawful influence is a well-researched topic in Sweden. A research tradition spanning over two decades has examined unlawful influence across a wide range of sectors. Drawing primarily on victim surveys and interviews, this research provides less insight into the prevalence of unlawful influence but offers substantial knowledge about its characteristics. These studies have contributed valuable process-oriented insights into how, when and where unlawful influence occurs, as well as its consequences for both victims and organisations. Reports produced by government agencies further complement this picture. Any conclusions concerning the developments in unlawful influence in Sweden are hard to draw based on the publicly available material. One indication is, however, that unlawful influence now seems to affect a broader range of agencies and organisations than it did a decade ago.