Locations of pellets
The beaches where pellets were expected to wash ashore were inspected. Outcomes of inspections must mainly be considered of a temporary nature since the weather can change the location of pellets rapidly. During these inspections the following conclusions regarding pellet distribution on beaches in Norway were drawn. The distribution was determined by (Dolva et al., 2020):
Sea currents.
Weather conditions in general (during bad weather and in the case of early deposits, plastic pellets washed up far beyond the edge of the beach).
Wind conditions when washed ashore (due to their low specific gravity, pellets are affected by the wind and are moved around on hard surfaces when there is no vegetation).
Heavy rain (this could wash pellets down from the beach to the sea).
The presence of vegetation, which will immobilize pellets for a while.
The presence of biological material, which can make pellets heavier.
High water line/floodmark (pellets usually accumulate in a narrow belt above the high-water line).
Waste accumulation sites will probably also be the sites where pellets will be present.
Pellet collection and removal
Since the weather conditions can influence the presence of pellets greatly, clean-ups need to start soon after inspections. In the case of the Trans Carrier incident the following removal methods were applied:
Manual sieving
Tractor sieving
Vacuum cleaners
Leaf vacuums (reverse leaf blowers)
Sucking vehicles
Flotation (e.g., water baths)
Machine tumbling
Trap systems in streams/pools
Others small scale methods like hand picking
Of these, the primary methods applied were vacuum cleaners, leaf vacuums and sieving (Dolva et al., 2020).
Finnbirch incident
In November 2006, the container vessel Finnbirch sank in the Swedish part of the Baltic Sea between Öland and Gotland. The cargo consisted of hazardous goods, and 70 tonnes of polymer pellets on the main deck. According to a report from 2008, the cargo was not collected as it was not considered a major environmental risk (Räddningsverket, 2008). Focus in this case was on the potential oil spill. About 200 out of the 520 cubic meters of oil present leaked into the environment at the time of the accident. The rest was recovered during operations in 2007 and 2019/2020 (Sjöfartstidningen, 2020). No information was retrieved on the fate of the 70 tonnes of plastic pellets the ship was transporting when it sunk, nor on whether they are still there or have leaked into the environment. This case illustrates the long-time character of potential pollution from sea accidents.
2.3.1.2 Relevant incidents outside the Nordic Region
MSC Zoe incident, the Netherlands
In the evening of 1 and the morning of 2 January 2019, the Ultra Large Container Ship MSC Zoe lost 342 containers with an estimated amount of 3,257 tons north of the Dutch and German Wadden Sea Islands (Van Duin et al, 2019). The ship is one of the world’s largest container ships (BSU et al., 2020), and has a total theoretical container capacity of 19,224 TEU, corresponding to a deadweight of approximately 200K tons and is sailing under Panamanian flag (Panama Maritime Authority, Dutch Safety Board, Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation Germany, 2019). It was en route from Sines, Portugal to Bremerhaven, Germany. Due to its severity, the accident is classified as a very serious marine casualty as defined by the Casualty Investigation Code of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and European Union Directive 2009/18/EC (Panama Maritime Authority, Dutch Safety Board, Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation Germany, 2019.).
Most of the contents of the lost containers consisted of consumables and associated packaging materials. One container contained 22.5 tons of pellets, with a diameter of 4 millimeters. Those washed up on the beaches after the event and were difficult to remove from the environment due to their small dimensions (Panama Maritime Authority, Dutch Safety Board, Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation Germany, 2019). After the incident, large numbers of plastic pellets were found on the Eastern Dutch Wadden Islands and the shores of the three Dutch Provinces Noord-Holland, Fryslân and Groningen (Foekema et al., 2021).
A number of containers contained chemicals and batteries. Floating objects spread with wind and sea currents, while others ended up on the seabed. Mainly plastic objects washed ashore on the coast of the Wadden Islands the days following the accident. Large-scale coastal clean-ups and salvage operations at sea were successful to the extent that the bulk of the lost cargo was recovered (Panama Maritime Authority, Dutch Safety Board, Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation Germany, 2019).
Not only the amount of the cargo that fell overboard determined the severity of the consequences, the location where it happened was also of great importance. MSC Zoe lost its cargo in the vicinity of the Wadden Sea, both being a UNESCO World Heritage Marine Site and a Natura 2000 site which is a high level nature conservation status in the European Union (BSU et al., 2020). Furthermore, the vulnerability of the Wadden Sea was officially recognized in 2002 by IMO by the designation of the Wadden Sea which is shared by Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands as a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA). International recognition of this kind of area as a PSSA offers the possibility of adopting additional protective measures within the mandate of the IMO, such as routing measures. In addition, as of 2009, the Wadden Sea is listed by UNESCO as World Heritage site which obliges the States of Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands to collaboratively ensure the protection and conservation of this natural heritage (Panama Maritime Authority, Dutch Safety Board, Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation Germany, 2019).
An interesting issue was the interaction between the organisations responsible for emergency response and clean-ups at national, regional and local level. The Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management, the “Safety Regions” of Provinces Noord-Holland (Noord), Fryslân and Groningen and the municipalities of the affected region had to work together (Van Duin et al, 2019). A “Safety Region” is an umbrella organization that has a coordinating role in a specific assigned Dutch region during calamities. To coordinate the approach of calamities during the first period of an event like this, each of the Islands has a Coordination Team Wadden Islands (CoWa). This includes representatives of the municipality, police, fire brigade, ambulance unit and when needed the Royal Netherlands Sea Rescue Institution (KNRM), Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management and the Forestry Department. Soon after the disaster, the mayors of the island municipalities were informed, and the municipal organisations were involved together with the CoWa teams and local volunteers. In some cases “beach cleaners” (large tractors with a special waste collection device attached) were deployed. Hundreds of volunteers from the mainland were transported to the islands by the regular ferries for free to help clean as well. The Dutch military was brought in to help cleaning Schiemonnikoog Island.
Apart from large amounts of debris, this island’s coastline was extensively polluted with plastic pellets (NOS, 2019). The dispersion of pellets was mapped using both scientific techniques and citizen science. On 11 January 2019, the Dutch University of Groningen launched an interactive map to register pellets finds at the Dutch coastline. The map can be found at
www.waddenplastic.nl (University of Groningen, 2023). According to the nature management organisation “Natuurmonumenten”, the research showed that 24 million plastic pellets washed ashore in the easterly part of the Wadden Sea area, 5.5 million of these landing on Schiermonnikoog Island’s North Sea beach. This location became the pellets hotspot in the region, where plastic pellets washed ashore for more than a year after the incident (Natuurmonumenten, 2020). Collecting the pellets manually was very difficult and in order to collect those more effectively a large beach vacuum cleaner that was attached to a tractor was deployed.
After about one week, large amounts of debris (including large numbers of plastic items) were collected by the mixed teams of volunteers and professionals on the different islands:
Vlieland Island: 60 tonnes collected, costing 30,000 euro and 1000 man hours
Terschelling Island: 250 tonnes, no hours presented.
Ameland Island: 350 tonnes, no hours presented.
Schiermonnikoog Island: 250 tonnes were collected, in comparison, the island’s own annual domestic waste production is 400 tonnes (Van Duin et al, 2019).
By mid-November 2019, 87% of the containers and 75% of the cargo had been found and removed. It is expected that the majority of the remaining lost content can no longer be traced and cleaned up (Panama Maritime Authority, Dutch Safety Board, Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation Germany, 2019).
The association of coastal municipalities, KIMO the Netherlands and Belgium, has coordinated the Fishing for Litter scheme in Dutch waters. This scheme supports fishermen to take waste they collect in their nets at sea to shore. A considerable proportion of this waste is plastics. KIMO takes care of the on-shore collection, transport and processing, but also of the funding of the operations. One of the authors of this report (M. Mannaart) coordinates the scheme and was directly involved. Directly after the container loss there was expected that a huge spike in the amount of marine litter collected by the fishermen in the area would occur. That was why negotiations with the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management were started for support. Support was received, from ports in the northern part of the country as well. And this proved to be true, as the amount of marine litter collected in the Dutch North Sea increased significantly. The amounts of marine litter collected in the period 2016–2018 (before the MSC Zoe incident) were respectively: 246, 288 and 338 tonnes annually. After the incident, the collected amounts during 2019–2021 were respectively: 567, 648 and 756 tonnes. The increase after 2018 is remarkable and the amounts of marine litter are lower, but still elevated to this day. This is an indication that suggests that when large amounts of cargo (including pellets) are lost, their presence in the marine environment is measurable for at least a number of years. Causality is difficult to prove which is depending e.g., on the number of fishermen participating in the clean-up scheme, locations where is fished et cetera. However, a fact is that after the disaster significantly more waste was and is collected (M. Mannaart, personal comments) and the experiences on the beaches of Schiermonnikoog Island point also in that direction (Natuur-monumenten, 2020). The entire clean-up operations that included both salvage of containers at sea and beach-clean-ups were complex because of the different environments (sea and land), the large amounts of debris and the vast area and the number of organisations involved. Despite the extensive operation having its challenges, the acute part of the problem was solved in the end. The incident and the governmental responses and cooperation were discussed by the governmental organisations during an event organized by KIMO the Netherlands and Belgium on 17 November 2021 (Mannaart et al., 2022).
The Merchant Marine General Directorate, Panama, the Dutch Safety Board, Netherlands, and the Bundesstelle für Seeunfalluntersuchung, Germany made a number of recommendations to their responsible administrations in their capacity as representative of the flag states in the various committees of the IMO, which are presented integrally here (Panama Maritime Authority, Dutch Safety Board, Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation Germany, 2019):
Revise the existing technical and legal regulations for container ships regarding the design limits of cargo securing equipment, approved loading and stability conditions and the consideration of shallow water effects and speed on ship motions and resulting accelerations and forces. In doing so, especially the following provisions and aspects are to be taken into account:
IS-Code (Off-design stability conditions for very large containerships and Second Generation Intact Stability started in May 2020)
Code of Safe Practice for Cargo Stowage and Securing for very large containerships
Container safety convention (CSC) and ISO 1496-1 Freight containers - Specification and testing respectively
IMO Circular MSC.1/Circ. 1228 dated 11 January 2007, Revised guidance to the master for avoiding dangerous situations in adverse weather and sea conditions whether it works at all sea conditions.
Stability booklet, include that all loading conditions should be checked on high accelerations/forces.
Cargo securing manual, include design limits of the cargo securing equipment in accordance to the design accelerations. In doing so, the aforementioned authorities should act in such a way that results attained by existing international working groups are incorporated.
Generate an obligation on all container ships:
To install electronic inclinometers or similar (inertia) systems to measure and display this information in real-time to the captain/crew, and
To install sensors on critical locations on the ship in order to measure accelerations and to provide this information in real-time to the captain/crew in order to allow them to monitor these;
And for ships with mandatory equipped VDR to record actual roll angle, roll period and accelerations for the purpose of safety investigations.
Evaluate and assess possible technical solutions that can assist the captain/crew in the detection of the loss of containers and propose international standards for implementation of such solutions.
The following recommendation to the ship-owning company were provided:
In the construction and operation of ships, reduce high acceleration forces, which can cause damage to crew, passengers and cargo, by installing, for example, bilge keels or anti-roll tanks or stabilizers or setting operational stability limits by limiting the operational GM.
X-Press Pearl incident, Sri Lanka
One of the largest plastic pellet spills globally recorded so far was that of the X-Press Pearl, which occurred off the Sri Lanka coast on 20 May – 17 June 2021. The vessel caught fire and sank eventually. Apart from oil, nitric acid, caustic soda, methanol and other substances, an estimated 1,680 tonnes of plastic pellets were lost, which littered 300 km of shoreline. A considerable proportion of the stranded plastics on the shoreline were burnt fragments of various sizes. They were mixed with various types of debris from the ship and its cargo. This caused concerns about contamination and toxicity of the environment in general but also of fish stocks. The nature of the disaster had multiple dimensions that had to be taken into account during management and cleaning-up, including:
dealing with oil and chemical spills.
coordinating emergency support from neighbouring and other countries.
surveillance and salvage of the wreck and containers.
assessing the environmental damage over the short and longer-term.
support to impacted economic sectors, particularly coastal fishing communities and tourist industry.
legal investigation of the incident.
filing of compensation claims.
To address all challenges as thoroughly as possible, the Cabinet of Ministers of Sri Lanka appointed an Inter-Ministerial Committee of senior government officials headed by the Minister of Justice for an overall coordinated response to the incident. Five sub-committees have been created thereunder dealing respectively with:
legal action.
compensation claims.
environmental impacts.
fisheries impacts.
economic damages.
A UN team was deployed to assess and address the disaster. Its key recommendations focused primarily on mitigating the key risks identified including:
the oil slick emanating from the wreck including a potential major sudden release of bunker oil (‘worst-case-scenario’);
on-shore oil spill response planning;
development of a detailed plan to remove the wreck and containers lost at sea;
the shoreline pellet clean-up strategy; and
focusing the environmental assessment on key hotspot areas to support decision-making in the emergency phase (Partow et al, 2021).
Massive clean-up operations took place at 48 sites along 180km of impacted coast (Partow et al, 2021). By 14 July 2021 approximately 1,610 metric tonnes of plastics, other debris and contaminated sand were collected. This included larger debris, and various types of pellets and small burnt plastic fragments that were deposited along the beaches. A lagoon was protected from floating plastic pellets by application of booms along two entrance channels, which may have prevented up to 80% of the plastics entering. Mixed pellets and sand were separated by manual sieving and flotation in seawater which was both highly labour intensive. Trailing of mechanical recovery techniques was planned, including the use of vacuum cleaners, mechanical sieving, trommels and beach graders. Burnt plastic fragments caused specific challenges due to their irregular shape and brittleness. Secondary pollution of pellets was created during storage and transport of sediment with pellets during clean-up work. As a result of the pollution caused by the ship, a spike in reported deaths of sea turtles and dolphins and whales was reported. The disaster had a substantial impact on Sri Lankan coastal fishing communities, especially those that were (or were suspected) of being impacted by the pollution. Coastal fishing was initially banned along an 80-km littoral stretch adjacent to the incident. A UN research team assisted the national authorities and in their report many recommendations on further research activities were done, including a long term-plastic beach clean-up programme with a community-based approach (Partow et al, 2021). Based on the experiences, a report from IPEN, a global network of NGOs for a toxics-free future, recommended the international community to classify plastic pellets as hazardous substances and called on coastal countries to ratify the hazardous and noxious spills (HNS) convention (Rubesinghe et al., 2022).
After the experiences of the actions in Sri Lanka, the recommendations of the UN-team regarding the plastic pollution clean-up include:
Chemical analyses of the pellet and burnt plastic mix to assess the level of their contamination should be conducted as a matter of priority.
The results of the chemical assessment should inform the characterization of the plastic waste as hazardous or non-hazardous.
If found to be hazardous, additional waste criteria testing (e.g., leachate analysis) should be carried out to determine the appropriate disposal method.
If found to be non-hazardous, then the potential for the reuse and recycling of the plastic waste should be prioritized.
On-site separation of the plastic waste should be maximized to reduce sand collection, transport and storage.
Beach sediment analysis should be conducted to quantify the presence of small burnt plastic particles (<3 mm) that may not be recovered during clean-up operations.
Develop clean-up methods to recover small burnt plastic particles (<3 mm) (e.g., adaptation of the flotation method to capture small burnt particles).
Recover floating pellet and burnt plastic pollution in the inlet channels of one of the affected lagoons (Negombo lagoon) to prevent incoming pollution dissemination deeper in the lagoon and mangroves.
Improve pellet storage at the backshore of the beach to avoid secondary pollution (e.g., protecting the temporary storage areas by placing a tarpaulin or equivalent under the bags).
Improve handling and transportation of pellet bags particularly from the beach to the main road to avoid secondary pollution (e.g., establish defined routes, use wheelbarrows for transportation).
Set specifications to guide the microplastic clean-up effort and help assess the environmental impact of clean-up techniques to determine when to stop cleaning and prevent additional environmental damage.
Develop a long-term plastic beach clean-up programme along the coastline to collect chronic beach pollution by plastic debris, including that from the X-press Pearl. A community-based approach for waste collection should be considered. (Source: Partow et al, 2021).
2.3.1.3 Other types of acute plastic pollution
Biocarrier spill in Iceland
In Iceland in 2017 there was a leakage of biocarriers from a fish farm on land, biocarriers that are used in the cleaning system. The fish farm is on the coast and the plastic reached the sea through the sewage system. The biocarriers ended up on a beach with clay, but the winds moved much of it to a grassy area. It has been a challenge to clean up after the incident. The industry developed a plan on how to do it. The environment agency assessed and approved the plan. Students in the area were engaged to do the work, but although there have been repeated cleanup operations every year, it is still not completely solved (Interview with Katrín Sóley Bjarnadóttir and Halla Einarsdottir on 13 Dec 2022).
There has been a similar incident in Denmark (Interview with Frank Jensen on 23 Nov 2022).
2.3.2 Sources and amounts of pellet loss
A number of events are presented in the previous sections that show examples of considerable amounts of lost pellets. But what is the loss globally per year? The global loss of pellets is estimated at 230,000 tonnes that enter the environment annually (Eunomia Research and Consulting Ltd., 2016). In Europe alone, the pellet losses are estimated to be between 16,888 tonnes and 167,431 tonnes per year (Han et al., 2018). Since the three main sources of pellet losses are producers, intermediary facilities and converters/processors, there might be assumed that a considerable portion of this will be lost on land. The estimation of pellet pollution in rivers is more challenging, but something can be said about its fate. According to Van Emmerik & Schwartz (2020) the fate of plastics in freshwater systems is strongly dependent on three processes, which are 1. the transport, 2. the accumulation, and 3. the degradation processes. This means that not all plastics discharged in rivers eventually end up into the ocean, at least not of the sizes and shapes present when released at source.