MENU
Also available in a web-accessible version at https://pub.norden.org/temanord2022-514.
Negotiations on a global agreement on plastic pollution are likely to start in 2022. Such a global agreement is hoped to foster a transition to a more circular global plastics economy. This transition is likely to provide significant environmental, economic and social opportunities. Yet, countries will also need financial resources in order to take advantage of these opportunities. A crucial issue in the negotiations of the agreement and an essential condition for its effectiveness will therefore be the availability, mobilisation and delivery of financial resources.
The study will discuss options for the basic financial set-up and approaches to resource mobilisation and delivery that ensure the agreement’s effective operation and implementation at international and national levels. It will provide answers to five guiding questions:
The study serves to inform decision-makers and other interested actors about options for the mobilisation and delivery of international and domestic financial resources from public and private sources in the context of a global agreement on plastic pollution, so that they can use them in further multilateral decision-making and negotiation processes.
The study first of all analyses the benefits that a global agreement on plastic pollution might provide and the financial needs that it needs to address. Chapter 2 therefore assesses on the one hand the economic potential of a global circular plastics economy and the opportunities it provides. On the other hand, it identifies the key finance needs in the combat of plastic pollution in general and in the context of a related global agreement in particular. The study’s key contribution to the debate about a global agreement on plastic pollution lies however in the exploration of viable options to mobilise and deliver public and private financial resources at international and domestic levels that support the effective implementation of an agreement. Chapter 3 describes different options to finance the secretariat of a global agreement on plastic pollution. Chapter 4 identifies and elaborates viable options for mobilising and delivering international financial resources through a dedicated international financial mechanism, Official Development Assistance (ODA) and private resources to support countries in implementing the obligations under a global agreement. Chapter 5 identifies and elaborates viable options for mobilising public and private financial resources at the domestic level that help funding efforts in the implementation of a global agreement on plastic pollution.
Four key messages stand out.
A more sustainable and circular global plastics economy
The finance needs are considerable but the transition to a more sustainable and circular global plastics economy is ultimately likely to incur less costs when compared to business-as-usual scenarios.
Effective and efficient mobilisation and delivery of international funding is needed to support countries and undergird their efforts to achieve circularity and reduce plastic pollution.
The design of any financial support under a global agreement involves inter alia several decisions on basic functions, governance, form of contributions, and form of financial support.
As regards the basic function, the analysis suggests that in addition to the direct mobilisation and provision of financial resources from parties to the agreement (funding function), the coordination function is important in order to overcome current cross-cutting deficits and barriers in the provision of financial resources. It supports countries in accessing already available funding, it helps avoiding duplication of initiatives and it contributes to increase the impact of existing funding.
As regards the forms of financial support the analysis suggests that in addition to the usual provision of grants, the use non-grant instruments and blended finance is important in order to attract and stimulate additional resources in particular from private sources.
As regards the governance
Three basic options exist for the governance and administration of financial support.
Two basic options exist for the form of contributions.
A second option to mobilise and deliver international funding in the context of a global agreement is to interlink it with already existing bi- and multilateral ODA through
In the context of a global agreement, the domestic provision of financial resources for the combat of plastic pollution might above all be directly or indirectly stimulated through the adoption and implementation of an appropriate political and legislative framework at international and/or domestic level. To this end, governments need to make two basic sets of decisions. On the one hand, they need to choose the policies and instruments they want to use in order to mobilise the domestic provision of financial resources. On the other hand, they need to decide how to foster the adoption and implementation of (some of) these policies and instruments in the context of a global agreement on plastic pollution.
As regards the choice of policies and instruments, the discussion of the various available and suitable instruments revealed four insights that might guide the related decisions.
As regards the decision on how to foster the adoption and implementation of (some of) these policies and instruments in the context of a global agreement on plastic pollution, three basic options exist for governments.
ADF | Adaptation Fund |
AHEG | Ad Hoc Open-ended Expert Group on Marine Litter and Microplastics |
Basel Convention | Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal |
BD | Basel Convention Trust Fund to Assist Developing Countries and other Countries in Need of Technical Assistance |
BE Trust Fund | Special Voluntary Trust Fund for Additional Voluntary Contributions in Support of Approved Activities of the Convention on Biological Diversity |
BH Trust Fund | Special Voluntary Trust Fund for the Additional Voluntary Contributions in Support of Approved Activities of the Cartagena Protocol |
BX Trust Fund | Special Voluntary Trust Fund for the Additional Voluntary Contributions in Support of Approved Activities of the Nagoya Protocol |
CBD | Convention on Biological Diversity |
CER | Certified Emission Reductions |
CITES | Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora |
COP | Conference of the Parties |
EPR | Extended Producer Responsibility |
EU | European Union |
GCF | Green Climate Fund |
GEF | Global Environment Facility |
IFAD | International Fund for Agricultural Development |
INC | International Negotiations Committee |
IUCN | International Union for the Conservation of Nature |
LDCF | Least Developed Countries Fund |
MEAs | Multilateral environmental agreements |
Minamata Convention | Minamata Convention on Mercury |
MoU | Memorandum of Understanding |
Multilateral Fund | Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol |
NGOs | Non-governmental organisations |
ODA | Official Development Assistance |
OECD | Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development |
PET | Polyethylene terephthalate |
POPs | Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants |
PSF | Private Sector Facility |
PVC | Polyvinylchloride |
QTL | CITES External Trust Fund |
Rotterdam Convention | Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade |
SCCF | Special Climate Change Fund |
UN | United Nations |
UNCCD | United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa |
UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
UNEA | United Nations Environment Assembly |
UNEP | United Nations Environment Programme |
UNFCCC | United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change |
UNGA | United Nations General Assembly |
UNIDO | United Nations Industrial Development Organization |
UNSG | United Nations Secretary General |
WTO | World Trade Organisation |
WWF | World Wildlife Fund for Nature |
“The accumulation of plastic litter in the ocean is a common concern for humankind owing to its far-reaching environmental, social and economic impacts.” (UNEP 2016, p. xii) Already in 2016, this was the conclusion of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Two years earlier, member states of the United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA) had adopted a resolution in which they stressed the precautionary approach and emphasised “that further urgent action is needed to address the challenges posed by marine plastic debris and microplastics” across the entire life cycle of plastics (UNEP 2014b). In another resolution, member states of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) describe “marine debris, and plastics in particular, [as] some of the greatest environmental concerns of our time, along with climate change, ocean acidification, and loss of biodiversity” (UNGA 2017, pp. 33–34). Other actors see marine litter and microplastics as “one of the greatest anthropogenic threats our planet faces” (EIA et al. 2020, p. 2; see also UNCTAD 2020) or a “planetary boundary threat” (UNEP 2019, p. 31). This view is also echoed in scientific publications: “plastic pollution fits the exposure profile of a planetary boundary threat” (MacLeod et al. 2021, p. 61).
In view of this problem, demands for a global agreement to reduce marine litter and microplastics have been rising for many years. In the past two years, the thrive towards a global agreement gained increasing political momentum. Starting with political declarations from the Nordic countries and the Caribbean community in 2019, now more than three quarters of United Nations (UN) Member States call for a global agreement at the end of 2021 (WWF 2021) and governments around the world prepare for starting negotiations. In September 2021, the governments of Ecuador, Germany, Ghana and Vietnam organised a Ministerial Conference where participating governments adopted a statement calling on UNEA to initiate negotiations on a global agreement on plastic pollution by establishing an international negotiation committee (INC) at its session in February 2022 (BMU 2021a). As of December 2021, the statement has been endorsed by 75 governments (BMU 2021b). At the next UNEA session in February 2022, Peru and Rwanda plan to submit a resolution that calls for the establishment of an INC to start negotiations on such an agreement (Governments of Peru and Rwanda 2021). In November 2021, also the US government announced to support the start of negotiations at UNEA (U.S. Department of State 2021).
In addition to this broad and steadily increasing government support, a range of business stakeholders, including financial institutions, consumer goods companies, as well as trade organizations representing the plastics industry have called for negotiations of a global agreement to start (www.plasticpollutiontreaty.org). Furthermore, a variety of non-governmental actors supports and endorses a global agreement on plastic pollution, including think tanks (EIA et al. 2020; Simon et al. 2018), foundations, e.g. the Ellen MacArthur Foundation (EMF 2020), civil society, e.g. the World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF) (WWF et al. 2020; WWF 2019b) and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) (IUCN 2020).
Overall, there is a strong drive to start negotiations on a global agreement on plastic pollution and actors from many different societal sectors support such negotiations. The global agreement is expected to help guiding the transition to a more circular global plastics economy. The transition will provide significant economic and social opportunities, but countries will also require financial and technical assistance in order to take advantage of these opportunities. A crucial issue in the negotiations of the agreement and an essential condition for its effectiveness will therefore be decisions on the mobilisation and delivery of financial resources – like they are for any multilateral environmental agreement.
Against this background, this study will discuss viable options for the basic financial set-up, specific financial support and approaches to resource mobilisation and delivery that ensure the agreement’s effective operation and implementation at international and national levels. The results will inform decision-makers and other interested actors about options for the mobilisation and delivery of international and domestic financial resources from public and private sources in the context of a global agreement on plastic pollution, so that they can use them in further multilateral decision-making and negotiation processes. The analysis provides answers to five guiding questions:
To this end, the study first of all analyses the benefits that a global agreement on plastic pollution might provide and the financial needs that it needs to address. Chapter 2 therefore assesses on the one hand the economic potential of a global circular plastics economy and the opportunities it provides in the context of a global agreement on plastic pollution. On the other hand, it identifies those sectors, actions and activities that require funding in the combat of plastic pollution in general and in the context of a related global agreement in particular and briefly describes the most important existing financial mechanisms, gaps and barriers in the combat of plastic pollution.
The study’s key contribution to the debate about a global agreement on plastic pollution lies however in the exploration of viable options to finance the intergovernmental process and to mobilise and deliver public and private financial resources at international and domestic levels that support the effective implementation of a global agreement. Chapter 3 describes different options to finance the secretariat of a global agreement on plastic pollution. Chapter 4 identifies and elaborates viable options for mobilising and delivering international financial resources through Official Development Assistance (ODA) and private resources to support countries in implementing the obligations under a global agreement. Chapter 5 identifies and elaborates viable options for mobilising public and private financial resources at the domestic level in developing countries that help funding efforts in the implementation of a global agreement on plastic pollution.
Tackling plastic pollution provides not only environmental benefits but also substantial economic benefits if it succeeds in fostering a (more) sustainable and circular plastics economy at global level. At the same time, it requires substantial financial resources to fund necessary changes. Against this background, this chapter highlights first of all the economic benefits that a global agreement on plastic pollution might yield by facilitating a global circular plastics economy and then identifies the key finance needs in the context of such an agreement. It concludes by highlighting the need for a substantial involvement of the private sector.
An effective prevention and reduction of plastic pollution provides not only environmental benefits. In particular a shift from the current predominantly linear plastics economy towards a more circular plastics economy promises to yield significant economic benefits for governments and business actors on several dimensions. In general, environmental and socio-economic costs of inaction are estimated to be significantly higher than costs of action (UNEP 2017a, p. xi).
On the one hand, a more global circular plastics economy would reduce costs of plastic pollution. First, it would reduce the loss of economic value that result from the current management of plastic waste. In general, the current linear plastics economy “leads to low resource efficiency and high material and economic value losses” (EEA 2020, p. 60). For packaging plastics alone, the loss of economic value (and thus the unexploited market size) as result of plastic leakage into the environment and low recycling rates is estimated at US$80 billion to US$120 billion a year (UNEP 2021, p. 15). This is roughly 20 percent of the estimated economic value of the global waste market (UNEP 2017a, p. 44). To the extent that the plastic agreement succeeds in increasing the use of recycled or secondary plastics in new plastic products, this economic value that is otherwise lost might be kept in the plastics economy.
Second, a more global circular plastics economy would reduce the economic, social and environmental costs that plastic pollution causes. In 2018, the direct business costs from marine plastic pollution alone are estimated to amount to up to US$19 billion a year for affected economic sectors (UNEP 2021, p. 14). The total natural capital costs of plastic use by the consumer goods industry alone are estimated at roughly US$75 billion, including the costs of environmental impacts on oceans and the loss of economic value when plastic is disposed of and does not re-enter the plastics value chain (UNEP 2014a, p. 7). One third of these natural capital costs stems from greenhouse gas emission that occur in the course of producing fossil-based plastic feedstocks (UNEP 2014a, p. 7). It is estimated that if plastic is recycled, this reduces the costs of these emissions by US$100 per metric tonne (EMF 2017, p. 48). The negative externalities of plastic packaging alone are estimated at US$40 billion per year (EMF 2017, p. 12). Another study estimates these costs to amount at over US$139 billion in 2015 and expects them to rise to US$209 billion by 2024 (Trucost 2016, p. 7). Taking account all social and environmental consequences of overall plastic pollution, the costs are estimated to be considerably higher (PEW 2020, p. 29).[1]Estimates of these costs are contested. They range between US$1.5 trillion and US$2.2 trillion a year ( PEW 2020, p. 29) With global plastic production projected to almost quadruple from 9,200 million metric tons 2017 to 34 billion metric tons in 2050 (UNEP 2021, p. 17), these costs are likely to increase further without actions to reduce plastic pollution.
Third, if business actors take steps towards a more global circular plastics economy they reduce their financial risks. These risks include on the one hand the possible adoption and implementation of costly regulations that internalise (some of) the external costs of plastic pollution, for example if governments decide to shift waste management costs to them by introducing virgin plastic taxes or imposing plastic waste collection, recycling and/or disposal fees (EMF 2017, p. 29; UNEP 2014a, pp. 10–11; Trucost 2016, p. 8). At projected volumes and recycling rates, this financial risk is estimated at staggering US$100 billion per year (PEW 2020, p. 9). On the other hand, these risks include the exposure of plastic producers to the volatility of prices for the fossil-based feedstocks for plastics (EMF 2017, p. 29; UNEP 2014a, p. 18). An increase in the use of secondary plastic products that use recycled plastics in new plastic products would significantly reduce the dependency of plastic producers on these prices and thus contribute to a more reliable and stable manufacturing conditions. The market for secondary plastic products is however still relatively small given that less than 10 percent of all plastics are recycled globally (UNEP 2021, p. 15)[2]The market for secondary plastic products is expected to rise to 30 percent of all plastic products by 2030, leading to a growth in profits in the petrochemicals and plastics sector of about USD$60 billion (Hundertmark et al. 2018)., notwithstanding substantial regional variations like in the EU where more than 50 percent are recycled. Moreover, a harmonisation of standards for plastic products could also reduce the costs for businesses to comply with currently rather heterogenous standards across the world (WWF et al. 2020, p. 23). Finally, the reduction of plastic waste that needs to be disposed also reduces the costs for business actors (UNIDO 2019, p. 28).
Fourth, a more global circular plastics economy would reduce the waste management expenditures for governments, in particular for local governments in developing countries where these expenditures are the single largest budget item amounting on average to almost 20 percent of their budgets (WWF 2019a, p. 2). The net costs of collection, sorting and recycling only of packaging waste[3]Net costs are the costs of collection, sorting and recycling from which the revenues from selling recycled materials are deducted. are estimated to amount to US$30 billion annually (EMF 2021, p. 8). It is estimated that more circularity in the plastics economy could reduce expenditures for waste management by US$70 billion between 2021 and 2040 when compared to the business-as-usual scenario (PEW 2020, p. 11).
On the other hand, a more circular plastics economy provides significant opportunities to governments and business actors (UNEP 2014a, p. 18). First, it provides gains in resource efficiency and the reduction of losses in material and economic values by unlocking material and energy savings and by enabling used plastics to re-enter the system (EEA 2020, p. 61; PEW 2020, p. 10). Gains in resource efficiency help business actors to reduce their direct costs (UNEP 2014a, p. 18). For example, UNEP estimates that in case of consumer good companies more circular practices in the management of plastics could save up to US$4 billion per year (UNEP 2014a, p. 7). Moreover, for at least 20 percent of plastic packaging reuse is already economically attractive and worth US$9 billion per year (EMF 2017, p. 36). In addition, a purification of waste streams by improvements in the manufacture of plastics as well as the collection and recycling processes is estimated to increase the downstream value of plastics by US$4.4 billion per year (UNEP 2018c, p. 115; see also EMF 2017). Likewise, if single-use plastic bags were replaced to 95 percent by reusable bags across the world, this would reduce 2 million metric tons of plastic waste and result in savings of US$900 million (EMF 2017, p. 46).
Second, a circular plastics economy might add jobs in national economies, above all in the plastics value chain and plastic services, including for example new jobs in reuse, repair and remanufacturing of plastics once the market for secondary plastic products grows. Between 541,000 and 795,000 new jobs might be created, above all in low- and middle-income countries, if certain steps are taken towards a more circular plastics economy (PEW 2020, p. 12). This would also increase the tax income of governments.
Third, a more circular plastics economy would also help to improve the social situation and working conditions of the estimated 11 million informal waste collectors (PEW 2020, p. 12).
Fourth, a substitution of fossil-based feedstock for plastics through alternative feedstocks is expected to provide significant economic, trade and investment opportunities to developing countries since these are key suppliers of potential substitutes, thereby also creating employment and improving livelihoods (WTO 2020, pp. 8–9).
Summary of main opportunities of a global circular plastics economy
Reduces plastic pollution
The finance needs in the combat of plastic pollution have been assessed to be considerable, given that “tackling marine plastic litter and microplastics requires the implementation of an array of policies, activities and technologies, many of which have high financial costs” (UNEA 2020, p. 3). At the same time, the lack of resources above all in developing countries is one of the biggest obstacles to an effective prevention of plastic pollution (Raubenheimer 2016, p. 29). As result, states “can face important financial barriers in implementing necessary measures“ (UNEA 2020, p. 3).
Yet, when compared to the business-as-usual scenario, tackling plastic pollution has the potential to overall reduce government expenditures for plastic waste management while reducing the environmental burden and costs of plastic pollution. The transition to a more circular plastics economy in particular is estimated to incur less costs for governments than the business-as-usual. According to estimates of the PEW Charitable Trust, implementing an integrated circular strategy that targets all stages in the plastic life cycle and that aims at reducing the plastic pollution in oceans by 80 percent in 2040 (compared to 2016 levels) could cost governments US$600 billion between 2021 and 2040 (PEW 2020, p. 36). Following the business-as-usual is estimated to cost governments US$70 billion more (US$670 billion) between 2021 and 2040 (PEW 2020, p. 36) and result in almost three times more plastic waste in the oceans in 2040 than in 2016 (PEW 2020, p. 25).[1]Less circular strategies that would also aim at reducing the plastic waste in oceans by 80 percent in 2040 (compared to 2016 levels) but only target specific stages in the plastic life cycle are estimated to be significantly more expensive. They could cost governments US$820 billion (if only waste collection and disposal is targeted) or US$850 billion (if only recycling is targeted) (PEW 2020, p. 36). Comparable estimates for a strategy that targets reduction and substitution at the production level or the upstream stage of the plastic life cycle were not made.
The mobilisation and delivery of financial resources under a global agreement on plastic pollution thus needs to address at least the key needs for resources in order to ensure its effective implementation and goal achievement. Moreover, an appropriate design of measures to mobilise and deliver financial resources under such an agreement provides an excellent opportunity to improve the current landscape in the provision of financial resources in this area.
This section therefore highlights first of all the key finance needs in the combat of plastic pollution by answering three questions:
In doing so, the section draws above all on studies that describe and discuss the need for and design of a global agreement on plastic pollution (most recently Simon et al. 2021) and reviews their proposals on where financial resources are most needed and what actions and activities require financial resources. More precisely, it identifies those financial needs that feature prominently in most of these studies. In addition, it uses assessments on the current availability of financial resources in the combat against plastic pollution, most prominently the recent inventory of financial resources for supporting countries to address plastic pollution that was compiled by the Ad Hoc Open-ended Expert Group on Marine Litter and Microplastics (AHEG) (UNEP 2020b).
As result, the section reveals first of all gaps between what is deemed desirable and necessary on the one hand and what is already in place on the other hand. It thus identifies potential focus areas and actions that the mobilisation and delivery of financial resources under a global agreement on plastic pollution might address. Moreover, the section identifies cross-cutting barriers and deficits in the current mobilisation of financial resources that might be addressed and targeted in the context of a global agreement on plastic pollution.
Three priority areas stand out when it comes to the question where financial resources are most needed, namely in which countries, stages of the plastics life cycle and sectors.
First, and as a matter of course, in terms of recipients financial resources primarily need to be directed to those countries that lack sufficient institutional, administrative and technical capacities and infrastructure to combat plastic pollution and to implement the commitments under a global agreement on plastic pollution (Raubenheimer and Urho 2020a, p. 106). These are above all developing countries and economics in transition (EIA et al. 2020, p. 10) or low- and middle-income countries (Raubenheimer and Urho 2020a, p. 106). They are most severely struggling with inadequate or insufficient financial resources, legal and regulatory deficits, low administrative capacities and limitations in the enforcement of existing policies to prevent and reduce plastic pollution (UNEP 2020b, p. 4). At the same time, estimates suggest that 93 percent of global macroplastics leakage and 62 percent of global microplastic leakage originate from developing countries, mainly due to relatively high waste mismanagement and low recycling or recovery rates (WTO 2020, p. 6). Nevertheless, financial resources are needed in all countries. According to estimates of the PEW Charitable Trust, between 2021 and 2040 the transition to a more circular plastics economy would incur costs of US$12 billion in low-income countries, US$67 billion in lower middle-income countries, US$199 billion in upper middle-income countries, and US$322 billion in high-income countries (PEW 2020, p. 43).
Second, and in terms of stages of the plastics life cycle, two stages stand out in the relevant studies when it comes to the mobilisation and delivery of financial resources even though approaches to mobilise and deliver financial resources should ideally be holistic covering all stages in the plastics life cycle and also cover land-based as well as sea-based sources (UNEP 2020b, p. 3).
On the one hand, most studies on the design of a global agreement on plastic pollution emphasise plastic waste prevention as the top priority and the need to intervene at the production stage in order to reduce waste generation already in the first stage of the plastics life cycle (e.g., Simon et al. 2021, p. 44; UNEA 2020, p. 4; EIA et al. 2020, p. 4; Tessnow-von Wysocki and Le Billon 2019, p. 100; UNEP 2018b, p. 89; Raubenheimer and McIlgorm 2017, p. 324; Simon and Schulte 2017, p. 33; UNEP 2020b, p. 33). In other words, and according to these studies, sustainable design and production of plastics needs to be prioritised in allocating financial resources. Yet, only 3 percent of all financial resources (or roughly US$24 millions) that were included in AHEG’s inventory are directed to waste prevention or upstream activities (UNEP 2020b, p. 22), clearly underscoring the need to channel more funds to this stage in the plastics life cycle.
On the other hand, many studies emphasise the need for substantial financial resources and investments that improve waste management services, infrastructures and capabilities and make waste collection, treatment and recycling more effective and sustainable (WWF et al. 2020, p. 22; Simon et al. 2018, p. 28; Borrelle et al. 2017, p. 9995; Simon and Schulte 2017, p. 33; UNEP 2020b, p. 5). In order to remove and dispose plastic waste in a sustainable manner and in order to prevent plastics that are currently in the economy to end up in the environment the waste management in many countries requires substantial financial resources (Simon et al. 2021, p. 47; EIA et al. 2020, p. 8). Here, the mobilisation and delivery of financial resources in and to developing countries is again particularly important: “Developing countries often do not have the financial means to introduce the necessary waste management infrastructure to handle waste sustainably.” (Tessnow-von Wysocki and Le Billon 2019, p. 99; see also Raubenheimer 2016, p. 333; Borrelle et al. 2017, p. 9996). So far, the improvement of waste management has been the main target of international and domestic financial resources. Almost 80 percent of all financial resources (or roughly US$660 millions) that were included in AHEG’s inventory are directed to waste management or downstream activities in the plastics life cycle (UNEP 2020b, p. 22). Yet, compared to estimations of the amount of resources that is needed to significantly improve waste management this is a relatively small sum. In 2015, it was estimated that investments between US$4.5 billion and US$5 billion a year over ten years are needed in order to increase the plastic waste collection rates on average to about 80 percent only in the five most critical markets, namely China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam that are responsible for over 50 percent of plastic waste that ends up in the oceans (Ocean Conservancy and McKinsey 2015, p. 26).[1]More generally, it is estimated that the costs for establishing effective solid waste management systems range between US$35 for basic systems and between US$50 and US$100 for more advanced systems per metric ton of solid waste. In municipalities in low-income countries the required investments would account to more than 20 percent of their budget (Simon et al. 2018, p. 33). Moreover, AHEG’s inventory revealed that countries lack sufficient financial resources to improve plastic waste management. This lack does not only exist in developing countries, where it is particularly severe, but is also a problem in developed countries (UNEP 2020b, p. 28).
Third, and in terms of sectors, an effective response to plastic pollution above all requires financial resources in those sectors that either significantly contribute to plastic pollution, e.g. food and beverages, packaging and retail, or are severely affected by plastic pollution, e.g. tourism, or both, e.g. fisheries. In fact, and according to AHEG’s inventory, available financial resources have already been directed to those sectors to a large extent (UNEP 2020b, p. 24). Yet, the AHEG inventory also observes a lack in the provision of financial resources in three high-polluting sectors, namely agriculture, textiles and automobiles (UNEP 2020b, p. 25).
Summary: where is funding most needed?
Three priority areas stand out when it comes to the question what requires financial resources, namely which actions and activities.
First, the agreement needs to mobilise and deliver financial resources for actions and activities that support the development, formulation and implementation of the commitments agreed to under the agreement and assist countries in meeting their obligations (e.g., Simon et al. 2021, p. 46; Rochette et al. 2020, p. 9). In other words, it needs to mobilise and deliver resources for enabling activities, capacity building and technical assistance to those countries in need. Second, it needs to mobilise and deliver financial resources for knowledge-related activities. Third, it needs to mobilise and deliver financial resources that facilitate the transition to a more sustainable and circular global plastics economy.
The three following subsections elaborate on specific actions activities within these three core funding areas for which the agreement might mobilise and deliver financial resources. As a matter of course, what actions and activities eventually require financial resources ultimately depends on the actual design of the global agreement on which states will agree.
In general, financial resources for enabling activities, capacity building and technical assistance typically cover the incremental costs that result from the implementation of the commitments under the agreement and that go beyond costs in business-as-usual scenarios for already envisaged activities to reduce plastic pollution (EIA et al. 2020, p. 11; Raubenheimer and Urho 2020a, p. 106). There is a wide range of actions and activities for which a global agreement on plastic pollution might need to mobilise and deliver financial resources in order to ensure its effective implementation, the compliance of parties with the agreement and the achievement of its goals. Yet, some generic categories of actions and activities can be derived from the studies on the need for and the design of a global agreement on plastic pollution. These categories also characterise many other existing global environmental agreements.
First, like any other global environmental agreement enabling activities require financial resources (e.g., Simon et al. 2021, p. 46). In general, enabling activities serve “to pave the way for or enable compliance” (EIA et al. 2020, p. 11). While they include a range of different activities, the funding of scientific and technical assessments that provide basic and essential information on the problem at stake stand out. They allow countries to set priorities and to develop policies and instruments in the combat against plastic pollution.
At the early stages of an agreement’s implementation, countries therefore need financial resources to design and conduct national inventories on plastic pollution (Raubenheimer and Urho 2020a, p. 106). Such assessments typically serve to prepare and/or inform national policies and more comprehensive strategies or action plans by collecting data on material flows (including production, consumption, final treatment and trade of plastics) and leakage (sources, pathways and sinks) across the life cycle of plastics (EIA et al. 2020, p. 6; Raubenheimer and Urho 2020a, p. 99), for example by mapping waste profiles and trends, domestic flows of plastics and import and export of plastic wastes (Raubenheimer and Urho 2020a, p. 106). This is particularly important as many countries do not have any data or monitoring programs in place (UNEP 2020b, p. 5). As result, data is lacking on material flows of plastics as well as leakage and occurrence of plastics in the environment (UNEP 2020b, p. 5). On the basis of these inventories or assessments, countries can start deriving first priorities and developing initial policies and instruments to address the plastic pollution in their specific national contexts. In this context, financial resources could also support the identification of necessary pre-conditions for potential policies, regulations and instruments as well as existing and necessary capacities (Raubenheimer and Urho 2020a, p. 106). Such assessments might also include studies on the socio-economic effects of planned or implemented policies (Raubenheimer and Urho 2020a, p. 107). Currently, and according to AHEG’s inventory, only 3 percent of financial resources supported monitoring and analysis (UNEP 2020b, p. 23). At later stages, and complementing the inventories, national assessments of and monitoring on the progress in implementing the agreement and achieving its goals in national reporting schemes require financial resources (Raubenheimer and Urho 2020a, p. 106; UNEP 2018b, p. 66; EIA et al. 2020, p. 6).
Second, the formulation and implementation of national policies that ensure countries’ compliance with provisions of a global agreement on plastic pollution and contribute to the achievement of its goals require financial resources (e.g., Simon et al. 2021, p. 46; Raubenheimer and Urho 2020a, p. 106; Tessnow-von Wysocki and Le Billon 2019, p. 101). While the related studies propose a wide range of different national measures that might be developed to implement a global agreement, the majority of studies feature two essential overlaps. There is a broad agreement that countries need to formulate and implement holistic and comprehensive strategies or plans to address plastic pollution across all stages of the plastics life cycle (e.g., Raubenheimer and Urho 2020a, p. 91; Rochette et al. 2020, p. 9; UNEA 2020, pp. 6–7; WWF et al. 2020, p. 22; Simon and Schulte 2017, pp. 34–36; UNEP 2020a, p. 8; EIA et al. 2020, p. 4). Likewise, the formulation and implementation of legislative frameworks and related policies requires financial and technical resources (UNEP 2018b, p. 66). Table 1 gives an overview of policies that are already implemented or are deemed useful in the combat against plastic pollution.
Table 1 Acutal and proposed policies in the combat against pollution.
Policy areas | Policies/instruments | |
Upstream | Reduction of avoidable plastic |
|
Product re-design for circularity |
| |
Substitution of plastic material for sustainable alternatives |
| |
Downstream | Expansion of waste collection |
|
Support for recycling |
| |
Controlled disposal of non-recyclable plastics |
| |
Solutions for microplastic release into the environment |
| |
Solutions for maritime sources of plastic pollution |
|
Third, and especially in developing countries, there is a need for more resources that help improving the enforcement of existing legislation (UNEP 2020b, p. 33). According to AHEG’s inventory, existing funds for such activities represent the second-largest share of financial resources that have been provided (41 percent).
Fourth, many studies on the possible design of a global agreement on plastic pollution highlight that international and national plastics sustainability standards are important for the success of such an agreement. They ensure an environmentally sound design, production and disposal of plastics by providing guidelines, communicating best practices, formulating codes, defining standards, and establishing procedures (Rognerud et al. 2022; see also UNEA 2020, p. 6; Tessnow-von Wysocki and Le Billon 2019, p. 101; WWF et al. 2020, p. 21; EIA et al. 2020, p. 4; UNEP 2018b, p. 94, 2020b, p. 5; Raubenheimer and Urho 2020a, p. 91). In a similar vein, other studies highlight the need to develop safe circularity of plastics and motivate improvements in the design, production and manufacture of plastic products that improve recyclability and ensure the use of recycled plastics (Simon et al. 2021, pp. 44–45; UNEP 2020a, pp. 6–7; EIA et al. 2020, p. 7). Here, the lack of financial resources to develop and administer such standards and the related certification schemes and to support circular product design are the biggest constraint for an effective implementation above all in developing countries (UNEP 2020a, p. 8). Only 3 percent of all financial resources (or roughly US$24 millions) that were included in AHEG’s inventory of financial resources that support countries to address plastic pollution are directed to waste prevention or upstream activities in the plastics life cycle (UNEP 2020b, p. 22). Against this background, the AHEG recommends to increase the provision of financial resources that support initiatives to eliminate the environmentally most harmful plastic products and enable product designs that improve the circularity of plastics (UNEP 2020b, p. 32).
Fifth, many studies highlight the need for financial resources that help building or advancing administrative and institutional capacities necessary to reduce plastic pollution (e.g., Simon et al. 2021, p. 46). This might include financial resources for national public plastics authorities that ensure the implementation of the agreement (e.g., Simon et al. 2021, p. 47; UNEP 2020a, p. 8; see also Busch et al. 2021) since the absence of single public authorities or bodies that are responsible for the prevention and reduction of plastic pollution is an important limitation in the combat against plastic pollution (UNEP 2020b, p. 28). Such financial resources might also support the development and implementation of market-based instruments that raise financial resources from plastic producers and would align with the polluter pays principle (e.g., Simon et al. 2021, pp. 46–47; EIA et al. 2020, p. 11; Raubenheimer and Urho 2020a, p. 106; Tessnow-von Wysocki and Le Billon 2019, p. 101). Here, AHEG observes a general lack of funds in support of market-based instruments (UNEP 2020b, p. 6).
Sixth, a global agreement on plastic pollution might also require financial resources for an implementation and compliance mechanism that assists and helps non-compliant countries to comply with the provisions of the agreement (EIA et al. 2020, p. 11; Tessnow-von Wysocki and Le Billon 2019, p. 122).
Finally, other actions and activities that studies on the design of a global agreement on plastic pollution suggest to require funding include, a stakeholder engagement mechanism and global commitment platform where actors in the plastics economy could commit voluntarily to implement certain measures targeting plastic pollution (Simon et al. 2021, p. 47) and expansion and strengthening of regional approaches to prevent and reduce plastic pollution (Gold et al. 2013, pp. 14–15), e.g. by facilitating regional action plans (UNEA 2020, p. 7).
Summary: what enabling activities requires funding?
In general, several studies that contemplate the possibility of a global agreement on plastic pollution complain about the lack of knowledge for an effective management and reduction of plastic pollution across the life cycle of plastics (e.g., UNEP 2020a, p. 8; Busch et al. 2021; Simon et al. 2018, p. 33; UNEP 2020b, p. 5). For example, knowledge about and assessments of the effectiveness of policy interventions, alternate materials, design standards, consumption patterns and plastic pollution occurring during production is largely missing (UNEP 2020a, p. 8; Busch et al. 2021, pp. 30–32; UNEP 2020b, p. 5). Moreover, monitoring and evaluation of plastic pollution is not harmonised or standardised (UNEP 2020a, p. 8; WWF et al. 2020, p. 22; EIA et al. 2020, p. 6; Busch et al. 2021, p. 30; UNEP 2020b, p. 5). Many studies therefore suggest to establish and fund a global science-policy interface on plastic pollution or scientific assessment panels as subsidiary body of the agreement so that these and other weaknesses in the current knowledge base on plastic pollution can be overcome (e.g., Simon et al. 2021, p. 44; Busch et al. 2021; UNEP 2020a, p. 8; EIA et al. 2020, p. 10; Raubenheimer and Urho 2020a, pp. 93–96; Rochette et al. 2020, p. 10; UNEA 2020, p. 7; WWF et al. 2020, p. 22; Simon et al. 2018, p. 35; Gold et al. 2013, p. 12).
A few studies also suggest to establish (and consequentially to fund) clearing-house mechanisms that fulfil different functions. Some propose to establish a mechanism that informs states about already existing funds and support countries in accessing these financial resources (Simon et al. 2021, p. 44). Another clearing house mechanism could serve to exchange and transfer data, information, expertise, know-how and best practices (EIA et al. 2020, p. 11; WWF et al. 2020, p. 22; UNEP 2018b, p. 96; Simon and Schulte 2017, p. 33; Gold et al. 2013, p. 12; Busch et al. 2021, p. 34). These technical resources are considered particularly important (UNEP 2020b, p. 3).
A global agreement on plastic pollution also requires the mobilisation and distribution of technological and financial resources to research, development and innovation of alternate materials or technologies that prevent plastic pollution or reduce its environmental effects (WWF et al. 2020, p. 22; Simon and Schulte 2017, pp. 36–37; Ocean Conservancy and McKinsey 2015, p. 38). These resources could help to develop safe circularity of plastics and the application of sustainability standards to plastic product (see previous section). According to the AHEG inventory most financial support in terms of spent resources (but not in terms of number of activities) is allocated to research and development, new product design, materials and processes, and innovations in plastic waste management already. Yet, on the one hand this is due to relatively high costs of related activities. On the other hand, it “is likely that further financing may need to be mobilised in this area” (UNEP 2020b, p. 23). Moreover, financial resources to develop innovative plastic products or materials and to bring them on the market have been largely lacking in the past (UNEP 2019, p. 33) and substantial gaps in financing and incentivising innovative solutions to plastic pollution in upstream activities continue to exist, including sustainable product design, the development of alternate materials or innovative business models (UNEP 2019, p. 5).
Other knowledge-related actions and activities that the studies on a global agreement on plastic pollution suggest to require funding include training, manuals and toolkits for relevant actors (EIA et al. 2020, p. 5); pilot and demonstration projects (EIA et al. 2020, p. 5); and education and awareness raising (Raubenheimer and Urho 2020a, p. 105).
Summary: what knowledge-related activities require funding?
As the preceding analysis of key benefits of a more circular global plastics economy revealed, a transition to more circularity provides significant economic opportunities. Measures to achieve circularity have however not reached sufficient scale and impact (WEF 2020, p. 6). Part of the challenge in achieving circularity lies in stimulating the necessary and enormous investments (WEF 2020, p. 11; Bucknall 2020, p. 22). On the one hand, appropriate provisions of a global agreement on plastic pollution could help to stimulate the much needed, particularly private investments into more circular approaches in the plastics value chain. On the other hand, the agreement’s supporting measures may assist countries in the implementation of these provisions and undergird the efforts to achieve circularity by mobilising and delivering financial resources and by stimulating and supporting necessary public and private investments. In general, supporting measures and financial resources should target activities that move away from the current, mostly linear business models in the plastics economy towards circular business models (EEA 2020, p. 55).
There is however no single solution, action or activity that advances a more circular plastics economy (EEA 2020, p. 56). Hence, it is insufficient to mobilise and deliver financial resources for measures in a single stage in the plastics life cycle, be it upstream, midstream or downstream. Rather, initiatives, actions and activities across the entire plastics life cycle require financial resources in order to achieve a global circular plastics economy or take steps towards more circularity (EEA 2020, p. 65; PEW 2020, p. 9; Smet and Linder 2019, p. 9). According to an influential and comprehensive assessment of different pathways to reduce plastic pollution by The PEW Charitable Trust, investments in and financial resources to support initiatives, actions and activities across the entire life cycle of plastics are also the most cost-efficient for governments, the economy and society (PEW 2020, p. 36). Nevertheless, the upstream and the downstream are often considered the two most important stages in the plastics life cycle where financial resources are needed and effective (WEF 2020, p. 13; PEW 2020, p. 9).
In general, financial resources in these areas are important since the current lock-in of the plastics economy into a largely linear production, consumption and end-of life infrastructure make changes costly (Barra and Leonard 2018, p. 12). Overall, financial resources could facilitate the transformation of the current linear plastics economy into a circular plastics economy by co-financing the high up-front investment costs and related risks to the transformation (Barra and Leonard 2018, p. 12). Financial resources and investments are not only needed for research and development and marketisation of product and process innovations that improve the circularity of plastics. They are also needed for the development, implementation and scaling up of underlying business models that aim at circularity (Smet and Linder 2019, p. 11; EEA 2020, p. 7) as well as the adoption, implementation and enforcement of policies that incentivise the shift from the existing linear to a global circular plastics economy (PEW 2020, p. 12; UNIDO 2019). Some studies suggest that the latter is particularly important, since it is not the lack of technological solutions that prevents the circularity of the plastics economy “but rather inadequate regulatory frameworks, business models, and funding mechanisms” (PEW 2020, p. 10). The exploitation of the economic potential of a global circular plastics economy is thus unlikely unless governments do not adopt and implement appropriate policies and regulations that incentivise the shift from the linear to the global circular plastics economy (PEW 2020, p. 12; see for a comprehensive overview of such policies and regulations UNEP 2018c, pp. 130–155). Finally, financial support should target the supply and the demand side in the plastics economy in order to improve its circularity (UNIDO 2019) and could focus on actions and activities in those economic sectors that contribute most to plastic pollution.
Several basic approaches and focus areas for activities and actions aiming at circularity of the plastics economy are proposed in related studies. UNEP, for example, highlights the importance of six areas where actions are needed: “Reduce (raw material use) – Redesign (design products for reuse or recycling) – Remove (single-use plastics when practical) – Reuse (alternative uses or for refurbishment) – Recycle (to avoid plastics going to waste) – Recover (re-synthesise fuels, carefully controlled incineration for energy production)” (UNEP 2018c, p. 112; see also UNEP 2017a, pp. 43–44). The Ellen Mac Arthur Foundation emphasises three priorities to achieve a circular plastics economy: 1) “Create an effective after-use plastics economy” (EMF 2017, p. 13) by increasing recycling, scaling up reusable packaging and compostable plastic packaging; 2) “drastically reduce the leakage of plastics into natural systems and other negative externalities” (EMF 2017, p. 14) by improving waste management infrastructure, making it economically more attractive to keep materials in the system, and by directing investments into innovative materials with less negative environmental effects; and 3) “decouple plastics from fossil feedstocks” (EMF 2017, p. 14).
More specifically, several measures stand out as priorities. As regards the upstream in the plastic life cycle, financial resources are needed for activities that increase the circularity of plastic products, namely product designs that minimise the use of virgin, unnecessary or avoidable plastics (PEW 2020, p. 10; UNIDO 2019, p. 1; Barra and Leonard 2018, p. 14; EMF 2017, p. 37), maximise the use of renewable sources and recycled or recovered plastics (EEA 2020, pp. 55–56; UNIDO 2019, p. 1) and improve the reusability or recyclability of plastic products (UNIDO 2019, p. 2). This also includes activities that promote the employment of less toxic or non-toxic plastic components as well as alternate materials (EEA 2020, 9 and 57; UNIDO 2019, p. 1; Kakadellis and Rosetto 2021). This is important since the “choice and organisation of materials, including plastics, are the main determining factors for product and material circularity” (EEA 2020, p. 56). Promising options in this regard are activities and actions that support the substitution of fossil-based plastics through plastics from alternative feedstocks (Barra and Leonard 2018, p. 9). Other viable options include the redesign of plastic production processes by adopting a life cycle approach that increases the lifespan, improves the reusability and eases waste prevention (Barra and Leonard 2018, p. 10). To achieve a sufficient circularity of plastic products, it is estimated that expenditures for research and development that exceed US$100 billion per year are required from 2021 to 2040 (PEW 2020, p. 11). In addition to product design, improvements in the production of plastics are worthwhile targets of financial efforts in the upstream of the plastics life cycle. Such improvements can reduce plastic leakage during production and improve the resource efficiency of production processes (UNIDO 2019, p. 2). In case of the consumer goods sector, which significantly contributes to plastic pollution, it is estimated that the largest environmental return on investment can be realised by designing more efficient products and packaging (Trucost 2016, p. 34).
As regards the midstream activities, financial resources might support education and awareness raising in order to reduce plastic consumption as well as regulations and policies that reduce plastic consumption (EEA 2020, p. 58; Barra and Leonard 2018, p. 11). Moreover, the development of innovative business models in the use of plastics are viable options at this stage of the plastics life cycle and might, for example, encourage the adoption of new delivery models (EMF 2017, pp. 45–46) and promotion of plastic products as services, e.g. by promoting the sharing and leasing of plastic products where possible (Barra and Leonard 2018, p. 11). As a matter of course, such measures are most appropriate in high-polluting sectors, including packaging, textiles, agriculture and the automobile sector (EEA 2020, p. 60).
As regards the downstream in the plastic life cycle, there is a need for investments into the improvement of collection, recycling and recovery processes and infrastructure (PEW 2020, p. 10; UNIDO 2019, p. 2; Barra and Leonard 2018, p. 10) as well as the promotion of a market for recycled and recovered plastics (EEA 2020, p. 61) and new value products that remanufacture plastics (Barra and Leonard 2018, p. 10). Financial resources and investments are particularly needed in low- and middle-income countries that have the least financial resources and where such measures are particularly promising strategies (PEW 2020, 11 and 33). Yet, also in high-income countries is room for improvement in the plastic waste collection and recycling systems (Smet and Linder 2019, p. 9). Improvements in this area are expected to reduce environmental costs of plastics. In 2016, it was, for example, estimated that if countries in Europe and North America increase the recycling rates of plastic waste to 55 percent and limit its disposal in landfills to a maximum of 10 percent this could save over US$7.9 billion in environmental costs (Trucost 2016, p. 10). Overall, investments into these activities are however economically less viable if not paired with investments in upstream activities and might struggle with keeping up with the increasing amounts of plastic waste that are expected under business-as-usual scenarios (PEW 2020, p. 9). Finally, the harmonisation of sustainability standards and labels require financial resources in order to achieve circularity since they would probably increase the use of recycled plastics (WEF 2020, p. 9).
Irrespective of the stage of the plastics life cycle, financial resources could promote circularity of the plastics economy by supporting clearing house mechanisms (UNEP 2018c, p. 128). These could be used to share best practices in and coordinate circular approaches to plastics (EEA 2020, p. 54), to transfer technologies (UNIDO 2019, p. 3) and exchange knowledge (UNIDO 2019, p. 3). Eventually, financial resources could also support capacity-building in the relevant areas (WEF 2020, p. 12; UNIDO 2019, p. 3).
Summary: what steps towards a more circular plastics economy require funding?
Several cross-cutting barriers and deficits in the current landscape in the provision of financial resources to address plastic pollution stand out.
First, existing funds in the combat of plastic pollution are overall insufficient. While the amount of related public financial resources has more than doubled between 2015 and 2018 (from US$360 million to US$800 million), the AHEG concludes that more public financial resources are needed to effectively reduce and prevent plastic pollution (UNEP 2020b, p. 20).
Second, coordination in the mobilisation and delivery of financial resources needs to be improved in order to reduce duplication of initiatives and increase the impact of funding. This holds for the provision of financial resources through bilateral channels as well as through private actors (UNEP 2020b, p. 19). In case of bilateral funding there is considerable room for improving the coordination between the overall funding strategies of the donors and the provision of financial resources for specific projects at domestic level (UNEP 2020b, p. 29). Coordination needs also to be improved between domestic and international funding efforts (UNEP 2020b, p. 21). Here, poor alignment of national priorities with international priorities might become a challenge in the mobilisation and delivery of financial resources (UNEP 2020b, p. 21).
Third, access of countries to international funds provided by bilateral or multilateral donors often remains a challenge. Countries often face difficulties in meeting the conditions and requirements of these donors (UNEP 2020b, p. 29). Here, a clearing house mechanism that informs states about already existing funds and supports them in accessing these financial resources could help (see also above).
Fourth, and in terms of sources of financial resources, private finance and investment have been making only a small contribution so far (UNEP 2020b, p. 28). Most financial resources currently come from public actors, mainly governments and municipalities. In general, the AHEG estimates that 62 percent of financial resources in the combat against plastic pollution stems from public sources, whereas only 38 percent from private sources (UNEP 2020b, p. 20). Based on its inventory, the share of funding that comes only from public sources amounts to 53 percent. Yet, in another 29 percent of financial resources public institutions contribute to alongside private actors (UNEP 2020b, p. 21). Funding that involves private actors only (that is without the involvement of any public donors) amounts to only 8 percent of the total amount of financial resources on which the AHEG inventory reports, either not-for profit or for profit (UNEP 2020b, p. 20). Funding in private not-for profit initiatives above all comes from large foundations and multinational consumer goods companies (UNEP 2020b, p. 19). They provide voluntary donations, crowdfunding donations, corporate social responsibility funds, and grants. Private for profit initiatives mostly rely on banks, microfinance institutions and private investors (UNEP 2020b, p. 19). They provide bank loans, venture capital, equity financing, angel networks, impact investments, microfinance institutions. The AHEG inventory suggests that funding form micro-finance institutions is particularly useful to help waste pickers that mostly work in the informal sector to set up their own businesses and thus leaving the informal sector (UNEP 2020b, pp. 19–20). Against this backdrop, the AHEG urges that “given the limitations on increasing public spending, it is particularly important that international and public spending further leverages private funding in the future” (UNEP 2020b, p. 20). Yet, in particular private actors often shy away from investments into research and development for new more sustainable plastic products or alternate materials because of the high risks that often characterise such projects (UNEP 2020b, p. 23). Moreover, attractive business models or opportunities are often lacking for private actors since appropriate and effective financial incentives are missing (UNEP 2020b, p. 29).
Fifth, in case of some bilateral donors internal regulations and policies prevent the funding of private companies (UNEP 2020b, p. 18). For example, in the context of bilateral funding many donors must not directly provide financial resources to the private sector (UNEP 2020b, p. 26).
Summary: what are cross-cutting barriers and deficits in the current landscape of financial support?
The preceding analysis of key finance needs raises the question how a global agreement on plastic pollution can contribute to raise and channel the much-needed financial resources. It revealed that the combat of plastic pollution in general and a global agreement on plastic pollution in particular are confronted with several challenges when it comes to the mobilisation of financial resources. Yet, two interrelated challenges stand out and need to be primarily addressed by a global agreement on plastic pollution. First, the expected costs to effectively combat plastic pollution and therefore the need for financial resources is considerable.
Second, the current availability of financial resources to tackle plastic pollution is overall insufficient even in the absence of a global agreement on plastic pollution that might set more ambitious targets and ultimately result in the need for more financial resources for its effective implementation and goal achievement. There is thus a need to mobilise more and additional resources if governments want to effectively reduce plastic pollution and decide to adopt a related global agreement that serves this goal.
Against this background, many of the reviewed studies call for a significant involvement of the private sector in mobilising and providing financial resources for the combat of plastic pollution in general and for the implementation of a global agreement on plastic pollution in particular (e.g., Cowan and Tiller 2021; Raubenheimer and Urho 2020b). Likewise, many related political declarations and resolutions demand substantial contributions from the private sector in the combat of plastic pollution (most recently BMU 2021a). These calls rest on four main considerations that already partially emerged as cross-cutting issues in the preceding analysis.
First, and most prominently, the calls refer to the well-established polluter-pays principle in national and international environmental governance (e.g., Cowan and Tiller 2021; Raubenheimer and Urho 2020b). More precisely, they propose to adopt and implement policies and instruments at international and/or domestic level that shift the responsibility (and as a consequence the costs) for a more sustainable and circular plastics economy to the various business actors in the plastics value chain, like taxes, levies or EPR schemes (see section 5 for more details).
Second, the considerations underlining these calls highlight the importance of innovations across the entire plastic life cycle and value chain that are indispensable to effectively prevent and reduce plastic pollution and to move towards a more circular plastics economy (most prominently PEW 2020, pp. 99–104). These innovations certainly can and need to be supported, facilitated and stimulated by the adoption and implementation of appropriate policies, instruments, regulations and incentives at international and/or domestic level. These can, for example, create (reliable and economically rewarding) markets for recycled materials by setting recycling targets or by banning single-use plastics (see section 5 for more details). Such innovations can also be stimulated by public investments that support related research and development. Yet, business actors in the plastics economy and private investors have a pivotal role in and are the most suitable actors for efficiently developing and marketizing such innovations (PEW 2020, pp. 99–104), let alone their responsibility as polluters.
Third, it is unlikely (and following the polluter-pays principle also undesirable) that governments and other public actors are able and willing to raise sufficient financial resources (Raubenheimer and Urho 2020b). For example, financial support under a global agreement on plastic pollution are certainly able to mobilise some of the needed financial resources and might furthermore be complemented by financial resources in the context of bi- and multilateral ODA (see section 4). Yet, it is unlikely that this will raise sufficient financial resources given that the volumes of financial support of most other multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) or of bi- and multilateral ODA rarely meet the financial needs for their implementation and goal achievement (Raubenheimer and Urho 2020b, p. 3).
Fourth and last, the calls highlight the significant economic opportunities that a more circular plastics economy provides to business actors and that might greatly facilitate their involvement (cf. section 2.1).
When designing a global agreement on plastic pollution, governments therefore need to think carefully about how to complement their financial contributions by stimulating the much-needed and desirable private resources for an effective implementation of the agreement. Two basic options emerge from the preceding discussion and analysis of key finance needs. On the one hand, governments can provide financial resources to incentivise and motivate private actors to invest in a more sustainable and circular plastic economy. On the other hand, governments can adopt and implement a political and legislative framework at international and/ or domestic level that stimulates private investments into a more sustainable and circular plastic economy and makes them economically rewarding. How this might be done and with which policies and instruments will be discussed in detail in sections 4 and 5.
The success of a global agreement on plastic pollution and its financial support will amongst others depend on the careful preparation and coordination of all participating parties’ efforts. To facilitate these efforts and the intergovernmental process, a secretariat is key. Based on a screening of existing MEAs and the funding of their respective secretariats, this section identifies and elaborates viable options to fund the secretariat of a global agreement on plastic pollution.
Depending on related decisions and the development stage in the evolution of the global agreement on plastic pollution, three different types of secretariats might require funding: a secretariat to the INC, an interim secretariat and a permanent secretariat. The INC secretariat supports states during the negotiations of the agreement. After the adoption of an agreement the interim secretariat supports participating parties in the initial phase of the agreement that lies between its adoption and its entry into force. When the agreement has entered into force, a permanent secretariat provides continuous support to the agreement’s intergovernmental process.
In the current practice of MEAs, the funding of secretariats features two basic similarities regardless of the secretariat type (WHO 2003). First, funding is typically provided by core budget or trust funds that finance the costs of the agreements’ core intergovernmental processes, including the secretariat(s). Second, the funds are typically used to finance comparable tasks and functions. They serve to enable the secretariat to convene and service conferences and meetings of the participating states and other actors, to collect, compile and disseminate relevant data, information, submissions by states, studies and reports, to provide substantive inputs and advice on relevant aspects of the agreement, to prepare draft decisions, and to support states in setting up and maintaining appropriate institutional structures and processes in the context of the agreement.
On two dimensions the funding of secretariats differs: the administration of the funds and the form of contributions to the funds. As regards the funds’ administration, two approaches exist in the current practice of MEAs. On the one hand, they are administered by an international organisation in which the secretariat is institutionally embedded, typically UNEP. On the other hand, they are administered by a separate decision-making body, namely the INC in case of INC secretariats or the Conference or Parties (COP) in case of the interim and permanent secretariats. In this case, the secretariats are institutionally independent from international organisations. The administration of the funds follow the applicable financial rules of the international organisation in which the secretariat is embedded or applies the rules that were adopted by the agreement’s decision-making body. An exception from this typical funding pattern is the secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The INC, interim and permanent secretariat of the UNFCCC have been funded by the UNGA, which also administers the financial resources in accordance with its rules and decides on the budget and programme of work of the secretariat.
As regards the form of contributions, the funding of the INC and interim secretariats on the one hand and the permanent secretariats on the other hand differ. The INC and interim secretariats are usually and mainly funded by voluntary contributions from participating states. Aside from monetary contributions, it is common practice that states also support the funds through in-kind contributions, such as the hosting of the secretariat or staff secondments. In a number of MEAs, other entities also made contributions to the funds of the INC and/or interim secretariats. In most cases, such contributions come from the international organisation, in which the secretariat is embedded, and from other international organisations that are active in the issue area that is targeted by the agreement. The POPs Club Trust Fund of the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (Basel Convention) provides an interesting alternative approach in two regards (WHO 2003, p. 9). It was open to contributions from entities other than states and international organisations, including non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or private actors. In addition, donors were publicly awarded tokens of recognition when they made contributions above a certain level. According to UNEP, this approach has generated 50 percent more resources when compared to other trust funds that did not award such recognition.
The permanent secretariats are usually and mainly funded by assessed contributions from parties of the agreement. Most of these funds are also open to voluntary contributions from other governmental and non-governmental actors, including international organisations. The assessed contributions of the parties to the agreement are mandatory. Their calculation is essentially based on the UN scales of assessment, the formula that determines the share that each state contributes to the UN regular budget. Within this common framework, two adjustments to the UN scale of assessment are typically applied when determining the assessed contributions in the context of the agreement.
First, the financial provisions of MEAs introduce a lower and an upper ceiling for a single party’s minimum and maximum share of the total contributions to the funds that finance the permanent secretariats. For example, the financial rules of the Minamata Convention on Mercury (Minamata Convention) define that each party contributes at least 0.01 percent and not more than 22 percent to the total budget of its General Trust Fund that finances its permanent secretariat, while also limiting the maximum contribution of least developed countries to 0.01 percent (UNEP 2017b). Similar provisions are applied inter alia by the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) (UNEP 1995), the UNFCCC (UNFCCC 1995) and the Basel Convention (UNEP 2011b). In case of the UNFCCC the upper ceiling lies however at 25 percent. In case of the Basel Convention the minimum contribution is set at 0.001 percent.
Second, the assessed contributions of those parties that pay more than the minimum or less than the maximum share are adjusted. This is necessary since usually not all UN members are parties of a MEA. If the UN scale of assessment was not adjusted, the budget of the trust fund would not be fully covered, since the parties of the MEA contribute for example only 80 percent to the UN regular budget. Therefore, the shares of the remaining parties that pay more than the minimum or less than the maximum share are raised. To this end, a factor is applied that apportions the remaining costs so that the budget of the MEA’s trust fund for the secretariat is fully covered. This factor is determined by dividing 100 by the share of contributions that the remaining parties contribute to the UN regular budget. For example, if the remaining parties contribute 80 percent to the UN regular budget, the factor is 1.25. A party that contributes 4 percent to the UN regular budget then contributes 5 percent to the budget of the MEA’s trust fund that finances the permanent secretariat.
When designing and setting up a financial architecture that supports a global agreement on plastic pollution through the mobilisation of international funding from public and private sources, decision-makers need to take into account, discuss and take decisions on two basic aspects. On the one hand, they need to discuss and take decisions on supporting measures, namely and typically the basic design of a financial mechanism and its functions, administration and governance as well as the mobilisation and delivery of resources from and among the parties to the agreement. On the other hand, they need to discuss and take decisions on how the financial mechanism might stimulate or attract additional financial resources from bi- and multilateral donors. When discussing and taking decisions on both aspects, they furthermore need to consider options to stimulate and leverage private financial resources through the financial mechanism or bi- and multilateral ODA.
The success of a global agreement on plastic pollution will amongst others depend on the careful design of its main financial mechanism that addresses the key finance needs in the combat against plastic pollution and ensures an effective and efficient mobilisation and delivery of financial resources. This section identifies and elaborates viable options for the design of the main financial mechanism.
The design of any financial mechanism that supports the implementation of a MEA typically involves several decisions. These include decisions about its basic function, administration and governance, mobilisation of resources (or form of contributions) and their delivery.
Financial mechanisms of MEAs typically perform one of two basic functions or a combination thereof.
On the one hand, financial mechanisms serve a funding function (UNEP 2005, p. 4). In this case, the mechanisms raise and distribute new and additional financial resources that are spent to assist parties of a MEA in developing, formulating and implementing actions and activities that contribute to the compliance with their commitments and obligations under the agreement. Such mechanisms may provide the financial resources through a single and comprehensive general-purpose fund or programme, like the Basel Convention Trust Fund to Assist Developing Countries and other Countries in Need of Technical Assistance (BD). Alternatively, the financial mechanisms of a MEA may provide the financial resources through several different funds or programmes, of which each mobilises and delivers financial resources for specific actions and activities (or protocols of the related MEA). For example, the financial mechanism of the Minamata Convention uses the Global Environment Facility (GEF) Trust Fund (for assessments, inventories, national action plans, and other implementing actions), the Specific International Programme (for capacity building and technical assistance) and the Special Programme (for institutional strengthening). Likewise, the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC uses several funds with different targets, addressees and sources of funding: the GEF Trust Fund, the Green Climate Fund (GCF), the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and the Adaptation Fund (ADF). Usually these funds are established to provide financial resources on a long-term basis. In the preparation of the Minamata Convention it was however also discussed to establish a fund that only provides financial resources within a limited period of time for some initial enabling activities (UNEP 2011a, p. 9).
On the other hand, financial mechanisms serve a coordinating function (UNEP 2005, p. 4). In this case, the financial mechanism supports parties of a MEA in the mobilisation of already available financial resources by identifying existing donors or programs and by assisting parties in applying, receiving and using these funds. A coordinating financial mechanism does however not raise new and additional financial resources. The Global Mechanism for the Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa (UNCCD) is a case in point. It advises and cooperates with developing countries and donors to facilitate access to financial resources for the implementation of UNCCD. In this context, it also provides small amounts of seed funding in order to create conditions that attracts funding from interested donors.
The administration of financial mechanisms typically follows three basic models in the current practice of MEAs (UNEP 2005, p. 4).
First, states of a MEA delegate the administration and operation of the MEA’s financial mechanism to the permanent secretariat of the MEA or of an international organisation. In case of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), for example, the convention’s permanent secretariat administers and operates the CITES External Trust Fund (QTL). The Global Mechanism of the UNCCD is administered by the secretariat of an international organisation, namely the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD).
Main advantages | Main disadvantages |
|
|
Table 2 Advantages and disadvantages of embedded administration and governance
Second, states of a MEA delegate the administration and operation of the MEA’s financial mechanism to an independent secretariat that was established for the sole purpose of administering and operating the MEA’s financial mechanism. The Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol (Multilateral Fund) and the GCF are administered and operated by independent fund secretariats that have no other tasks to perform than running the financial mechanism. In both cases, the secretariats service and are accountable to a separate and independent decision-making body of the financial mechanism, the Board in case of the GCF or the Executive Committee in case of the Multilateral Fund. These decision-making bodies in turn operate under the guidance of the COPs of the MEAs. In the context of the negotiations of the Minamata Convention several advantages and disadvantages of an independent governance and administration of a financial mechanism were raised. Developing countries were in favour of this option and – using the Multilateral Fund as example – highlighted that it would be more responsive to the needs of parties, would better support the improvement of institutional frameworks and would be more efficient. Developed countries by contrast essentially argued that the creation of a new mechanism should be avoided given that such a mechanism might also be effectively operated by a multi-purpose organisation, namely the GEF (see below) (Eriksen and Perrez 2014, pp. 207–208).
Main advantages | Main disadvantages |
|
|
Table 3 Main advantages and disadvantages of independent governance and administration
Third, states of a MEA may delegate the administration and operation of the MEA’s financial mechanism to a multi-purpose body that administers and operates the financial mechanisms of several MEAs. The GEF is the only multi-purpose organisation that administers and operates the financial mechanisms of MEAs, namely of CBD (since 1994), UNFCCC (since 1994), Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) (since 2001), UNCCD (since 2010), and Minamata Convention (since 2013). The administration and operation of a MEA’s financial mechanism through the GEF is typically based on a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on which the COP of the MEA and the GEF agree. This MoU usually provides guidance to the GEF from the COP, outlines how the GEF intends to conform with this guidance, defines reporting obligations for the GEF vis-à-vis the COP, establishes monitoring and evaluation processes, and determines the relations between GEF and the secretariats of the MEA. The MEAs typically provide relatively broad strategic guidance to the GEF and its main governing bodies, the GEF Council and the GEF Assembly. The guidance is translated into programming directions in the focal areas, operational guidelines and criteria for GEF funding through its eighteen implementing agencies.[1]Asian Development Bank, African Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN, Inter-American Development Bank, IFAD, UN Development Programme, UNEP, UN Industrial Development Organization, World Bank Group, Conservation International, Development Bank of Latin America, Development Bank of Southern Africa, Foreign Economic Cooperation Office in the Ministry of Environmental Protection of China, Brazilian Biodiversity Fund, IUCN, West African Development Bank and WWF. Within this broad model, two more specific options are implemented. On the one hand, the GEF might administer and operate the financial mechanism under its General Trust Fund. On the other hand, it might administer and operate special funds for selected conventions. The difference between these two options lies in the origin of financial resources that are administered and delivered (see also the subsequent section 5.1.3). In the former case, the resources are mobilised through the GEF replenishments that take place every four years. In the latter case, the resources are mobilised through an independent mechanism of the special funds. In the context of the negotiations of the Minamata Convention several advantages of a financial mechanism administered by the GEF were raised by developed countries. They emphasised that the GEF has a proven track record in administering financial mechanisms of MEAs and would best be able to link the goals of different MEAs in its funding decisions (Eriksen and Perrez 2014, pp. 207–208).
Main advantages | Main disadvantages |
|
|
Table 4 Main advantages and disadvantages of administration and governance through multi-purpose organisation
Another, yet rarely implemented option lies in integrating the financial mechanism of a MEA into the financial mechanism of another already existing MEA or an existing fund. Several such options were, for example, discussed in the context of the financial mechanism for the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade (Rotterdam Convention) (UNEP 2005).
Main advantages | Main disadvantages |
|
|
Table 5 Main advantages and disadvantages of integrating administration and governance of financial mechanism into other financial mechanims or funds
Financial mechanisms of MEAs mobilise resources in two basic ways.
First, financial mechanisms of MEAs mobilise resources through voluntary contributions from parties of the MEA but typically also encourage non-parties and other governmental or non-governmental actors to contribute as well, including international organisations, NGOs, civil society actors, business and economic actors or private donors and foundations, to name just a few. In this case, any actor that wants to contribute to the financial mechanism pledges the sum of resources that it intends to contribute to the financial mechanism. Such voluntary contributions are made in the form of grants, capital or loans. They are typically earmarked for the funding of specific and more or less narrowly pre-defined activities and actions. For example, the GCF and the BD rest entirely on voluntary contributions.
Main advantages | Main disadvantages |
|
|
Table 6 Main advantages and disadvantages of voluntary contributions
Second, financial mechanisms of MEAs mobilise resources through what is best described as negotiated mandatory contributions. In these cases, states negotiate the overall budget of the financial mechanism for a pre-defined budget period as well the share each party contributes to this budget. Once the negotiations are concluded and states have agreed upon the budget and the burden sharing, their contributions become mandatory. The GEF and the Multilateral Fund are cases in point. At the GEF states negotiate every four years the overall sum of their contributions to the GEF and agree on the burden sharing. In practice, the shares have however been not subject to negotiations (GEF 2021, 3 and annex 2). After the conclusion of the negotiations, each state enters into a legally binding agreement on its contribution with the Trustee of the GEF, the World Bank. At the Multilateral Fund states also negotiate the overall sum of their contributions. The distribution of funds is then however determined by the applicable UN scale of assessment.
Main advantages | Main disadvantages |
|
|
Table 7 Main advantages and disadvantages of negotiated mandatory contributions
In fact, many financial mechanisms mobilise resources by combining these two ways. In particular those MEAs which mobilise resources through the GEF also established trust funds that raise voluntary contributions. The CBD, for example, has established three such funds: the Special Voluntary Trust Fund (BE Trust Fund) for additional voluntary contributions in support of approved activities of the Convention on Biological Diversity, The Special Voluntary Trust Fund (BH Trust Fund) for the Additional Voluntary Contributions in Support of Approved Activities of the Cartagena Protocol, and the Special Voluntary Trust Fund (BX Trust Fund) for the Additional Voluntary Contributions in Support of Approved Activities of the Nagoya Protocol. Likewise, the financial mechanism of POPs rests on the GEF and an additional Special Voluntary Trust Fund.
A third, yet rather uncommon way of mobilising resources is implemented by the Adaptation Fund of the UNFCCC. Its financial mechanism mobilises some of its resources through a two percent levy on certified emission reduction credits (CER) of developed countries that are issued under the Clean Development Mechanism of the UNFCCC for the implementation of emission-reduction projects in developing countries. As of June 2021, the levy on CER amounted to 24 percent of the Adaptation Fund’s cumulative resources (US$208 million of US$1.1 billion). Voluntary pledges by states account for the largest share of cumulative resources (76 percent or US$859 million).
The delivery of resources includes above all the form of financial support that is provided and the resource allocation in terms of eligibility and other criteria (namely which states, and possibly other actors, and actions and activities can obtain financial support).
Eligibility and other criteria: The provisions of any financial mechanism of MEAs limits access to funding first of all to certain countries. The eligibility criteria typically limit the access to funding to countries that ratified the MEA and are compliant with its obligations. In addition to this basic criteria, most MEAs define certain groups of countries that are eligible to receive funding from their financial mechanisms. These include typically developing countries, least developed countries, economies in transition and countries in need for technical assistance. They are either explicitly named and grouped in the MEA or defined by applying some generic criteria. In case of the GEF, for example, all countries that are eligible to receive funding from the World Bank or the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) are also eligible to receive funding from the GEF.
Aside from these country-based criteria, financial mechanisms of MEAs allocate resources only to certain projects, actions and activities. The currently effective investment framework of the GCF, for example, applies six basic investment criteria with more than 30 related specific sub-criteria and more than 50 indicators for assessing the project proposals (GCF 2015). These criteria reflect the mapping of guidance from the UNFCCC COP, the Governing Instrument for the GCF, previous GCF Board decisions, conditions imposed by the Board on funding proposals and a review of the approach taken by other institutions on eligibility (GCF 2018). Likewise, the GEF applies several project-related eligibility criteria. These require that the project is aligned with national priorities in sustainable development and country-driven, pursues an integrated approach to tackle the drivers of environmental degradation, addresses one or more of the GEF focal areas, contributes to achieving global environmental benefits and ensures public participation in design and implementation of projects.
Form of financial support: Most financial mechanisms of MEAs primarily provide grants for projects that help achieving the goals of the MEA. In these cases, funding is typically limited to the incremental costs of the projects and may also require co-financing through the recipient country.
Increasingly, financial mechanisms do however also seek to attract and stimulate private investments through more innovative funding approaches and non-grant instruments. To this end, some financial mechanisms provide blended finance and partner with private entities to finance initiatives. Blended finance involves a number of different financing instruments and might also yield financial returns for the investors (not necessarily the financial mechanism). Essentially, it is employed to lower the risks of and thereby facilitating private investments. As the analysis of the key finance needs revealed, such de-risking in the combat of plastic pollution is, for example, needed in the transition to a more circular plastics economy as private actors here often shy away from the high up-front investment costs and risks (UNEP 2020b, p. 23). This applies not only to investments into research and development of more sustainable plastic products but also to investments needed for their marketisation or new business and delivery models (see section 2.2).
The GEF, for example, provides partial or full credit guarantees, performance risk guarantees, structured financing, equity and investment funds, revolving equity funds, contingent loan, concessional loans and revolving loan funds (GEF 2020, p. 25). In 2019, the GEF estimated that its investments in blended finance of US$700 million mobilised US$7 billion in private sector co-financing (GEF 2019, p. 3). The GCF has even set up a separate division that promotes private sector investments, including institutional investors: the Private Sector Facility (PSF). It uses concessional financing instruments such as low-interest and long-term project loans, lines of credit to banks and other financial institutions, and equity investments and risk mitigators, including guarantees and first-loss protection (GCF 2019). As of July 2021, 33 percent or US$3 billion of GCF’s funding was invested in blended finance in 35 projects and stimulated US$9.6 billion private sector investment (GCF 2021).
When designing and setting up the main financial mechanism of a global agreement on plastic pollution, decision-makers need to take into account, discuss and take decisions on several questions.
Table 8 Overview on questions in the design of the financial mechanism
Question | Options |
What basic functions should the financial mechanism perform? |
|
How should the financial mechanism be administered and governed? |
|
How should the financial mechanism mobilise resources from parties to the agreement? |
|
What activities should be funded? |
|
How should the financial mechanism deliver resources? |
|
There is no general single best-choice of options or combination across all design elements in the context of a global agreement on plastic pollution. Nevertheless, when it comes to the financial mechanism’s basic functions and the delivery of resources some options are more viable than others.
As regards the mechanism’s basic function, the analysis of the key finance needs and cross-cutting barriers and deficits in the current landscape of financial support suggests that a global agreement on plastic pollution would benefit from a financial mechanism that performs both functions, funding and coordination. On the one hand, the analysis of key finance needs revealed that the needs are considerable and current funding is insufficient. On the other hand, the analysis of cross-cutting barriers and deficits in the current availability and distribution of resources revealed that coordination in the mobilisation and delivery of financial resources needs to be improved in order to reduce duplication of initiatives and increase the impact of funding. Moreover, it revealed that access of countries to the already available international financial resources often remains a challenge, be it access to funding from bi- and multilateral donors or access to private financial resources.
As regards the delivery of resources, the analysis of key finance needs and cross-cutting barriers and deficits in the current landscape of financial support suggests that a global agreement on plastic pollution would benefit from a financial mechanism whose eligibility criteria and forms of financial support meet four requirements.
First, they should allow to deliver resources to developing countries since they often lack sufficient institutional, administrative and technical capacities and infrastructure to tackle plastic pollution, while contributing a large share to plastic pollution. Second, they should generally allow to deliver resources to all stages in the plastics life cycle since an effective reduction of plastic pollution requires measures and actions at each stage. However, emphasis should be placed on the one hand on plastic waste prevention and the production stage in order to reduce waste generation already in the first stage of the plastics life cycle. On the other hand, emphasis should be placed on the improvement of waste management services, infrastructures and capabilities in order to make waste collection, treatment and recycling more effective and environmentally sound. Third, the criteria should allow to deliver resources to enabling activities, capacity building and technical assistance (e.g. national inventories, formulation and implementation of national policies and plans, or improvements administrative and institutional capacities and in the enforcement of existing legislation), knowledge-related activities (e.g. research, development and innovation of alternate materials or technologies) and steps towards a more circular plastics economy. Fourth, they should allow to deliver resources not only through grants but also through non-grant instruments and blended finance since these promise to leverage and stimulate much needed private resources and investments. The GCF and its PSF or the GEF and its blended finance mechanisms might be taken as role model in this regard.
When it comes to the administration and governance of a financial mechanism as well as the form of contributions under a global agreement on plastic pollution, decisions become more challenging and less straightforward since no option is generally superior to other options but each involves advantages, disadvantages, trade-offs and obstacles on different dimensions.
In case of governance and administration, the account of options identified advantages, disadvantages, trade-offs and obstacles on altogether seven dimensions, namely 1) costs, 2) accountability relationship between agreement and financial mechanism, 3) alignment of MEA goals/priorities and financial mechanism, 4) integration of financial mechanism with other financial mechanisms, 5) political feasibility, 6) predictability and reliability of funding, and 7) capacity of the financial mechanism’s administration (see Table 9).
Governance and administration | |||
Dimension | Embedded | Independent | Multi-purpose |
Low costs | + | - | + |
Strong accountability relationship between agreement and mechanism | + | + | - |
Good alignment of agreement goals/priorities with mechanism | + | + | - |
Good integration of mechanism with other financial mechanisms | - | - | + |
High political feasibility | + | - | + |
High predictability and reliability of funding | - | + | + |
High capacity of mechanism’s administration | - | + | + |
Table 9 Overview on viable options for the mechanism’s administration and governance
In order to exploit the advantages of the different options governments could also decide to set up different financial mechanisms, for example one that is administered by the GEF and another one that is embedded in the institutional framework of a global plastic agreement. A similar decision was taken by the parties of the Minamata Convention (Eriksen and Perrez 2014, pp. 207–208). They established the Specific International Programme (for capacity building and technical assistance) and the Special Programme (for institutional strengthening), which are administered and governed by convention bodies. In addition, they also delegated the funding of finance assessments, inventories, national action plans, and other implementing actions to the GEF Trust Fund (see above).
When it comes to the form of contributions, the account of options identified advantages, disadvantages, trade-offs and obstacles on altogether three dimensions, namely 1) alignment of MEA goals/priorities and financial mechanism, 2) political feasibility, and 3) predictability and reliability of funding (see Table 10). While mandatory contributions are certainly the most viable option, their political feasibility is highly uncertain.
Form of contribution | ||
Dimension | Mandatory | Voluntary |
Good alignment of agreement goals/priorities with mechanism | + | - |
High political feasibility | - | + |
Table 10 Overview on viable options for the form of contributions
Ultimately, and when deciding on mechanism’s administration and governance or its form of contributions, the choice of options therefore depends on what dimension or what combination of dimensions is prioritised in the assessment of the goals, functionalities, capabilities and performance of the financial mechanism.
In general, it is rather difficult for MEAs to directly, mobilise resources from bi- and multilateral aid donors, that is without using the GEF as administrator and source of funding of the financial mechanism. Usually, bi- and multilateral donors follow their own strategies and priorities. Nevertheless, three basic options exist that might also be used under a global agreement on plastic pollution.
First, the global agreement on plastic pollution could incentivise bilateral ODA from developed countries by accepting a certain share of bilateral ODA as contribution to its financial mechanism. The Multilateral Fund accepts that states can deliver up to 20 percent of their contributions to the Fund’s budget by providing new and additional resources to specific countries through their bilateral development aid agencies. The challenge here lies in ensuring that contributing parties in fact provide new and additional resources through their bilateral ODA and do not simply reallocate existing resources that they would have spent anyway.
Second, the agreement could facilitate access to and use of already existing (or future) funds that bi- and multilateral donors provide. To this end, the agreement could perform a coordinating function, like the Global Mechanism of the UNCCD, and support parties in the mobilisation of already available financial resources by identifying existing donors or programs and by assisting parties in applying, receiving and using these funds.
Third, parties to the agreement might be privileged to obtain multilateral ODA from global and regional development banks that fund projects in the area of the agreement.
All options would benefit from the fact that many donors of multilateral and bilateral ODA already provide (some) financial resources for tackling plastic pollution. In fact, the AHEG inventory finds that most of the currently available financial resources that support actions and activities in this area originate from bi- and multilateral ODA. Of the 74 sources of financing that the inventory identifies 47 are provided by the global and regional development banks, multi-country partnerships and bilateral ODA (UNEP 2020b, p. 17). Bilateral funding comes above all from developed countries like Australia, Germany, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States (UNEP 2020b, p. 18). Overall, bilateral ODA represents the most important source of funding, amounting to 41 percent of all financial resources that the AHEG inventory identified.
Most of these financing initiatives provide financial resources through project grants (cf. UNEP 2020b, Annex I). Yet, in particular multilateral donors also use blended finance to support actions and activities that target plastic pollution. The AHEG inventory lists altogether eight such initiatives that primarily provide loans with the aim to attract, stimulate and de-risk private sector investments.
In addition, the World Bank has set up two financing initiatives that raise funds through issuing bonds that can be used by companies, governments and municipalities, the Sustainable Development Bond on Sustainable Use of Oceans and Coastal Areas and the Blue Economy Bond (together with developed countries) (UNEP 2020b, p. 18). Such bonds are also widely used for the support of climate-related actions and activities (CBI 2021). In the context of plastic pollution, the AHEG inventory emphasises that such bonds are particularly useful for funding activities at city and municipality level that typically receive less financial resources but are particularly important in the combat against plastic pollution since usually local governments are responsible for financing and investing into improvements of waste management systems (UNEP 2020b, p. 30).
Moreover, the World Bank has also set up two multi-donor trust funds, ProBLUE and the Oceans, Marine Debris and Coastal Resources Multi-Donor Trust Fund. Under its second pillar, the former provides grants and engages in blended finance for the prevention of marine litter (UNEP 2020b, p. 18). The latter provides financial resources to the Indonesian government for technical assistance and capacity-building (UNEP 2020b, p. 38).
Aside from international funding through a financial mechanism or bi- and multilateral ODA, mobilizing public and private financial resources at the domestic level, especially in developing countries, will be key to help funding efforts in the implementation of a global agreement on plastic pollution. Typically, MEA emphasise that each party makes independent efforts to mobilise resources for national actions and measures that serve to implement the MEA. To this end, three basic categories of instruments may be used: regulatory, market-based and/or informational (Karasik et al. 2020, pp. 26–27). These instruments might directly contribute to the mobilization of financial resources at the domestic level, like taxes or levies. Others might indirectly mobilise resources by lowering costs for waste management, like bans on single-use plastic products or incentives to reuse of products. Regulatory and market-based instruments are particularly suitable to mobilise financial resources at the domestic level, including private resources. Depending on their design, these instruments can target and lead to changes in either one or multiple stages of the plastics life cycle, from plastic production over plastic consumption to plastic waste collection, management and disposal. If successfully implemented and enforced, they can contribute to a decrease in plastic production, to less plastic waste and to a reduction of environmentally harmful plastic waste management and disposal. Information instruments mostly and at best indirectly affect the mobilisation of financial resources through changes in the behaviour of consumers that lead to the adaptation of consumption patterns and then to changes in the plastic production and disposal. In practice, governments were more likely to adopt regulatory instruments to tackle plastic pollution than market-based instruments (by a factor of 3.5) and than information instruments (by a factor of 3) (Karasik et al. 2020, p. 8). In many cases, market-based instruments are accompanied by information instruments (Karasik et al. 2020, pp. 26–27).
In principle, a global agreement on plastic pollution can contribute to the mobilisation of financial resources through these instruments in at least three ways. First, and most far-reaching but also politically least likely and feasible, it can prescribe the use of (a selection of) such instruments. Second, its goals and rules might (indirectly) prompt governments to formulate, adopt, implement and enforce such instruments in order to achieve the goals and commitments of the agreement. Third, it can support parties to the agreement in designing, formulating, implementing and enforcing these instruments, e.g. through capacity building, technical assistance, information exchange or guidance.
Against this background, and drawing on the most recent and comprehensive studies on approaches to reduce plastic pollution (Karasik et al. 2020; IRP 2021), this chapter introduces the most prominent and promising instruments and polices that have the potential to mobilise financial resources at the domestic level, namely their objectives, functions and modalities. Yet, knowledge about the success conditions of plastic policies and their effectiveness is severely limited (Karasik et al. 2020, p. 10; IRP 2021, p. 9; Busch et al. 2021, p. 32). A vast majority of the available studies analyses the effectiveness of plastic bag bans, levies and taxes (Karasik et al. 2020). This makes an assessment of the effectiveness of other policies and unintended side effects as well as success conditions difficult. Nevertheless, and even if only in some cases, an assessment of their success conditions will be provided or examples from different countries will be introduced that highlight potential success factors or unintended side effects that might inform the selection of suitable instruments or instrument mixes in the context of a global agreement on plastic pollution.
In general, it was found that some basic conditions contribute to the effectiveness of policies that tackle plastic pollution.
General success conditions of plastic pollution policies
Availability of alternative (in- or less expensive) materials/substitutes
Moreover, the thorough consideration of a few key questions about target area, context, regulatory frameworks, implementation capacities and monitoring tools before selecting an instrument might increase the effectiveness of market-based and regulatory instruments (ten Brink et al. 2009, p. 31).
Question | Reasoning |
What type of plastic pollution is targeted? | Depending on the type, the instrument should be tailored accordingly. |
What is the source of plastic pollution that is targeted? | Instruments can focus specifically on land-based or ocean-based plastic pollution. Sometimes several sources are to be targeted with an instrument mix. |
What is the current state of the waste management structure? | Most instruments require effective waste management strategies and infrastructure for implementation. A critical assessment should therefore always accompany the choice of instruments in order to avoid a disconnect that undermines implementation efforts. |
What is the experience and expertise in applying the instrument? Do adequate legal and regulatory frameworks exist to apply the instrument? | Before applying successfully implemented instruments from elsewhere, it is advisable to verify whether the context and circumstances are comparable and allow it. |
Are there sufficient capacities to implement, enforce and monitor market-based instruments? What enforcement and monitoring tools are available? | Enforcement and monitoring is essential to ensure compliance with and thus effectiveness of the policy. |
Table 11 Key questions for designing effective instrument
The following options and instruments to reduce plastic waste should be considered against the backdrop of these guiding questions to ensure adequate selection and effective implementation.
Regulatory instruments are the most common instruments to tackle plastic pollution and typically address plastic pollution at the points of sale or selling stage in the plastics life cycle (Karasik et al. 2020, p. 8). They typically require and oblige actors in the plastics value chain to change their behaviour and adopt more sustainable practices, actions and/or behaviour. Or they require and oblige them to take responsibility for reducing unsustainable and adapting to more sustainable practices, actions and/or behaviour, e.g. by imposing related costs on them.
One of the most prominent regulatory instruments to address waste in general and plastic waste in particular are EPR schemes. Introduced in the 1990s, EPR schemes assign property rights to producers and, as a consequence, duties for the sound management and disposal of plastic waste with the objective to shift responsibility away from municipalities. EPR schemes mobilise private resources for plastic waste collection and management as well as recycling efforts by obliging producers to assume responsibility and bear the costs. EPR schemes might also promote circular economy approaches by encouraging product design that reduces waste and use of harmful chemicals. If producers are held responsible for the collection and processing of plastic waste this provides an incentive to them to increase recycling and reuse and to improve resource efficiency in order to reduce the loss of economic value of their products (Bucknall 2020, p. 6). Among the different sources and streams, the most important waste stream to address is packaging waste, which contributes the largest share to plastic waste (UNEP 2017a, p. 45).
Typically, producers pay a fee to a third party or organization that is responsible for waste collection and treatment. The fee is usually based on the amount of packaging that producers put on the market (e.g., a fee on weight or volume), also taking into account different materials in the plastic product and rewarding those with a circular or more recyclable and/ or reusable design and penalising other, less circular, recyclable and/or reusable products (Leal Filho et al. 2019, p. 10). Fees are then used to cover, or contribute to, the cost of collection, treatment, recycling and/or reuse of plastic waste. As an alternative, there can be an obligation for producers to pay a compensation fee to authorities that are responsible for waste collection and treatment, mostly municipalities (Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2020, p. 129; Leal Filho et al. 2019, p. 6). Yet, producers are likely to shift the costs onto the consumers, resulting in higher prices for plastic products (Valpak 2021) but also providing an incentive for consumers to use alternative products.
Other options to implement EPR systems are deposit-refund schemes or product take-back programs (OECD 2014, p. 6). In the former case, a small deposit is charged in addition to a product’s regular price at purchase and later the buyer is granted a refund if the product is returned. If properly designed, deposit- refund schemes can contribute significantly to the collection and recycling of plastic products, thus also reducing the production of virgin plastic and related greenhouse gas emissions. In countries with deposit refund schemes such as Denmark, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands, polyethylene terephthalate (PET) recycling rates of more than 85% are achieved – in stark contrast to the United Kingdom (57%) where no such system is in place (Mazhandu et al. 2020, p. 28). In the latter case, actors that put plastic products on the market are required to take back their products after they were disposed. To work effectively, deposit-refund schemes or product take-back programs need to be accompanied by targets for waste separation and processing (e.g. recycling or reuse). To implement deposit-refund schemes or comply with product take-back programs, each actor may set up its own waste collection and management system or – as it is typically done in practice – they join forces and delegate the related tasks to a single organisation.
EPR schemes are considered to provide a number of advantages besides resource mobilisation, if they are designed properly (IRP 2021, p. 28). According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), they “have contributed to significant increases in recycling rates and reductions of public spending on waste management in many countries” (OECD 2014, p. 3).
Main advantages of EPR schemes
Yet, EPR schemes also pose several challenges. This applies in particular to developing countries and includes, for example, 1) competition of the EPR scheme with already existing market-based waste collection systems, often including informal waste collection and recycling, 2) insufficient waste collection and management infrastructures in particular in rural areas, 3) limited number (and capacity) of recycling facilities that accept and can deal with multi-layer or compound plastic waste, 4) financial and technological constraints to implement and enforce sufficient pollution control mechanisms that prevent plastic leakage at waste management and recycling facilities, 5) free riding of small, unregistered plastic producers and traders that often dominate the plastic markets in developing countries, and 6) high transportation costs of recyclable waste from rural areas to recycling facilities in mostly urban areas (Johannes et al. 2021). These challenges are not insurmountable but to overcome them typically requires accompanying measures that in turn require additional financial resources not necessarily generated or borne by the EPR scheme, for example investments for the reduction of transport costs, incentives for informal waste collectors to contribute to the formal waste collection or the expansion of waste management capacities in rural areas (Johannes et al. 2021).
Main success conditions of EPR schemes
As in the case of taxes and levies (see section 5.2), EPR schemes are typically introduced at domestic level but could also be adopted or encouraged at global level in the context of a global agreement on plastic pollution (Cowan and Tiller 2021, p. 9; Raubenheimer and Urho 2020b).Yet, the greatest obstacle for a global EPR scheme lies in the complex negotiations that are necessary and the strong political resistance that it would most probably meet from a variety of actors, in particular the plastics industry (Cowan and Tiller 2021, p. 9). Moreover, a global EPR scheme would need to set up relatively complex institutional structures and processes as well as to involve and assign responsibilities to a huge number of different actors, including governments at different levels and a variety of actors in the plastics value chain across the globe.
Nevertheless, the proposal for a global EPR scheme could possibly build on the support from an increasing number and diversity of actors (EMF 2021). In 2019, Asian countries suggested to introduce EPR schemes in the ASEAN Framework of Action on Marine Debris. EPR schemes have also been mentioned as possible and promising key instrument in many UNEA resolutions on marine litter. Recently, the introduction of EPR schemes were furthermore endorsed by many business organisations, including major multi-national companies (EMF 2021). Moreover, the proposal for a global EPR scheme could build on (and try to connect in one way or another) the more than 400 existing EPR schemes around the world, including in developing countries (EMF 2021).
Bans prohibit the use of certain plastic products or materials and are most frequently used by national governments across the world (Karasik et al. 2020, p. 8). Caps (progressively) limit their use. Targets (progressively) prescribe a certain share of certain plastic products or material in the plastic market. Standards prescribe a certain share of materials in plastic products that are put on the markets and feature prominently in proposals on the design of a global agreement on plastic pollution (e.g., Raubenheimer and Urho 2020a).
All instruments require and signal to actors in the plastic value chain that they need to adapt their behaviour and provide stimuli for innovative and more sustainable product designs, thereby creating new markets for alternative products and materials that substitute those that are banned or capped or that need to be reduced in plastic products. Most existing bans address plastic bags or single-use and throw-away plastic products. Most existing targets typically prescribe the share of plastic products that needs to be recycled (IRP 2021, pp. 31–33).
Bans, caps, targets and standards are generally considered as promising instruments in the combat against plastic pollution (Karasik et al. 2020; IRP 2021). They mobilise financial resources in particular from private actors that – in response to the bans, caps, targets and standards – invest in developing and marketizing alternative plastic products and materials or in increasing the recyclability or re-usability. Bans on plastic bags were shown to result in significant short-term effects, while longer-term effects are less significant due to changes in consumer behaviour and related rebound effects (Karasik et al. 2020, pp. 83–85). Caps for certain plastic products and materials also feature prominently in studies on the design of a global agreement on plastic pollution, like targets for recycling and reuse do (e.g., Simon et al. 2021, p. 44; UNEA 2020, p. 4; EIA et al. 2020, p. 4; Tessnow-von Wysocki and Le Billon 2019, p. 100; UNEP 2018b, p. 89; Raubenheimer and McIlgorm 2017, p. 324; Simon and Schulte 2017, p. 33; UNEP 2020b, p. 33). Most recently, Simon et al. (2021) proposed a cap on the production of virgin plastics. Like taxes, levies and EPR schemes, bans, caps, targets and standards thus might also be introduced at global level in the context of a global agreement on plastic pollution.
Main success conditions of bans, caps, targets and standards
Market-based instruments can essentially take two different forms: incentives and disincentives that both mobilise financial resources. Disincentives typically penalise environmentally harmful, unsustainable and undesired actions, practices and behaviour by increasing related costs, whereas incentives reward environmentally friendly, more sustainable and desired actions, practices and behaviour by reducing related costs. If market-based instruments shall mobilize domestic resources for combating plastic pollution, revenues must be earmarked to this purpose to avoid that they are channelled into the general government budget, as is sometimes the case (Newman et al. 2015, p. 379).
Disincentives mobilise financial resources typically through taxes, levies, penalties or charges on environmentally harmful, unsustainable and undesired actions, practices and behaviour. Their revenues can be earmarked to dedicated funds that are then used to tackle plastic pollution by funding, for example, research and development into new and more sustainable plastic products or alternative materials as well as their marketisation, improvement of waste collection and recycling processes, facilities and other infrastructure, and/or awareness and information campaigns.
Incentives do not raise revenues. They mobilise financial resources by prompting actors in the plastics value chain to invest in and make available resources for desired actions, practices and behaviour. Typical incentives are tax exemptions or other financial and monetary reliefs for desired actions, practices and behaviour.
The adoption and implementation of disincentives have also been already proposed at global level. For example, and in the context of a global agreement on plastic pollution, governments could decide to coordinate or impose a minimum international levy or tax on the plastics industry (or importers and exporters of plastic products) (Simon et al. 2018, p. 34). A coordinated tax or levy would be collected by all governments using their domestic tax systems. An international tax or levy would be collected by a designated international body or organisation. The revenue could be directed to a new or existing international fund (under the auspices of the governing bodies of the global agreement) and used to finance and support activities to combat plastic pollution. A successful example for such a tax is the funding mechanism of the Oil Pollution Compensation Fund, which is funded by a tax and in which 116 countries participate (Eisen et al. 2020, pp. 27–28). Such taxes, their potential, benefits, costs and design option have also been discussed in the context of financing the sound management of chemicals (Eisen et al. 2020).
Overall, taxes and levies are considered rather effective tools to reduce plastic consumption and to mobilize financial resources, for example in case of single-use plastics (Cornago et al. 2021). The effectiveness of market-based instruments generally depends on many different factors.
Main success conditions of market-based instruments
However, these instruments can also lead to unintended side-effects. Levies on plastic bags, for example, could lead to an increase in the consumption of other products, e.g. garbage bags, or a shift to reusable plastic bags (Martinho et al. 2017). Too high levies on plastic waste disposal could lead to increases in illegal waste disposal. In order to avoid such unintended effects, it is vital to set the taxes and levies at adequate levels and support them through further accompanying measures (Alpizar et al. 2020, p. 29), for example measures to sanction illegal waste disposal (Abbott and Sumaila 2019, p. 330; Newman et al. 2015, p. 377). In reverse, too low tax levels impair the instruments’ effectiveness (Prata et al. 2019, p. 7). Past observations from South Africa’s levy scheme have also indicated that disproportionately low levies can reveal ineffective and undermine efforts to affect consumer change (Dikgang et al. 2012). In addition, the tax or levy proceedings risk a possible decline as soon as the instrument unfolds its effect and leads to a decreasing consumption of the taxed product. Disincentives typically raise government revenues as long as undesired behaviour does not completely change. Although complete behaviour change is unlikely to occur, revenues might decrease over time if the specific measure or instruments reveals to be effective (Oosterhuis et al. 2014, p. 49). It may therefore function as a tool to encourage change of behaviour but is less suitable to raise high revenue in the long-term.
Four basic options for market-based instruments targeting plastic production and mobilising public and/ or private resources at domestic level are noteworthy.
First, and in order to increase the use of recycled plastics in plastic production, a differentiated taxation system might be established that raises higher taxes on virgin plastic products than on recycled plastic products (UNIDO 2019, p. 25). For example, the United Kingdom announced the introduction of a plastic packaging tax from April 2022 that will apply to manufactured or imported plastic packaging with less than 30% recycled plastic. It is estimated to increase the use of recycled plastic in packaging by around 40% and raise £235m (UK Government 2021).
Second, taxes on environmental damage associated with a specific product or its potential to be recycled or reused might be introduced. For example, higher taxes on polymer or plastics with certain chemical additives can be envisaged to discourage further production of hard-to-recycle or -reuse materials with particularly damaging environmental or health impact. In the case of Denmark, a tax is applied to certain soft Polyvinylchloride (PVC) products that contain phthalates, thus providing a fiscal disincentive for manufacturers to use these materials and an incentive to replace these chemicals and opt for other softeners (Watkins et al. 2019, p. 28).
Third, existing market-based instruments that support fossil fuel production might be reformed by removing subsidies or alternatively apply taxation of greenhouse gas and/or other emissions during the plastic production. It is projected that the greenhouse gas emissions from plastic production could be responsible for 10% to 13% of the entire remaining carbon budget by 2050 (CIEL 2019, p. 1). Given the lower greenhouse gas footprint of recycled plastic (plastic resins) as well as reused plastic vis-à-vis virgin plastic (OECD 2018, p. 7), this could contribute to a higher uptake of recycled and reused plastic while disincentivising the use of virgin plastic.
Depending on the design of the tax or levy, such approaches could not only create significant environmental benefits by targeting unnecessary production or incentivising increased usage of recycled content and recollection (Simon et al. 2018, p. 34; Forrest et al. 2019). They could also mobilise a significant amount of financial resources that could be invested in the combat of plastic pollution. For example, the global plastic market had an annual turnover of US$580 billion in 2020 and is estimated to reach an annual turnover of US$750 billion in 2028. Hence, a mere 0.5 percent (global) tax or levy could generate US$3.75 billion in 2028 (Statista 2021).
Yet, at least with regard to a globally imposed tax or levy, the greatest disadvantage of this option lies in the complex negotiations that are necessary and the strong political resistance that it would most probably meet from a variety of actors. The adoption of a global minimum corporate tax of 15 percent by the G20 shows however that such taxes are politically feasible, at least in principle and accepting a considerable duration of negotiations.
An alternative international option would be to adopt and implement border tax adjustments for certain less sustainable plastic products, comparable to what has been recently discussed in the context of the international climate negotiations and what was proposed as Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism in the Green Deal of the EU. These would however need to be in accordance with respective rules and prescriptions of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).
In addition to the production stage, taxes and levies can also come into effect at the consumption level as product or input taxes, aiming to discourage the consumption of certain products. Several countries have successfully put such instruments in place.
The most prominent example is a levy on single-use plastic (bags). In 2002, Ireland was one of the first countries to introduce a levy on single-use plastic bags, leading to a drastic reduction in the use of plastic bags in the order of 90% (Convery et al. 2007). The levy proceeds, which have totalled €234 million as of the end of 2015, are channelled into an Environment Fund (DPER 2017). Fiji, Colombia and Israel are just some of the currently thirty countries worldwide regulating the use of plastic bags through levies or fees (UNEP 2018a). Recent examples illustrate that this instrument can easily be expanded to other products. The Irish government announced plans to apply a levy to single-use plastic articles such as disposable cups.
Another option are advance disposal fees. These fees translate in higher prices on plastic products to subsidize recycling (UNEP 2020a). Fees may be charged on producers or consumers and consider the disposal and recycling costs of different materials. Such fees have already been implemented in a number of countries, including South Africa and the United States (Abbott and Sumaila 2019, p. 330).
Finally, tourist taxes or levies (or parking fees at waterfronts) can be an instrument to mobilise financial resources and finance activities that aim to reduce plastic pollution, e.g. coastal cleaning or waste collection and treatment, thus following the “user pays principle” (ten Brink et al. 2009, p. 10). Tourist taxes or fees require wide-spread implementation in order to avoid indirect effects such as loss of competitiveness of targeted destinations or tourism shifts to tax-free areas.
A third target area for taxes and levies is plastic disposal, where the implementation of these instruments can contribute to reducing plastic waste, increasing appropriate disposal of plastic products and funding a robust waste management structure. Several options are to be distinguished: “pay-as-you-throw” systems in the forms of weight-based, volumetric or unit-based pricing of plastic waste disposal, landfill taxes, and infrastructure charges.
So-called “pay-as-you-throw” systems incentivize waste reduction by charging a fee per item disposed, e.g. per trash bag (Ocean Conservancy and McKinsey Center for Business and Environment 2015, p. 41). They fall under the polluter-pays principle and are operationalized in either weight-based, volumetric or unit-based systems. In certain jurisdictions, the fee on waste disposal has contributed significantly to the reduction of the production of residual waste (ADEME 2018). However, it requires close monitoring, enforcement policies and formal enforcement to avoid illegal waste disposal or waste tourism as a result of these policies (Abbott and Sumaila 2019, p. 330). Analysis from Switzerland for example offers a mixed picture: the introduction of unit-based pricing systems may have led to illegal waste disposal in nearby communities without such policy for some municipalities, whereas for others no such effect was observed (Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2020, p. 128). Previous applicability might thus depend on the national and even local context, institutional capabilities and enforcement mechanisms.
A second option to regulate plastic disposal are landfill taxes. Their aim is to incentivize recycling, recovery or reuse instead of waste disposal by charging plastic waste that is sent for disposal at landfills. The charge typically depends on the weight and on the environmental impacts of the waste in question. Landfill taxes of varying levels are in place in some 20 EU countries, in the Australian state of Victoria as well as in New Zealand, with some of these countries directly channelling revenues into waste reduction and environmental protection policies (Newman et al. 2015, pp. 378–379). Analysis by OECD suggests that high landfill taxes have led to lower landfill rates in many European countries and to an increase in treatment infrastructure (IRP 2021, p. 27).
Third, infrastructure charges can help to ensure that waste management infrastructure and facilities are developed and maintained. These can consist in levies at ports that are then used to reduce marine litter and improve waste management at ports. Such levies typically take into account the size of ships, volumes of waste and type of waste (UNEP 2018c, p. 145). As with previous instruments, special levies or charges at ports might also result in waste being dumped into the sea. In anticipation of such effects, alternative instruments privilege a general port reception fee, including costs for waste management, rather than special fees (UNEP 2018c, p. 146; Newman et al. 2015, 377 and 386). In Cyprus, the Cypriot Port Authority introduced an “indirect fee system”, charging all incoming ships – depending on their type – a fee of €14,84 to €111,22. for the right to dispose of waste. A total of 15,400 cubic meters of waste is collected yearly through this mechanism (MARLISCO no year).
Aside from the previously mentioned instruments, additional fee- or tax-related instruments with relevance to (plastic) waste reduction exist: penalties, liability schemes and tax exemptions.
Penalties on illegal disposal of plastic waste can function as means to deter such behaviour and – depending on the nature of the penalties – generate revenues for environmental protection or waste minimization policies. However, the effectiveness of penalties largely depends on the ability to identify the polluter and enforce the penalty. Studies in Australia and the Asia-Pacific Region have revealed a limited or conditional effectiveness of this economic instrument, mostly due to weak political support (Oosterhuis et al. 2014, pp. 49–50).
Liability schemes are an instrument aimed at shifting costs to remedy environmental damage to polluters. In terms of implementation, the enforcement of liability schemes might reveal challenging and complex as typically a direct link between the polluter and the damage caused must be established, which is not trivial. A prominent example related to marine pollution are liability schemes to cover oil incidents, which have also been formalized in multilateral conventions such as the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (Raubenheimer 2016, p. 78). Requiring a suitable legal system and strong operationalization capacity, liability schemes for marine litter are considered especially difficult in developing countries (ten Brink et al. 2009, p. 28). A long-term revenue generation to support a financial mechanism is unlikely to emerge from liability schemes.
Finally, tax exemptions or tax breaks for certain activities that contribute to reduce plastic pollution are considered key instruments for implementation. They might incentivize investments, for example in improved waste collection, better technologies and enhanced waste management processes and systems (UNEP 2019, p. 61). In Colombia for example, the government introduced subsidies for investments in landfills and grants tax exemptions to incentivize investments in recycling and energy generation through agricultural waste (OECD 2019, p. 104).
The mobilisation of financial resources to combat plastic pollution could be improved and expanded. This is not only desirable when governments start negotiations on and in a number of years might eventually adopt a global agreement on plastic pollution. It is desirable anyway against the backdrop of an escalating plastic pollution and the insufficient availability of financial resources to address what some describe as planetary threat or crisis. The lack of sufficient financial resources is seen by many as one of the biggest obstacles to an effective prevention of plastic pollution.
In general, this requires first and foremost strengthened efforts to mobilise significantly more public and private resources given that the finance needs for an effective combat of plastic pollution are considerable. The analysis of key finance needs and opportunities revealed four important overarching insights.
In a nutshell: in order to effectively prevent and reduce plastic pollution substantial public and private financial resources are needed for public and private actions and activities that target the entire plastics life cycle and that – in doing so – attempt to seize to the best extent possible the economic and social opportunities that a more sustainable and circular global plastics economy provides.
A global agreement on plastic pollution can essentially contribute to the mobilisation and delivery of public and private financial resources in two basic ways. On the one hand, governments can decide to adopt and implement a political and legislative framework that directly or indirectly stimulates private investment into more circular approaches in the plastics value chain and domestic provisions of financial resources for the combat of plastic pollution. On the other hand, governments can decide on supporting measures that assists countries in mobilising and delivering financial resources to necessary public and private investments.
Such financial support require several decisions on different options that exist with regard to their basic functions, their administration and governance, the form of contributions, the range of activities that will be funded, the form of financial support and the interface with related bi- and multilateral ODA. For some decisions the analysis led to relatively clear-cut conclusions on the best choices:
For other decisions no single option generally and clearly outperforms any of the other options. As regards the administration and governance of financial support, decisions are less straightforward since each option involves advantages, disadvantages, trade-offs and obstacles on different dimensions. Here decisions depend on political priorities and goals:
Each of these options might be combined with another in order to realise the benefits of both and balance related disadvantages.
As regards the form of contributions, decisions are also less straightforward and depend on political priorities and goals:
In principle, mandatory and voluntary contributions might be combined in order to realise the benefits of both and balance related disadvantages.
As regards the interface of financial support under the agreement with bi- and multilateral ODA, governments can incentivise bilateral ODA from developed countries by accepting a certain share of bilateral ODA as contribution to its financial support and/ or facilitate access to and use of already existing (or future) funds that bi- and multilateral donors provide through the coordination function of the financial support.
The adoption and implementation of a political and legislative framework that directly or indirectly stimulates the domestic provision of financial resources for the combat of plastic pollution requires two basic decisions.
On the one hand, governments need to decide which policies and instruments they want to use how in order to mobilise the domestic provision of financial resources. In principle, there is a wide array of regulatory, market-based and informational instruments that can be used, including EPR schemes, bans, caps, targets, standards, taxes or tax exemptions, fees, levies, penalties charges, liability schemes, information campaigns, education. They might be used to target a wide variety of actors and challenges across the plastics life cycle. From the discussion of the various instruments, three overarching insights emerged that might guide these decisions.
First and in general, rather a well-coordinated policy and instrument mix is needed than a single policy or instrument. Even EPR schemes, which feature as one of the most prominent instruments in any discussion on how to best prevent and reduce plastic pollution, need to be accompanied by supporting policies.
Second, policies and instruments that have impacts on the processes at the end-of-life or downstream stage of plastics need to ensure effective plastic waste management strategies and infrastructure.
Third, any decision on policies and instruments needs
On the other hand, governments need to decide how to foster the adoption and implementation of (some of) these policies and instruments in the context of a global agreement on plastic pollution. Here, governments have three basic options:
Improving and strengthening the financial architecture and increasing the availability of financial resources in the combat of plastic pollution is thus by no means an easy task. It requires a high number of complex decisions and often involves high political stakes.
Abbott, Joshua K.; Sumaila, U. Rashid (2019): Reducing Marine Plastic Pollution: Policy Insights from Economics. In Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 13 (2), pp. 327–336. DOI: 10.1093/reep/rez007.
ADEME (Agence de la transition écologique) (2018): Benchmark of pay as you throw practices for waste management. With assistance of Frédéric Michel, Simon Standaert, Tom Huppertz. Edited by Agence de la transition écologique (ADEME). Available online at https://www.rdcenvironment.be/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/benchmark-pay-throw-practices-2018-synthesis_en.pdf, checked on 12/22/2021.
Alpizar, F.; Carlsson, F.; Lanza, G.; Carney, B.; Daniels, R. C.; Jaime, M. et al. (2020): A framework for selecting and designing policies to reduce marine plastic pollution in developing countries. In Environmental Science & Policy 109, pp. 25–35. DOI: 10.1016/j.envsci.2020.04.007.
Barra, Ricardo; Leonard, Sunday A. (2018): Plastics and the circular economy. A STAP document. Edited by Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel to the Global Environment Facility (STAP). Available online at https://stapgef.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/PLASTICS%20for%20posting.pdf?null=, checked on 7/14/2021.
BMU (Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Protection and Nuclear Safety) (2021a): Ministerial Statement. Adopted at Ministerial Conference on Marine Litter and Plastic Pollution. Available online at https://ministerialconferenceonmarinelitter.com/.cm4all/uproc.php/0/Ministerial%20Statement_final.pdf?cdp=a&_=17ba5ef76c1.
Borrelle, Stephanie B.; Rochman, Chelsea M.; Liboiron, Max; Bond, Alexander L.; Lusher, Amy; Bradshaw, Hillary; Provencher, Jennifer F. (2017): Opinion: Why we need an international agreement on marine plastic pollution. In Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 114 (38), pp. 9994–9997. DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1714450114.
Bucknall, David G. (2020): Plastics as a materials system in a circular economy. In Philosophical transactions. Series A, Mathematical, physical, and engineering sciences 378 (2176), p. 20190268. DOI: 10.1098/rsta.2019.0268.
Busch, Per-Olof; Schulte, Maro Luisa; Simon, Nils (2021): Strengthening the Global Science and Knowledge Base to Reduce (Marine) Plastic Pollution. Edited by Nordic Council of Ministers. Copenhagen, Denmark (TemaNord, 2021:519). Available online at https://pub.norden.org/temanord2021-519/temanord2021-519.pdf.
CBI (Climate Bonds Initiative) (2021): Climate investment opportunities. Climate-aligned bonds & issuers. Available online at https://www.climatebonds.net/files/reports/cbi_climate-aligned_bonds_issuers_2020.pdf, checked on 8/2/2021.
CIEL (Center for International Environmental Law) (2019): Plastic & Climate. The hidden costs of a plastic planet. Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL). Available online at https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Plastic-and-Climate-FINAL-2019.pdf, checked on 12/22/2021.
Convery, Frank; McDonnell, Simon; Ferreira, Susana (2007): The most popular tax in Europe? Lessons from the Irish plastic bags levy. In Environmental and Resource Economics 38 (1), pp. 1–11. DOI: 10.1007/s10640-006-9059-2.
Cornago, Elisabetta; Börkey, Peter; Brown, Andrew (2021): Preventing single-use plastic waste. Implications of different policy approaches. Edited by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (OECD Environment Working Paper, No. 182). Available online at https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/environment/preventing-single-use-plastic-waste_c62069e7-en, checked on 12/22/2021.
Cowan, Emily; Tiller, Rachel (2021): What Shall We Do With a Sea of Plastics? A Systematic Literature Review on How to Pave the Road Toward a Global Comprehensive Plastic Governance Agreement. In Frontiers in Marine Science 8. DOI: 10.3389/fmars.2021.798534.
Dijkgraaf, Elbert; Gradus, Raymond (2020): Post-collection Separation of Plastic Waste: Better for the Environment and Lower Collection Costs? In Environ Resource Econ 77 (1), pp. 127–142. DOI: 10.1007/s10640-020-00457-6.
Dikgang, Johane; Leiman, Anthony; Visser, Martine (2012): Analysis of the plastic-bag levy in South Africa. In Resources, Conservation and Recycling 66, pp. 59–65. DOI: 10.1016/j.resconrec.2012.06.009.
DPER (Department of Public Expenditure and Reform) (2017): Spending Review 2017. Environment Fund. Edited by Irish Government Economic & Evaluation Service (IGEES). Available online at https://igees.gov.ie/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Environment-Fund.pdf, checked on 12/22/2021.
EEA (European Environment Agency) (2020): Plastic, the circular economy and Europe’s environment. A priority of action (EEA Report, No. 18/2020). Available online at https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/plastics-the-circular-economy-and/download, checked on 5/31/2021.
EIA (Environmental Investigation Agency) ; CIEL (Center for International Environmental Law) ; GAIA (Global Anti-Incinerator Alliance) (2020): Convention on Plastic Pollution. Toward a new global agreement to address plastic pollution. Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL). Available online at https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Convention-on-Plastic-Pollution-June-2020-Single-Pages.pdf, checked on 7/7/2020.
Eisen, Nathaniel; Azoulay, David; DiGangi, Jo (2020): Financing the sound management of chemicals beyond 2020: options for a coordinated tax. Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL); International Pollutants Elimination Network (IPEN). Available online at https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/ipen-ciel-producer-responsibility-vf1_9e-web-en.pdf, checked on 5/26/2021.
EMF (The Ellen MacArthur Foundation) (2017): The new plastics economy. Rethinking the future of plastics and catalysing action. The Ellen MacArthur Foundation (EMF).
___ (Ed.) (2020): UN Treaty. We call for UN member states to commit to the development of a UN treaty on plastic. Available online at https://www.plasticpollutiontreaty.org, checked on 10/14/2020.
___ (2021): Extended Producer Responsibility - a necessary part of the solution to the packaging waste and pollution. A statement by key stakeholders from across the packaging value chain and a position paper of the Ellen MacArthur Foundation. Edited by The Ellen MacArthur Foundation (EMF). Available online at https://emf.thirdlight.com/link/cp8djae8ittk-xo55up/@/download/1, checked on 12/22/2021.
Eriksen, Henrik Hallgrim; Perrez, Franz Xaver (2014): The Minamata Convention: A Comprehensive Response to a Global Problem. In RECIEL 23 (2), pp. 195–210. DOI: 10.1111/reel.12079.
Forrest, Andrew; Giacovazzi, Luca; Dunlop, Sarah; Reisser, Julia; Tickler, David; Jamieson, Alan; Meeuwig, Jessica J. (2019): Eliminating Plastic Pollution: How a Voluntary Contribution From Industry Will Drive the Circular Plastics Economy. In Front. Mar. Sci. 6. DOI: 10.3389/fmars.2019.00627.
GCF (Green Climate Fund) (2015): Initial Investment framework: activity-specific sub-criteria and indicative assessment factors. Available online at https://www.greenclimate.fund/sites/default/files/document/investment-framework-criteria-assessment.pdf, checked on 8/2/2021.
___ (2018): Mapping of elements related to project or programme eligibility and selection criteria. GCF/B.21/Inf.02. Available online at https://www.greenclimate.fund/sites/default/files/document/gcf-b21-inf02.pdf, checked on 8/2/2021.
___ (2019): Green Climate Fund’s Private Sector Facility. Available online at https://www.greenclimate.fund/sites/default/files/document/green-climate-fund-s-private-sector-facility_0.pdf, checked on 8/2/2021.
___ (2021): GCF in brief. Available online at https://www.greenclimate.fund/sites/default/files/document/gcf-brief-private-sector_4.pdf, checked on 8/2/2021.
GEF (Global Environment Facility) (2019): Advances in blended finance. GEF’s solutions to protect the global environment. Available online at https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/publications/gef_advances_blended_finance_201911_0.pdf, checked on 8/2/2021.
___ (2020): Guide for Understanding and Accessing Blended Finance at the Global Environment Facility. Available online at https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/publications/GEF_Guide_Understanding_Accessing_Blended_Finance_2020.pdf, checked on 8/2/2021.
___ (2021): Eighth GEF replenishment. Overview of financial structure (prepared by teh Trustee). GEF/R.8/04. Available online at https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/council-meeting-documents/GEF%208%20First%20Meeting%20Financial%20Structure%20Note.pdf, checked on 7/31/2021.
Gold, Mark; Mika, Katie; Horowitz, Cara; Herzog, Megan; Leitner, Lara (2013): Stemming the Tide of Plastic Marine Litter: A Global Action Agenda. Emmet Center on Climate Change and the Environment (Pritzker Environmental Law and Policy Briefs, No. 5). Available online at https://escholarship.org/content/qt6j74k1j3/qt6j74k1j3.pdf?t=qen0eb, checked on 8/12/2020.
Governments of Peru and Rwanda (2021): Draft resolution on an internationally legally binding instrument on plastic pollution. Available online at https://ministerialconferenceonmarinelitter.com/.cm4all/uproc.php/0/UNEA5.2%20Global_Agreement_.pdf?cdp=a&_=17ba640bc3b, checked on 11/19/2021.
Hundertmark, Thomas; Mayer, Mirjam; Mcnally, Chris; Simons, Theo Jan; Witte, Christof (2018): How plastics waste recycling could transform the chemical industry. In McKinsey & Company, 12/12/2018. Available online at https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/chemicals/our-insights/how-plastics-waste-recycling-could-transform-the-chemical-industry, checked on 11/19/2021.
IRP (International Resource Panel) (2021): Policy Options to Eliminate Additional Marine Plastic Litter by 2050 under the G20 Osaka Blue Ocean Vision. Edited by United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Available online at https://www.resourcepanel.org/file/2367/download?token=s2hSrt44, checked on 8/1/2021.
IUCN (International Union for Conservation of Nature) (2020): Stopping the global plastic pollution crisis in marine environments by 2030. Decision 022 of the IUCN World Conversation Congress. Available online at https://www.iucncongress2020.org/motion/022, checked on 3/4/2021.
Johannes, Hendro Putra; Kojima, Michikazu; Iwasaki, Fusanori; Edita, Ellen Putri (2021): Applying the extended producer responsibility towards plastic waste in Asian developing countries for reducing marine plastic debris. In Waste management & research : the journal of the International Solid Wastes and Public Cleansing Association, ISWA 39 (5), pp. 690–702. DOI: 10.1177/0734242X211013412.
Kakadellis, Sarah; Rosetto, Gloria (2021): Achieving a circular bioeconomy for plastics. In Science 373 (6550), pp. 49–50. DOI: 10.1126/science.abj3476.
Karasik, Rachel; Vegh, Tibor; Diana, Zoie; Bering, Janet; Caldas, Juan; Pickle, Amy (2020): 20 Years of Government Responses to the Global Plastic Pollution Problem. The Plastics Policy Inventory. Edited by Duke University Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions. Available online at https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/20-Years-of-Government-Responses-to-the-Global-Plastic-Pollution-Problem-New_1.pdf, checked on 12/22/2021.
Leal Filho, Walter; Saari, Ulla; Fedoruk, Mariia; Iital, Arvo; Moora, Harri; Klöga, Marija; Voronova, Viktoria (2019): An overview of the problems posed by plastic products and the role of extended producer responsibility in Europe. In Journal of Cleaner Production 214, pp. 550–558. DOI: 10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.12.256.
MacLeod, Matthew; Arp, Hans Peter H.; Tekman, Mine B.; Jahnke, Annika (2021): The global threat from plastic pollution. In Science 373 (6550), pp. 61–65. DOI: 10.1126/science.abg5433.
MARLISCO (Marine Litter in European Seas - Social Awareness and Co-Responsibility) (no year): Indirect Fee System for the Collection of Ship Waste in Cyprus (Cyprus). Available online at https://www.marlisco.eu/Indirect_fee_system_for_the_collection_of_ship_waste_in_Cyprus.en.html?articles=indirect-fee-system-for-the-collection-of-ship-waste-in-cyprus-cyprus, checked on 12/22/2021.
Martinho, Graça; Balaia, Natacha; Pires, Ana (2017): The Portuguese plastic carrier bag tax: The effects on consumers’ behavior. In Waste management (New York, N.Y.) 61, pp. 3–12. DOI: 10.1016/j.wasman.2017.01.023.
Matz, Nele (2002): Environmental Financing: Function and Coherence of Financial Mechanisms in International Environmental Agreements. In Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Online 6 (1), pp. 473–528. DOI: 10.1163/138946302775159361.
Mazhandu, Zvanaka S.; Muzenda, Edison; Mamvura, Tirivaviri A.; Belaid, Mohamed; Nhubu, Trust (2020): Integrated and Consolidated Review of Plastic Waste Management and Bio-Based Biodegradable Plastics: Challenges and Opportunities. In Sustainability 12 (20), p. 8360. DOI: 10.3390/su12208360.
Newman, Stephanie; Watkins, Emma; Farmer, Andrew; Brink, Patrick ten; Schweitzer, Jean-Pierre (2015): The Economics of Marine Litter. In Melanie Bergmann, Lars Gutow, Michael Klages (Eds.): Marine Anthropogenic Litter. Aufl. 2015. Cham: Springer International Publishing, pp. 367–394.
Ocean Conservancy and McKinsey (2015): Stemming the Tide - Land-based strategies for a plastic-free ocean. Ocean Conservancy; McKinsey.
Ocean Conservancy and McKinsey Center for Business and Environment (2015): Stemming the tide: land-based strategies for a plastic-free ocean. Ocean Conservancy. Available online at https://oceanconservancy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/full-report-stemming-the.pdf, checked on 5/26/2021.
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) (2014): The State of Play on Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR): Opportunities and Challenges. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Available online at https://www.oecd.org/environment/waste/Global%20Forum%20Tokyo%20Issues%20Paper%2030-5-2014.pdf, checked on 12/22/2021.
___ (2018): Improving Plastics Management: Trends, policy responses, and the role of international co-operation and trade. Edited by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (OECD Environment Policy Papers, No. 12). Available online at https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/environment/improving-plastics-management_c5f7c448-en, checked on 12/22/2021.
___ (2019): Waste management and the circular economy in selected OECD countries. Evidence from environmental performance reviews. Paris (OECD Environmental Performance Reviews).
Oosterhuis, Frans; Papyrakis, Elissaios; Boteler, Benjamin (2014): Economic instruments and marine litter control. In Ocean & Coastal Management 102, pp. 47–54. DOI: 10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2014.08.005.
PEW (The PEW Charitable Trust) (2020): Breaking the plastic wave. A comprehensive assessment of pathways towards stopping ocean plastic pollution. The PEW Charitable Trust. Available online at https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/mediaassets/2020/07/breakingtheplasticwave_report.pdf, checked on 8/10/2020.
Prata, Joana C.; Silva, Ana L. Patrício; Da Costa, João P.; Mouneyrac, Catherine; Walker, Tony R.; Duarte, Armando C.; Rocha-Santos, Teresa (2019): Solutions and Integrated Strategies for the Control and Mitigation of Plastic and Microplastic Pollution. In International journal of environmental research and public health 16 (13). DOI: 10.3390/ijerph16132411.
Raubenheimer, Karen (2016): Towards an improved framework to prevent marine plastic debris. Doctor of Philosophy Thesis. Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS), University of Wollongong. Available online at https://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5747&context=theses, checked on 7/20/2021.
Raubenheimer, Karen; McIlgorm, Alistair (2017): Is the Montreal Protocol a model that can help solve the global marine plastic debris problem? In Marine Policy 81 (July), pp. 322–329. DOI: 10.1016/j.marpol.2017.04.014.
Raubenheimer, Karen; Urho, Niko (2020a): Possible elements of a new global agreement to prevent plastic pollution. Nordic Council of Ministers. Copenhagen, Denmark (TemaNord, 2020, 535). Available online at https://pub.norden.org/temanord2020-535/temanord2020-535.pdf, checked on 11/3/2020.
___ (2020b): Rethinking global governance of plastics – The role of industry. In Marine Policy 113, p. 103802. DOI: 10.1016/j.marpol.2019.103802.
Rochette, Julien; Schumm, Romain; Wrigth, Glenn; Cremers, Klaudija (2020): Combatting marine plastic litter: state of play and perspectives. Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations (iddri) (Study, N° 3/20). Available online at https://www.iddri.org/sites/default/filestemanord2022-514.pdfPublications/Catalogue%20Iddri/Etude/202006-ST0320-plastic%20marine%20envt_0.pdf, updated on 6/9/2020, checked on 6/9/2020.
Rognerud, Idun; Steindal, Eirik Hovland; Kumar, Nandini; Tartiu, Valentina Elena (2022): International Sustainability Criteria for Plastic Products in a Global Agreement on Plastic Pollution. 4th Nordic Report. Edited by Nordic Council of Ministers. Copenhagen, Denmark. Available online at https://pub.norden.org/temanord2022-509/.
Simon, Nils; Knoblauch, Doris; Mederake, Linda; McGlade, Katriona; Schulte, Maro Luisa; Masali, Supriya (2018): No more Plastics in the Ocean. Gaps in Global Plastic Governance and Options for a Legally Binding Agreement to Eliminate Marine Plastic Pollution. Edited by ecologic, adelphi (Discussion Paper).
Simon, Nils; Raubenheimer, Karen; Urho, Niko; Unger, Sebastian; Azoulay, David; Farrelly, Trisia et al. (2021): A binding global agreement to address the life cycle of plastics. In Science 373 (6550), pp. 43–47. DOI: 10.1126/science.abi9010.
Simon, Nils; Schulte, Maro Luisa (2017): Stopping Global Plastic Pollution: The Case for an International Convention. Edited by Heinrich Böll Stiftung (HBS) (Publication Series Ecology, Volume 43). Available online at https://www.adelphi.de/de/system/files/mediathek/bilder/Stopping-Global-Plastic-Pollution%20-%20Heinrich-B%C3%B6ll-Stiftung_adelphi.pdf, checked on 7/8/2020.
Smet, Michiel de; Linder, Mats (Eds.) (2019): A circular economy for plastics. Insights from research and innovation to inform policy and funding decisions. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.
Statista (2021): Market size of plastics worldwide from 2016 to 2028. Edited by Statista. Available online at https://www.statista.com/statistics/1060583/global-market-value-of-plastic/, updated on 6/24/2021, checked on 12/22/2021.
ten Brink, Patrick; Lutchman, I.; Bassi, S.; Speck, S.; Sheavly, S.; (Register, K., Woolaway, C.) (2009): Guidelines on the Use of Market-based Instruments to Address the Problem of Marine Litter. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Available online at https://ieep.eu/uploads/articles/attachments/6860075f-491a-4206-91ac-2c2805a6b1a3/Economic_Instruments_and_Marine_Litter.pdf?v=63664509718, checked on 9/30/2020.
Tessnow-von Wysocki, Ina; Le Billon, Philippe (2019): Plastics at sea: Treaty design for a global solution to marine plastic pollution. In Environmental Science & Policy 100 (October), pp. 94–104. DOI: 10.1016/j.envsci.2019.06.005.
Trucost (2016): Plastics and Sustainability. A Valuation of Environmental Benefits, Costs and Opportunities for Continuous Improvement. Edited by American Chemistry Council. Available online at https://plastics.americanchemistry.com/Plastics-and-Sustainability.pdf, checked on 7/28/2021.
U.S. Department of State (2021): Secretary Antony J. Blinken at an Ocean Plastics Event. Available online at https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-an-ocean-plastics-event/, checked on 11/19/2021.
UK Government (Government of the United Kingdom) (2021): Introduction of Plastic Packaging Tax from April 2022. Policy Paper. Edited by Government of the United Kingdom (UK Government). Available online at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/introduction-of-plastic-packaging-tax-from-april-2022/introduction-of-plastic-packaging-tax-2021, updated on 7/20/2021, checked on 12/22/2021.
UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) (2020): Growing plastic pollution in wake of COVID-19: how trade policy can help. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Available online at https://unctad.org/en/pages/newsdetails.aspx?OriginalVersionID=2440, checked on 8/13/2020.
UNEA (United Nations Environment Assembly) (2020): Chair’s summary of the work of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Expert Group on Marine Litter and Microplastics s for consideration by the United Nations Environment Assembly at its fifth session. Available online at https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/34635/K2100061.pdf?sequence=11&isAllowed=y, checked on 5/26/2021.
UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme) (1995): Financial rules for the administration of the Trust Fund for the Convention on Biological Diversity. UNEP/CBD/COP/1/17. Available online at https://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-01/cop-01-dec-06-en.pdf, checked on 7/30/2021.
___ (2005): Study of possible options for lasting and sustainable financial mechanisms. Note by the secretariat. UNEP/FAO/RC/COP.2/10. Available online at https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/RotterdamStudy_Secretariat_May2005.pdf, checked on 7/30/2021.
___ (2010): Options for predictable and efficient financial assistance arrangements. Note by the secretariat. UNEP(DTIE)/Hg/INC.1/8. Available online at http://www.mercuryconvention.org/Portals/11/documents/meetings/inc1/English/INC1_8_financial_assistance.pdf, checked on 7/31/2021.
___ (2011a): Further comparative analysis of options for financial mechanisms to support the global legally binding instrument on mercury. Note by the secretariat. UNEP(DTIE)/Hg/INC.3/4. Available online at http://www.mercuryconvention.org/Portals/11/documents/meetings/inc3/English/3_4_c_Further_comparative_analysis_of_options_for_financial_mechanisms.pdf, checked on 7/31/2021.
___ (2011b): Financial rules for the Conference of the Parties, its subsidiary bodies and the Secretariat of the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal. UNEP/CHW.10/28. Financial rules. Decision BC-10/28. Available online at http://www.basel.int/Portals/4/download.aspx?d=UNEP-CHW-COP.10-BC-10-28.English.pdf, checked on 7/30/2021.
___ (2014a): Valuing plastics. The business case for measuring, managing and disclosing plastic use in the consumer goods industry. Nairobi, Kenya. Available online at http://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/9238/-Valuing%20plastic%3a%20the%20business%20case%20for%20measuring%2c%20managing%20and%20disclosing%20plastic%20use%20in%20the%20consumer%20goods%20industry-2014Valuing%20plasticsF.pdf?sequence=8&isAllowed=y, checked on 8/13/2020.
___ (2014b): Marine plastic debris and microplastics. Resolution adopted by the United Nations Environment Assembly on 27 June 2014. UNEP/EA.1/Res.6. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).
___ (2016): Marine plastic debris and microplastics. Global lessons and research to inspire action and guide policy change. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Nairobi, Kenya. Available online at https://plasticoceans.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/UNEP-research.pdf, checked on 6/2/2020.
___ (2017a): Marine litter. Socio-economic study. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Available online at https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/26014/Marinelitter_socioeco_study.pdf?sequence, checked on 3/5/2021.
___ (2017b): Financial rules for the Conference of the Parties to the Minamata Convention on Mercury and any of its subsidiary bodies, as well as financial provisions governing the functioning of the secretariat. UNEP/MC/COP.1/Dec.10. Available online at https://www.mercuryconvention.org/Portals/11/documents/Decisions/COP1/UNEP-MC-COP1-Dec10-FinancialRules.EN.pdf, checked on 7/30/2021.
___ (2018a): Legal Limits on Single-Use Plastics and Microplastics : A Global Review of National Laws and Regulations. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Nairobi, Kenya. Available online at http://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/27113/plastics_limits.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, checked on 12/22/2021.
___ (2018b): Combating marine plastic litter and microplastics: an assessment of the effectiveness of relevant international, regional and subregional governance strategies and approaches. UNEP/AHEG/2018/1/INF/3. Nairobi, Kenya. Available online at https://papersmart.unon.org/resolution/uploads/unep_aheg_2018_inf3_full_assessment_en.pdf, checked on 7/8/2020.
___ (2018c): Marine plastic debris and microplastics: global lessons and research to inspire action and guide policy change. Note by the secretariat. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Available online at https://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-01/cop-01-dec-06-en.pdf, checked on 9/28/2020.
___ (2019): Addressing Marine Plastics: A Systemic Approach. Recommendations for action. Edited by Philippa Notten. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).
___ (2020a): Summary of the analysis of the effectiveness of existing and potential response options and activities on marine litter and microplastics at all levels to determine the contribution in solving the global problem**. Note by the Secretariat. UNEP/AHEG/4/4. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Available online at https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/35933/UNEP%20AHEG%204%204%20English%2028%20Sept%202020.PDF?sequence=12&isAllowed=y, checked on 10/7/2020.
___ (2020b): Report on the inventory of technical and financial resources or mechanisms for supporting countries in addressing marine plastic litter and microplastics. Note by the Secretariat. UNEP/AHEG/4/INF/7.
___ (2021): From Pollution to Solution: a global assessment of marine litter and plastic pollution. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Available online at https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/36963/POLSOL.pdf, checked on 11/19/2021.
UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) (1995): Report of the Conference of the Parties on its first session, held at Berlin from 28 March to 7 April 1995. Addendum. Part two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its first session. FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1. Financial procedures. Decision 15/CP.1. Available online at https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop1/07a01.pdf#page=44.
UNGA (United Nations General Assembly) (2017): Oceans and the law of the sea. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 23 December 2016. A/RES/71/257. United Nations (UN). Available online at https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/71/257, checked on 8/25/2020.
UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development Organization) (2019): Addressing the challenge of Marine Plastic Litter using Circular Economy methods. Relevant considerations. United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). Vienna, Austria. Available online at https://www.unido.org/sites/default/files/files/2019-06/UNIDO_Addressing_the_challenge_of_Marine_Plastic_Litter_Using_Circular_Economy_0.pdf, checked on 9/29/2020.
Valpak (2021): Extended Producer Responsibility. What you need to know. Edited by Valpak. Available online at https://www.valpak.co.uk/epr-ready/packaging/packaging-epr-white-paper, checked on 12/22/2021.
Watkins, Emma; Gionfra, Susanna; Schweitzer, Jean-Pierre; Pantzar, Mia; Janssens, Charlotte; ten Brink, Patrick (2017): EPR in the EU Plastics Strategy and the Circular Economy. A focus on plastic packaging. Edited by Institute for European Environmental Policy (IEEP). Available online at https://ieep.eu/uploads/articles/attachments/95369718-a733-473b-aa6b-153c1341f581/EPR%20and%20plastics%20report%20IEEP%209%20Nov%202017%20final.pdf, checked on 12/22/2021.
Watkins, Emma; Schweitzer, Jean-Pierre; Leinala, Eeva; Börkey, Peter (2019): Policy approaches to incentivise sustainable plastic design. Paris (OECD Environment Working Paper, 149). Available online at https://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=ENV/WKP(2019)8&docLanguage=En, checked on 3/8/2021.
WEF (World Economic Forum) (2020): Plastics, the Circular Economy and Global Trade. World Economic Forum (WEF) (White Paper). Available online at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Plastics_the_Circular_Economy_and_Global_Trade_2020.pdf, checked on 8/27/2020.
WHO (World Health Organization) (2003): Financial arrangements for convention secretariats during the interim period and on a permanent basis: precedents in multilateral environmental agreements. Report by the Secretariat. A/FCTC/INB6/INF.DOC./3. Available online at https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/75500/einb6id3.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, checked on 5/27/2021.
WTO (World Trade Organization) (2020): Communication on trade in plastics, sustainability and development by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). JOB/TE/63. Available online at https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/Jobs/TE/63.pdf&Open=True, checked on 7/28/2021.
WWF (World Wildlife Fund for Nature) (2019a): Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) for Plastic Packaging. Position Paper - WWF Network. Edited by World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF). Available online at https://wwfeu.awsassets.panda.org/downloads/wwf_epr_position_paper.pdf, checked on 12/22/2021.
___ (2019b): Momentum building behind global treaty to combat marine plastic pollution. Available online at https://wwf.panda.org/wwf_news/press_releases/?354810/Momentum-building-behind-global-treaty-to-combat-marine-plastic-pollution, updated on 10/19/2019, checked on 10/14/2020.
___ (2020): 15 Basic Principles. Establishing an effective extended producer responsibility (EPR) scheme for packaging. Edited by World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF). Available online at https://wwfint.awsassets.panda.org/downloads/wwf_15_basic_principles_2020_final_with_layout_1130.pdf, checked on 12/22/2021.
___ (2021): Global Plastic Navigator. Available online at https://plasticnavigator.wwf.de/#/en/policy/?st=0&ch=0&layers=surface-concentration%7Cpolicy-commitments-area&info=policy-commitments-area, updated on 12/10/2021, checked on 12/22/2021.
WWF (World Wildlife Fund for Nature) ; EMF (The Ellen MacArthur Foundation) ; BCG (Boston Consulting Group) (2020): The business case for a UN treaty on plastic pollution. Available online at https://www.plasticpollutiontreaty.org/UN_treaty_plastic_poll_report.pdf.
WWF (World Wildlife Fund for Nature) ; IEEP (Institute for European Environmental Policy) (2020): How to implement Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR). A briefing for governments and businesses. Edited by World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF). Available online at https://wwfint.awsassets.panda.org/downloads/how_to_implement_epr___briefing_for_government_and_business.pdf, checked on 12/22/2021.
Per-Olof Busch, Maro Luisa Schulte, Florian Wintermeyer
ISBN 978-92-893-7275-6 (PDF)
ISBN 978-92-893-7276-3 (ONLINE)
http://dx.doi.org/10.6027/temanord2022-514
TemaNord 2022:514
ISSN 0908-6692
© Nordic Council of Ministers 2022
Cover photo: Adobe Stock
Published: 9/2/2022
This publication was funded by the Nordic Council of Ministers. However, the content does not necessarily reflect the Nordic Council of Ministers’ views, opinions, attitudes or recommendations.
This work is made available under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (CC BY 4.0) https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0.
Translations: If you translate this work, please include the following disclaimer: This translation was not produced by the Nordic Council of Ministers and should not be construed as official. The Nordic Council of Ministers cannot be held responsible for the translation or any errors in it.
Adaptations: If you adapt this work, please include the following disclaimer along with the attribution: This is an adaptation of an original work by the Nordic Council of Ministers. Responsibility for the views and opinions expressed in the adaptation rests solely with its author(s). The views and opinions in this adaptation have not been approved by the Nordic Council of Ministers.
Third-party content: The Nordic Council of Ministers does not necessarily own every single part of this work. The Nordic Council of Ministers cannot, therefore, guarantee that the reuse of third-party content does not infringe the copyright of the third party. If you wish to reuse any third-party content, you bear the risks associated with any such rights violations. You are responsible for determining whether there is a need to obtain permission for the use of third-party content, and if so, for obtaining the relevant permission from the copyright holder. Examples of third-party content may include, but are not limited to, tables, figures or images.
Photo rights (further permission required for reuse):
Any queries regarding rights and licences should be addressed to:
Nordic Council of Ministers/Publication Unit
Ved Stranden 18
DK-1061 Copenhagen
Denmark
pub@norden.org
Nordic co-operation is one of the world’s most extensive forms of regional collaboration, involving Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and the Faroe Islands, Greenland and Åland.
Nordic co-operation has firm traditions in politics, economics and culture and plays an important role in European and international forums. The Nordic community strives for a strong Nordic Region in a strong Europe.
Nordic co-operation promotes regional interests and values in a global world. The values shared by the Nordic countries help make the region one of the most innovative and competitive in the world.
The Nordic Council of Ministers
Nordens Hus
Ved Stranden 18
DK-1061 Copenhagen
pub@norden.org
Read more Nordic publications on www.norden.org/publications